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Following the discovery of the DNA double helix in 1953, concepts of genetic code and 
program emerged to redefine life. A range of complementary assumptions—about the 
cryptographic behavior of language, the transcriptional nature of creative writing, and the 
mechanistic constitution of the human organism—buttressed this new, textual explanation for 
living beings. In this dissertation, I analyze how the 1960s novels of three writers—Ken Kesey’s 
One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, John Barth’s Giles Goat-Boy, and the detective novels of 
Chester Himes—respond to this epistemic shift within the life sciences. While the loudly-
heralded “genomic book of life” written in the double helix appeared to co-opt the novel’s age-
old endeavor  to describe life, it also proved a compelling invitation to writers who could 
reconceive these molecular metaphors as compositional resources.  
Drawing on intellectual histories of the post-WWII life sciences to establish the heavily 
rhetorical character of this episode in biology, I demonstrate how Kesey, Barth, and Himes 
mobilized biological metaphors to dual purpose. By employing these new concepts to parody the 
anachronistic organic logics of literary criticism, they challenged received notions of literary 
form. Simultaneously, they harnessed the truth-value of scientific metaphors in a complex 
speculative impulse, which, by taking the new biology’s claims literally, satirized the rhetorical 
bombast of scientific discourse while flaunting the period’s nostalgic literary-critical investments 
in the “Great American Novel.” Each text pursues post-DNA biological theory as theme and 
 
iv 
formal architecture, but ultimately arrives at a more fundamental reckoning with the poetics of 
literality that, at this historical juncture, worked to elide the distance between life and text. These 
analyses contribute to critical conversations around the Anthropocene, posthumanism, scale 
critique, biopolitics, and comparative methods for the interdisciplinary study of science and 
literature. They also promise to complicate dominant accounts of the postwar novel that have 
tended to minimize the contributions of 1960s writers, and to augment our understanding of the 
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INTRODUCTION: BOOKS OF LIFE: POST-DNA LIFE SCIENCE IN 1960S 
AMERICAN FICTION 
  
The “book of life” now is available for study by biological scholars the world over. For 
human DNA-genes represent the most important “book” in existence. Deciphering its 
“pages” is a quest for the ages. 
  —Irving Bengelsdorf, “Man Comes With an ‘Instruction Manual’” 
 
The novel is the one bright book of life. 
  —D.H. Lawrence, “Why the Novel Matters” 
 
 With James D. Watson and Francis H. C. Crick’s 1953 discovery of the DNA double 
helix, the semantics of life were transformed by a powerful, and powerfully contagious, new 
metaphor: the “genomic book of life” (Kay 3).1,2 This dissertation is my attempt to understand 
how American novelists responded to the introduction of this exceptional “book” to public 
discourse. To be more specific, I analyze how the 1960s novels of three writers—Ken Kesey, 
John Barth, and Chester Himes—constitute responses to the epistemic shift triggered by DNA’s 
discovery. The image of the double helix, in its structural semantics and implied functional logic, 
came to powerfully symbolize the new bio-theoretical regime, which had far-reaching 
implications. To wit: after DNA, genetic theory and popular discourse alike grounded new 
explanations of life in a range of complementary assumptions about the behavior of language 
                                                             
1Watson and Crick first announced their discovery in their 1953 Nature article, “Molecular Structure of Nucleic 
Acids: A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid.” As the article makes clear, DNA was already understood to be 
the seat of biological mechanisms for inheritance. But its molecular structure had not yet, in 1953, been ascertained; 
it was the “novel features” of Watson and Crick’s double-helix proposal that were of “considerable biological 
interest . . . immediately suggest[ing] a possible copying mechanism for the genetic material” (737).   
 
2In referring to the “genomic book of life,” I am throughout following Lily Kay’s use of the phrase to denote “the 
metaphor of transcendent writing [that] acquired new, seemingly scientifically legitimate meaning” during the 
period of the “conceptualization, breaking, and completion of the genetic code, 1953-67” (3)—though, as I will 
demonstrate, I find “metaphor” insufficient to describe the emphatic reification that the concept received in the 




(cryptographic), the creative act of writing (transcriptional), and the (mechanistic) constitution of 
the embodied self. Crowded by a literally de-scriptive text that was rapidly transforming our 
scientific understanding of life as such, writers of American fiction found that their perennial 
subject had become a moving, and proliferating, target. What, then, do these new theories 
portend for the novel, privileged by D. H. Lawrence among literary forms for its proximity to 
life, its “instinct for life,” and its ability to “set [the reader] trembling with life and the wisdom of 
life” (198, 194), when life itself changes meaning?3 In this project, I offer three case-studies that 
map several avenues of response to this historically specific proximity of life and text. Seizing 
first on the thematic currency of new biological concepts, the novels I analyze ultimately pursue 
post-DNA metaphorics to dual purpose: as a formal emancipation from received theories of the 
well-constructed novel on one hand; and as immanent linguistic critiques of the new 
biotheoretical regime itself, colloquial scientific speculations offered in response to DNA’s 
synonymization of the vital and the textual. 
The genomic book of life became popular during a period of skepticism among literary 
critics, who doubted the descriptive adequacy of the novel to postwar social life, its exigencies 
and its rhythms. Witness Susan Sontag’s scathing indictment, in 1964, of American novels as 
“the literary equivalent of program music . . . [formally] rudimentary, uninspired, and stagnant” 
(10-11). It was a period of crisis for literature generally as a vehicle for humanist values, 
memorably summarized in Adorno’s famous dictum that “to write poetry after Auschwitz is 
barbaric” (34). But laments about the possibilities of the American novel in particular more often 
came from a position of outsized belief in the form, even from its critical “overvaluation” (Greif, 
Age 109). Rarefied by Cold War cultural politics, the ideological stakes for the genre’s success 
                                                             
3See especially my second chapter, third section for the longstanding double valence of the novel genre’s attachment 
to life, as at once the most faithful representation of life and its most effective engendering agent. 
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had rarely been higher. Lionel Trilling holds forth the novel form as “a kind of summary and 
paradigm of our cultural life,” believing it the agent most likely to “reconstitute” a postwar 
American will “dying of its own excess” (“Art” 266). But he worries that modern American 
literature is “essentially passive,” that it lacks an “an active reciprocal relation” to American life 
(“Meaning” 292-301). Despite calls for new, brave work from American novelists writing within 
a genre that was increasingly being asked to serve as a literary barometer of national virtue and 
character, public discourse about the novel was, on balance, conservative. Even critics urging 
novelty, like Sontag and Leslie Fiedler, were answering a stagnant literary scene that refused to 
renounce the “well-made novel” (Klinkowitz 19). Primarily concerned with what Mark Greif has 
termed “the work of the restoration of the human” (“Death” 15, emphasis in original), a majority 
of critical observers were looking for the novel to relive, or recreate, the past.4,5 
In the decades following World War II, amid this intellectually, politically, and morally 
freighted “American search for a ‘Great American Novel’” (Greif, Age 99), American readers 
were introduced to the concept of the genetic script as an exceptional text of another sort. “The 
description of man—as contained within the coded information carried by his DNA-genes . . . is 
                                                             
4For Greif, this was a response to an escalation in the stakes of novel criticism, not the state of novelistic production: 
in a Cold War context, Greif argues, critics made the novel a proxy for humanist values and its health a measure of 
American exceptionalism (“Death” 16). The feeling that the novel, specifically, would be the form to carry this 
geopolitical symbolism was neither arbitrary as a nomination nor disinterested as an instance of generic 
(re)inscription: in a circularly reinforcing fashion, the novel was first isolated for praise as the quintessential artistic 
expression of free-market individualism, that quality seen as foundational to American national character when 
contrasted to Soviet values. The novel then saw its generic virtues subtly reshaped according to its ideological 
success along the same lines. This tendentiousness is aptly dramatized in the canonizations of William Faulkner and 
Ernest Hemingway, who saw their bodies of work re-described in humanist terms in the fifties—and whose own 
subsequent careers (see, especially, Faulkner’s 1950 Nobel acceptance speech, “I Decline to Accept the End of 
Man,” and Hemingway’s 1952 novella, The Old Man and the Sea) moved to self-consciously embrace that 
humanism in ways that, in turn, lent strength to subsequent critical glosses (Greif, Age 116-22). 
 
5This nostalgic tendency of the 1960s literary field is nowhere more apparent than in the preservation and academic 
institutionalization of criteria of literary value rooted directly in scientifically anachronistic philosophies of 
organism—theories that had made their way into literary theory long ago, and were primed for re-emergence by the 
sociopolitical, nationalistic pressures exerted by Cold War culture. See my second chapter, third section for further 
analysis of how literary-critical conservatism betrays its pre-DNA life-science investments in both New-Critical 




about nine times the entire contents of the latest edition of the Encyclopaedia Brittanica!” 
exclaimed Los Angeles Times writer Irving Bergensdorf, in 1965 (16). One of many pop-science 
explications of the DNA double helix, Bergensdorf’s “Man Comes with an Instruction Manual” 
indexes the rhetorical consolidation of a metaphor over twenty years in the making.6 In 1943, 
Erwin Schrödinger famously argued the source of organic continuance was a “code-script” that 
could be found in “the structure of the chromosome fibres” (21).7 This supposition initiated the 
race to find “the Rosetta Stone for unraveling the true secret of life” (Watson 18); upon emerging 
victorious, Watson and Crick confirmed the textual analogy by describing their double helix 
model as “the code which carries . . . genetical information” (965). The subsequent decade saw 
an explosion of scientific activity that, in its theoretical elaboration of the text-genome analogy, 
was more akin to literary interpretation than to laboratory work.8 Concurrently, news of the 
discovery was making its way into the public consciousness; by the time of Bergensdorf’s article 
a decade later, the genomic “book of life” had become a ubiquitous turn of phrase, the scare 
                                                             
6Or, more accurately, remaking: the phrase “the book of life” in fact has religious roots dating back at least to 
Thomas Aquinas (Kay 31), roots which are, of course, emphatically carried forward in the genomic book’s scientific 
reiteration of the biblical account whereby “the Word became flesh and lived among us” (New Oxford Annotated 
Bible, John 1.14).  
 
7Schrödinger’s What is Life?, first published in 1944, took as its basis a series of lectures he delivered in early 1943 
at the Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies. Schrödinger’s speculations were rendered anachronistic almost 
immediately, in 1944, when Avery et al. definitively located DNA as the chemical site of the hereditary mechanism. 
Though it lacked that crucial evidence, What is Life? was prescient. Its hypotheses were largely confirmed by 
subsequent research, even if its specifics proved to be incorrect. Moreover, Schrödinger’s book served an essential 
motivational role, inspiring a generation of scientists to attack the DNA “mystery” through the 1940s and -50s—
notably including a large number of disciplinary émigrés from the fields of molecular chemistry and physics. These 
included Crick, for whom Schrödinger’s volume was “[a] major factor in his leaving physics and developing an 
interest in biology” (Watson 18).  
 
8Keller reminds us that the work of scientific research is, in large part—and to some extent, definitionally—
“directed at the elucidation of entities and processes about which no clear understanding exists, and to proceed, 
scientists must find ways of talking about what they do not know . . . to make sense of their day-to-day efforts, they 
need to invent words, expressions, forms of speech that can indicate or point to phenomena for which they have no 
literal descriptors” (Making 118). I follow Keller in two assertions: first, that this metaphorical retrofitting of 
observed phenomena constitutes a necessary component of legitimately scientific praxis, in the life sciences 
especially; and, second, that the rise of molecular biology, approximately 1960-1980, forms a distinct period in the 
development of modern genetic science during which the metaphorical work required to produce the conceptual 




quotes that set it off on the verge of falling away entirely. Moreover, the popularizers of this 
“metaphor of transcendent writing” (Kay 3) described it in a manner that paradoxically pushed 
the “book of life” beyond its metaphoricity by insisting upon its comparative logic. The 
volumetrically precise translational logic of Bergensdorf’s article—the genome, he calculates, 
“would require 1,000 volumes, with 680 pages per volume, with 500 five-letter words printed on 
each page”—render genome and book contiguous, not analogous, forms of writing (16). This, 
then, was the process by which man’s genomic description entered into the cultural imagination 
in the 1960s, not as a habituated figure of speech, but as a virtual object: its existence vouchsafed 
by scientific consensus, the genome was an actual book in all but material fact, awaiting its 
eventual paper-and-ink rendering.9  
Viewed in light of postwar debates about the stature and role of the novel in American 
life, the introduction of the new biology exacerbated the bind in which 1960s novelists found 
themselves. On one hand, the genomic book of life took up a place opposite the sociopolitically-
cathected “Great American Novel”; each, after its own fashion, offered a template and shining 
example of what “lively” writerly efficacy should look like. Working novelists were now 
constrained on either side, by not one but two virtual books. On the other hand, these writers 
found themselves within a broader interdisciplinary array characterized by anxieties over the 
increasing degree of academic specialization, and, correspondingly, with the ever-widening “gulf 
of mutual incomprehension” that C.P. Snow diagnosed in his 1959 Rede Lecture, “The Two 
Cultures” (3). A singular polemical success, Snow’s lament over the “joke . . . gone sour” of 
                                                             
9Note that, in its literal and quantitative understanding of meaning-by-page-count, Bergensdorf’s figure of speech 
implies a qualitative impoverishment of the model of language: meaning, no longer contextual, becomes a problem 
of sheer length. This qualitative reduction of language and text is the very means by which the genomic book of life 
can then be understood as a real book, rather than simply as a metaphor; the genomic book’s transposability beyond 
disciplinary boundaries and its literality are related. Bergensdorf has internalized the reductionist fervor of his 




farcical levels of misunderstanding between writer and scientist established the discursive 
ground for midcentury debates about the relationship between science and literature (12).10 
Snow’s lecture, ostensibly an appeal for genuine interdisciplinary communication, was 
ultimately much more successful in establishing science and literature as rivals. Specifically, 
when he enjoins “literary persons” to pay greater respect to the “much more rigorous,” if 
“unrecognizable,” scientific use of literary words “in an exact sense” (13), Snow would seem to 
put his thumb to the scales, reserving a language capable of positivistic truth-claims for science, 
and science alone. Exactitude emerges as a self-justifying claim for disciplinary neologism: 
Snow grants scientific discourse the latitude to claim new vocabulary over and against the 
“customary” range of meaning while cautioning writers not to “mystify” scientific phenomena in 
verse or prose (18). Reconceiving linguistic strategies that are arguably literary—metaphor, 
neologism, catachresis—as scientific tools, Snow’s Janus-faced treatment of scientific and 
literary language renders his vision of interdisciplinary communication thoroughly asymmetrical.  
Snow’s insinuation that writers should keep to their place within “traditional” culture 
(Snow 12) was broadly consonant with the conservative literary-critical impetus urging the novel 
to reproduce itself, recognizably, on the model of past classics. Likewise, Snow’s rhetorical 
distillation of a huge and varied endeavor into a monolithic scientific culture—tellingly, with 
“the physical scientists [as its] most representative” members (4)—also rhymes with the 
                                                             
10Snow’s polemical success comes at the cost of diagnostic subtlety, as Snow himself is quite frank in admitting. 
“The number two is a very dangerous number,” he intones. “I have thought a long time about going in for further 
refinements: but in the end I have decided against . . . I was searching for something a little more than a dashing 
metaphor, a good deal less than a cultural map: and for those purposes the two cultures is about right, and subtilising 
any more would bring more disadvantages than it’s worth” (9-10). In an essay that also argues that “this same 
polarization” of intellectual and creative inquiry into two cultures “is sheer loss to us all” (12), this admission makes 
for quite the tautological irony, and Snow’s subsequent interlocutors are hardly deaf to the tautology by which 
Snow’s two-cultures crisis manufactures itself out of its own deliberate polemical oversimplification. Indeed, many 
have questioned the extent to which Snow’s essay produces, rather than diagnoses, the two culture problem. And yet 
the critical “revisitations” that Snow continues to invite from every corner paradoxically underscore the rhetorical 
adroitness in his refusal to “subtilize”; each critique serves to perpetuate the “two culture” diagram even as it 
dismantles its specious simplicity. See, for example, Inmaculada de Melo-Martin’s “The Two Cultures: An 
Introduction and Assessment.”  
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increasing influence of scientific reductionism within the life sciences after the war, when 
Watson and Crick’s discovery precipitated a disciplinary reorganization within biology that 
increasingly privileged the methods and explanatory paradigms of physics. Nowhere were these 
historical trends in both science and literature more emphatically confirmed than in the scientific 
reinvestment of the (formerly exegetical) metaphor of the book of life: promising a textually 
literal description of life, DNA’s cultural dissemination across the 1960s terminologically co-
opted what had been, in at least a metaphorical sense, the perennial ambit of prose fiction. But 
this two-culture scheme contains polemical possibilities, too, even if in apparent contradiction of 
some of its own admonitions. Indeed, such possibilities become more abundant as the 
admonitions grow more stringent.11 Snow’s preoccupation with the rhetorical bombasts of 
scientific theory—and, oddly, its challenge to “literary persons” to read scientific metaphors “in 
an exact sense”—proved a compelling invitation to writers who could reconceive the discursive 
encroachments of molecular metaphors, and the new tropology of life-as-text that attended them, 
as compositional resources. 
Life: A New Tropology 
The claim that DNA’s discovery did, in fact, occasion a wholesale redefinition of life “as 
such” is well supported. As the “anticipated emblem of the era that defined it and that it defined” 
(Roof 3), the ubiquitous and overdetermined image of the double helix has prompted a wide-
ranging scholarship devoted to exactly what, and how, DNA signifies. Across this body of work, 
the double helix emerges as a kind of conceptual prism. Its molecular architecture, quickly and 
                                                             
11Snow occupies a strangely contorted position within the discursive diagram he himself maps. Conflating an overly 
broad, imprecisely construed “science” with descriptive precision and literary or “traditional” culture with an 
attitude of referential laziness, Snow argues for the superiority of the former while demonstrating his own affiliation 
with the latter, both rhetorically and in the annals of his critical reception. The dialectical motor of Snow’s argument 
runs on this tension between terminological precision and rhetorical productivity—even though the tension here 
does not produce any real reciprocity between the essay’s two cultures, producing instead an oscillation within the 




definitively adopted by scientific consensus, has prompted a wide range of complementary 
analyses testifying to the breadth of its signifying power.12 Much of DNA’s epistemic potential 
was immediately apparent, manifest in the complementarity of its twinned helical strands and the 
sequencing of its base pairs. But untangling the consequences of the new model was a problem 
sufficiently complex to preoccupy theoretical work in the life sciences for years to follow. This 
(quintessentially linguistic) theoretical labor was particular concentrated between 1953 and the 
mid-1970s.13 And the captivating image of the double helix as it was reproduced in postwar mass 
media, together with the discovery’s fundamental importance and inherently extra-scientific 
appeal, granted this theoretical work an unusual degree of public visibility.14  
 While historians of biology still debate just how “loudly” the double helix debuted and 
the speed at which its discovery was disseminated, there is little doubt that by the early 1960s 
DNA’s fundamental importance was universally acknowledged.15 If Watson and Crick were not 
household names by 1962, the Nobel committee ensured that they were by awarding them that 
                                                             
12On scientific consensus, see Mayr: “Watson and Crick’s double helix fitted all the facts so perfectly that it was 
accepted by everyone almost at once, including the two most actively competing laboratories, those of [Linus] 
Pauling and [Maurice] Wilkins” (Growth 823). 
 
13See Keller’s thoroughgoing demonstration of biologists’ heightened rhetorical sensibility during the period. Her 
argument is twofold: broadly, she holds that the midcentury life sciences were particular invested in “linguistic 
work” entailing the experimental deployment of “metaphor—understood in the largest sense of that term . . . as a 
particular explanatory tool” (Making Sense 117). More discretely, she argues that the revelation of the double helix 
in its exacting material specifications rendered the prior concept of “gene action” unsuitable to genetic theory. This 
prompted the search for a new rhetoric that “would accommodate the new information . . . and yet rival gene action 
in its ambi-valence” (134) of structure and function. Biologists eventually lit upon the genetic program as a new 
paradigm—but Francois Jacob’s Logic of Life (1970) stands as ample evidence of the fact that the program was 
itself rhetorically convoluted, and went in for a good deal of theoretical hashing-out as well. 
 
14See for example Soraya de Chadarevian, “Portrait of a Discovery: Watson, Crick, and the Double Helix”: “The 
history of the photograph Barrington Brown took at the Cavendish in 1953 suggests that the picture is much more 
than just a document of the model and its makers at the time. Together with Watson’s best-selling account, it has 
become part of the making of that discovery and the way it is represented” (104-05). 
 
15See “Revisiting the ‘Quiet Debut’ of the Double Helix” by Yves Gringas, in which the author asserts—contrary to 
recent trends in the history of molecular biology—that the impact of Watson and Crick’s 1953 paper was more or 
less immediate. It is worth noting that, even for historians who argue that the double helix debuted “quietly,” there is 




year’s Prize in Physiology or Medicine.16 Bibliometric analyses paint a complementary picture, 
suggesting that “[i]ntegration of the Watson and Crick hypothesis occurs in research level texts 
in 1954 and 1955; in undergraduate texts by 1957 to 1959; and it has been incorporated into 
school texts by the mid-sixties” (Winstanley, 546).17 Some scientific historians go so far as to 
call DNA a catalyst of Kuhnian proportions: rapidly and universally adopted by scientists; 
foundational to a new, soon-to-be-dominant subdiscipline, molecular genetics; and occasioning a 
wholesale reorientation of research agendas in the life sciences.18 For evolutionist and historian 
of biology Ernst Mayr, this goes too far; the inherently heterogeneous nature of biological 
inquiry, he argues, prevents anything like a “general revolution” (127) almost by definition.19 
But even for Mayr, whose work is about as far removed from molecular research as is possible 
under the life sciences umbrella, “[t]here has hardly been a more decisive breakthrough in the 
whole history of biology than the discovery of the double helix . . . [it] opened up an immense 
new field of exciting research and it is no exaggeration to say that as a result molecular biology 
completely dominated biology for the next fifteen years” (825).  
Members of the popular press were less fastidious in their characterizations. Lacking a 
suitable analogue in the history of biology, journalists and scientists became fond of comparing 
the double helix to the physicist’s atom. The double helix was declared a “master-” and “mother 
                                                             
16The prize was awarded for “discoveries concerning the molecular structure of nucleic acids and its significance for 
information transfer in living material” (Nobelprize.org); Watson and Crick shared it with Maurice Wilkins, whose 
X-ray diffraction evidence helped to confirm the Watson / Crick model. Notably absent from the award was 
Rosalind Franklin, Wilkins’ collaborator.  
 
17In related work, Winstanley corroborates this timeline with reference to DNA’s adoption in school syllabi (546, fn 
8). 
 
18 See “The Double Helix and the Warped Zipper—An Exemplary Tale” by T. D. Stokes and Robert Olby’s The 
Path to the Double Helix (434-35).  
 
19See also Mayr’s What Makes Biology Unique?: “conceptually the new field was nothing but a smooth continuation 
of the developments in genetics preceding 1953 . . . the rise of molecular biology was revolutionary, but it was not a 




molecule” (Weldon, “Restoration” 8; “Huxley” 38); the “coil of life” (New York Times 1962); 
and an elementary unit “as important to biologists as uranium is to nuclear physicists” (New York 
Times 1953).20 Molecular biologists themselves were no less bullish; Watson recounts, with a 
sense of eager apprehension, Crick’s announcement to a crowded Cambridge, U.K. pub “that we 
had found the secret of life” (126). Reflecting on “our latest wonder,” molecular genetics, in his 
1969 Nobel address, physicist-turned-phage biologist Max Delbrück confirmed Crick’s boast in 
like terms, concluding that the prior fifteen years of research in the field allowed “that we might 
say in plain words, ‘This riddle of life has been solved’” (Nobelprize.org).21 Writing in 1967, J. 
D. Bernal indicated the extent to which these framings of biology’s object of study had become 
characteristic: “Life is beginning to cease to be a mystery and becoming . . . a cryptogram, a 
puzzle, a code” (qtd. in Keller, Secrets 97).  
Explicit comparisons to physics went hand-in-hand with the posing of life as a “riddle” 
and a “secret”: both indicate the desire, at that time, to remake our understanding of the life 
                                                             
20As Keller notes in greater detail than I am capable of entertaining here, this analogy actually significantly predates 
DNA’s discovery (Century 18-19). Decades before the double helix appeared to demonstrate the actuality of 
“particulate hereditary elements” that might be thought of as biology’s “fundamental units of explanation” 
analogous to those of physics and chemistry, the possibility that such a particle might exist comprised one of 
classical genetics’ “enduring articles of faith” and animated the gene-concept.  
 
21To a large extent, questions of credit and attribution lie outside the scope of this study, for which it is sufficient to 
establish that DNA and the metaphor of the genetic program had become cultural facts by the early 1960s. Still, it is 
worth noting here, as most histories of molecular biology also note, that popular narratives overstate the originality 
and singular importance of Watson and Crick’s 1953 discovery. Mayr suggests drily that “if they had not been 
successful, somebody else would have been a few months or years later” in the “hot race” begun in 1944 when 
Avery et al. determined that DNA, rather than proteins, caused pneumococcal transformation in bacteria (123-24). 
Indeed, the “race to the structure” animates Watson’s autobiographical account, which plays up professional 
rivalries and generates narrative tension out of the fear that “our small headstart over Linus [Pauling and the 
CalTech laboratory] might suddenly vanish” if quotidian distractions and professional detours overtook the pair 
(92). It is all too easy to forget, more than half a century on, that many of the rhetorical trappings of DNA—the 
notion of the genetic program in particular—did not attach themselves to the molecule until several years later. Here, 
recent emphases on the work of George Gamow, who first attempted to apply modern cryptography to discovering 
the “translation procedure” that would “crack” the genetic code (Gamow 318), and Francois Jacob, popularizer of 
the “genetic program,” provide a welcome historiographic course-correction. In particular, Lily Kay takes special 
care to emphasize Gamow in contrast to the “dominant code narratives built around [Francis] Crick” (128). In his 
On Beyond Living, Richard Doyle devotes subsequent chapters to Gamow and Jacob following his analysis of 
Schrödinger, lending them equal weight in a narrative of the gene’s “rhetorical transformations” from “code” to 
“word” to “program.”  
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sciences so that they more closely resembled the physical sciences. This desire was projected 
onto the young field of molecular biology from the outside and also from within its ranks, 
especially by younger practitioners trained in the laboratory methods and mindsets of molecular 
chemistry and physics. Accounting for this interdisciplinary context is crucial to understanding 
the way DNA’s structural elaboration was initially taken up within the field, and ultimately fixed 
in the metaphorics of the genomic book of life. Particularly decisive are the ways in which the 
genomic book of life took shape in reaction to an aging vitalist paradigm within biology; as an 
extension of the disciplinary attitudes and social capital of postwar physics; and in terms of the 
conceptual apparatus of cybernetics. 
 Joseph Needham defines vitalism straightforwardly in the opening pages of Order and 
Life (1936) as any biological theory “which postulate[s] some entity in the living organism in 
addition to the chemical elements. . . . plus organizing relations” (6). Needham frames vitalism 
as one of the “the ultimate problems of biology” and dissensus over its legitimacy a major 
roadblock to “the need for a comprehensive biological science, which is great” (ibid). 
Needham’s tract exemplifies the longstanding habit of thought among biologists that conceives 
the discipline around the opposition between vitalism and mechanism, a polarity with Cartesian 
antecedents that well predate Lamarck’s coinage of “biology” in the early 19th century.22 In the 
decades leading up to the discovery of the double helix, vitalism was increasingly disparaged as 
pseudoscience. Correspondingly, scientists moved to embrace research programs informed by a 
mechanist perspective, their questions framed by the conviction that vital effects might in fact be 
explained by material processes at cellular and sub-cellular levels. Avery et al.’s 1944 findings, 
                                                             
22See the introduction to William L. Coleman’s Biology in the Nineteenth Century: Problems of Form, Function, 





pointing to a chemical, and thus mechanistic, solution to the longstanding “riddle of life,” paved 
the way for the double helix to intervene decisively on the longstanding vitalism / mechanism 
debate.23 With DNA, “all remaining doubts about the material reality of the gene were dispelled” 
(Keller Century 3); assertions like Francois Jacob’s claim that “[t]he reproduction of an organism 
has become that of its constituent molecules” (1) became dogmatic. Consequently, “the way was 
cleared for the gene to become the foundational concept capable of unifying all of biology” 
(Keller Century 3). Under the explanatory aegis of a mechanistic biochemistry, Needham’s 
“great need” had been answered.24  
 It was an answer more likely to arouse interest among physicists than working biologists, 
and the research program of molecular biology did in fact attract great interest from scientists 
trained in physics and chemistry. If Avery et al. had opened a new chapter in the “scientific 
super-detective story” of genetic chemistry by establishing the hereditary importance of DNA 
(Laurence E11), it was arguably Schrödinger, by then a celebrity among physicists, who made it 
theoretically seductive the same year with the publication of What is Life?, subtitled “The 
Physical Aspect of the Living Cell” and beginning with a chapter on “The Classical Physicist’s 
Approach to the Subject.” A new generation of researchers inspired by Schrödinger’s speculative 
account—Crick and Watson among them—brought their research methods and a disciplinary 
predisposition towards explanatory reduction, the attitude that “one cannot understand a whole 
                                                             
23Specifically, Avery et al. found, in their study of Pneumococcus Type III bacteria, that “the chemically induced 
alterations in structure and function are predictable, type-specific, and transmissible in series”—and that, crucially, 
“a nucleic acid of the deoxyribose type is the fundamental unit of the transforming principle,” where “transforming 
principle” may be read as the principle of heredity itself (156).  
 
24It is likely incorrect to treat vitalism as it is deployed by biologists as synonymous with vitalism in a more 
developed philosophical sense—the vitalism of Henri Bergson, for example—despite their shared origins. Further, 
as Richard Doyle’s On Beyond Living convincingly demonstrates, at a disciplinary level the opposition between 
vitalism and molecular biology is only “apparent,” despite the repudiations of the latter. On this view, Jacob’s claim 
that “the aim of modern biology is to interpret the properties of the organism by the structure of its constituent 
molecules” (9) simply masked the way that even molecular biology, in order to fix its disciplinary object in place, 
still “relied on an unseen unity that traversed all the differences and discontinuities of living beings, ‘life’” (11).  
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until one has dissected it into its components, and again these components into theirs, down to 
the lowest level of hierarchical integration” (Mayr 60). This attitude was a natural fit for 
biology’s midcentury anti-vitalist predispositions. It is a short step indeed from repudiating 
vitalism with molecular chemistry to declaring that “Molecular biology is all of biology” (ibid), 
and from there to the position that all of biology is a branch of physics.  
Accompanying the reductionist predilection towards unifying theories was an appetite for 
big questions. For Evelyn Fox Keller, “the story of real interest” in the ascendency of molecular 
biology was in biology’s transformation 
. . . from a science in which the language of mystery had a place not only legitimate but 
highly functional, to a different kind of science—a science more like physics, predicated 
on the conviction that the mysteries of life were there to be unraveled, a science that 
tolerated no secrets. (Secrets 42-43) 
 
Arguably as important as any method or domain expertise that physicists brought to molecular 
biology was their residual social authority, garnered during the war, and also “‘an attitude: the 
conviction which few biologists had at the time, that mysteries can be solved’” (Szilard, qtd. in 
Keller, Secrets 43).25 In some sense, the very question that prompted the search for DNA and its 
eventual structural elucidation had to be posed to the life sciences from outside:  
When Watson and Crick embarked upon a quest that they themselves described as a 
‘calculated assault on the secret of life,’ they were employing a language that was, at the 
time, not only grandiose and provocatively unfashionable, but, as Donald Fleming has 
pointed out, ‘in total defiance of contemporary standards of good taste in biological 
discourse.’” (Keller, Secrets 42)  
 
                                                             
25Vannevar Bush, the Director of the Military’s Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), described 
the research crossroads of postwar physicists in a heroic light: “What are the scientists to do next? . . . They have felt 
within themselves the stir of [military] achievement. They have been part of a great team. Now one asks where they 
will find objectives worthy of their best” (112). On a less sanguine view, the move from physics to the life sciences 
was can be understood as a transaction: physicists involved in the war effort brought the residual prestige of their 
wartime demonstrations of scientific power. In exchange, this return to “basic research” as an absolute good offered 




In addition to accounting for a swing of the pendulum toward mechanistic explanations, the 
involvement of physicists meant that the midcentury redefinition of life “as such” took place 
very much in the open. What we witness is less a gradual, subtextual migration of life’s 
connotative range within biological discourse than an explicit and at times strident series of 
disquisitions “on life,” operating on something closer to the rhetorical mold of the maxim. This 
dispositional shift was not limited to molecular biology; a similar reductionist attitude and 
terminological makeover was already underway in ecology, too, where Arthur G. Tansley’s “The 
Use and Abuse of Vegetational Concepts and Terms” had already set the stage, in 1935, for 
disciplinary overhaul by way of a terminological intervention that was still being worked through 
in postwar ecological science.26 
 As Keller notes elsewhere, once the “quest” for DNA “appeared to have been realized, 
something was lost” (Making Sense 134): the explanatory force of the gene-concept. With the 
materiality of the gene on full and irrefutable display, she argues, the concept of the gene broke 
down. It could no longer perform double duty as “law-code and executive power . . . architect’s 
plan and builder’s craft—in one” (Schrödinger 22). As it happened, a knot of intertwined 
technoscientific discourses already existed to supply the conceptual apparatus for a replacement. 
Lily Kay’s history, Who Wrote the Book of Life? (2000), lays out in great detail the profound 
conceptual debts that molecular biology owes to cybernetics, information theory, cryptography, 
and early computing. The latter fields supplied two of molecular genetics’ central concepts, code 
and program, and to that extent smuggled military and technoscientific registers into its theory of 
                                                             
26Though on an earlier timeline than DNA, Tansley’s coinage of the term “ecosystem” before the war one of the 
“formative episodes in the development of New Ecology” (Worster 311), a bioeconomically-inflected, systems-
based ecological paradigm that had consolidated its disciplinary grip on the field by the period of this study. I 
explore the rise of New Ecology, a disciplinary narrative with numerous and striking parallels to the rise of 




organism. The influence of cybernetics, developed in the late 1940s alongside its complement, 
information theory, was even more fundamental; it provided an informatic milieu in which a new 
vision of encoded, mechanized life might be glimpsed in situ.27 
The cybernetic paradigm was theoretically grounded in the thermodynamic concept of 
entropy, and was thus a natural retrofit for those inspired by Schrödinger, who believed that the 
organism’s “apparent immunity to the second law of thermodynamics . . . got at the very core of 
the distinction between living and nonliving beings” (Keller, Century 21). It was this difference-
in-kind that cybernetics sought to explain away by further pursuing the mechanistic analogy of 
organism and machine. Conceived by Norbert Wiener as a universally-applicable study of 
messages, cybernetics was built upon an ambitious analogy between self-correcting, “smart” 
machines and living organisms: the feedback sensitivity of the former was an equal measure of 
“intelligence” as the homeostasis and self-direction of the latter. This analogy is made possible 
by a theory of communication which renders the semantic content of any given message as a 
quantum of information—a transformation that factors out any prior qualitative traces of medium 
specificity or material uniqueness to the message or information-pattern in question. Unable or 
simply uninterested in depicting quality, the world it conjures is not only explicitly mechanistic 
but “devivified,” even “postvital” (Keller, Secrets 52; Doyle, Beyond 13): it takes as its objects 
                                                             
27Regarding the complementarity of cybernetics and information theory, see Kay chapter 3: “Although Shannon and 
Weiner worked independently, their conceptual frameworks turned out to be remarkably close . . . Shannon 
represented phenomena positively, while Wiener traced their negative space” (94). For simplicity’s sake, I take this 
complementarity as an excuse to focus on cybernetics as the representative discourse within this dissertation. 
Generally, I follow George Canguilhem in understanding the biological concept of milieu as a network of relations, 
thusly: “the milieu on which the organism depends is structured, organized, by the organism itself” (Knowledge 
118). But in deploying the term here, I mean it in a sense closer to the outmoded analytic concept that Canguilhem 
critiques. Cybernetic theory, I argue, brings about the return of “a strictly mechanist usage of the notion of milieu,” 
even if milieu is not explicitly a part of their vocabulary: cybernetic theory, like 19th-century mechanistic theory, 
depends upon some notion of milieu as “a universal instrument for the dissolution of individualized organic 
syntheses into the anonymity of universal elements and movements . . . we are brought back to the theory of animal-
machines” (103). For cyberneticists, it is something like a generalized thermodynamic entropy that functions as this 





the “local enclaves” of negative entropy themselves, whether organic, mechanical, or semantic, 
within a universe that “tends to run down” (Wiener 12).28 On such a view, “all question-begging 
epithets such as ‘life,’ ‘soul,’ ‘vitalism,’ and the like” are best avoided—not as untruths, but 
rather, more damning still, as irrelevancies (32).  
The influence of cybernetics on biology accounts for some of the most paradoxical 
features of post-DNA life. First, it helps to explain why a discourse that was suddenly compelled 
to ask itself “what is life?” can, upon finding its answer, declare the inquiry moot: witness the 
claim made by François Jacob in 1970 that “Biologists no longer study life today” (qtd. in Doyle 
25), pronounced under the sign of cybernetics and in connection with the coinage of the genetic 
program. The “information” paradigm established by cybernetics can also begin to shed light on 
a second, even odder, discursive paradox: that an epistemic shift dependent upon “the material 
reality of the gene” (Keller, Century 3) could actually end by de-materializing the organism—not 
simply by rendering flesh and metal bodies equivalent but by enjoining what Katherine Hayles 
calls the “condition of virtuality” (14) a quintessentially “posthuman” milieu in which, to return 
to Wiener’s aphorism, “we are not stuff that abides, but patterns that perpetuate ourselves” (96).  
 When the book of life, a metaphor that has attended life science inquiry since antiquity, 
was reinvested with new, biochemically precise meaning, it did so in a way that reflected these 
disciplinary investments; when the discovery of the double helix consolidated life and language 
under the sign of its twin strands, for example, it was according to a decidedly cybernetic 
understanding of language (as code) and how it functions (as a computer program). Scholars 
have been quick to point out that this conflation is misleading at best. The slightest scrutiny 
clarifies that human language as we understand it—arbitrary, substitutive, consensus-based—
                                                             
28On the sufficiency of mechanistic explanations in cybernetics, Wiener is emphatic: “Cybernetics takes the view 
that the structure of the machine or of the organism is an index of the performance that may be expected from it” 
(57, italics in original). 
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functions nothing like the base-pair “alphabet” and its protein referents.29 But these observations 
offer little explanation for the profound rhetorical appeal of the life-as-language trope. If 
anything, such an explanation emerges from these objections in relief, as it were, with the 
understanding that semantic overdetermination was no obstacle to the genomic book of life, but 
the very measure of its success. For genetic theory, the metaphoric incoherence of the genomic 
book of life was an index of its “productive value” (Keller, Making 132).30 And the productivity 
so engendered was not only felt within scientific discourse proper; that same metaphorical reach 
also allowed the life-language equation to serve as a bridge between biochemical protocols and 
theories of human language. 
 Two linguistic theories that were hailed by the new biology are of particular note: 
structuralism and speech-act theory. The DNA paradigm so fully analogized the structuralist 
paradigm that Roman Jakobson, an eminent structuralist linguist, enthusiastically embraced 
biologist François Jacob’s proposal to understand life as language in a literal sense.31 Part of the 
appeal, no doubt, lay in “the structural beauty” of DNA’s molecular form, and the perfect 
functioning of its language, “from the first declaration of its codelike quality,” as a material 
                                                             
29Judith Roof argues that, if anything, DNA “is like a photographic negative. Its series of base pairs, when replicated 
by RNA, produce the proteins that eventually constitute living flesh—again, more like . . . a template, or even 
molecular topography, than a word” (87). Lest this be thought a bad-faith circumnavigation around the fact that it is 
a more limited, cryptographic understanding of language at play, we have Kay observing that even “if it were a 
purely formal language,” DNA ought to “possess syntax only but no semantics. Thus the informational 
representations of the genome do not stand up under rigorous scrutiny. From linguistic and cryptoanalytic 
standpoints, the genetic code is not [even] a code: it is simply a table of correlations” (2). 
 
30Keller, who studied as a physicist and worked as a mathematical biologist, articulates the most sustained and 
perceptive study of how “referential imprecision can have a positive function in scientific work” (119) among critics 
of molecular biology. In her hands, this truism of scientific intellectual history is shown to have a pronounced 
importance for the ten years following 1953, when “the sheer drama of the discoveries they witnessed” made 
research “of necessity a process of groping – groping for words, for concepts, for new experimental handles” (167). 
 
31See Kay, chapter 7 for an account of Jacobson’s sustained interest, first with his embrace of cybernetics at MIT 
through the interdisciplinary Center for Communication Studies, where he encountered Wiener; and, later, his 
increasing interest in interdisciplinary work between linguistics and biology following a televised roundtable in 
1967 on the “epistemic and social significance of the genetic code" (307). The roundtable, broadcast in France as 
“Vivre et Parler,” featured notable co-panelists François Jacob and Claude Lévi-Strauss. 
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demonstration of depth structures at work (Roof 47). Reminding us that, in large part, Lévi-
Strauss derived those depth structures from binary kinship relations, Judith Roof emphasizes that 
it is “the idea of the ‘combinatory’ . . . structured as the joinder of complementary opposites” that 
“links the structure of language to the biological structures of reproduction” (47). The 
combinatory, then, provides a sort of buttress against the arbitrary S/s relation that threatens any 
easy conflation of human and genetic language. And in the work of an enthusiast like Jacobson, 
it becomes clear that far from weakening the “life as language” analogy, the “combinatory” logic 
of genetic transfer could be routed through existing structuralist paradigms, lending them 
strength and making over human language on the model of organic diversity—whereby a 
superficial heterogeneity in expression finds its roots an ur-language, or deep grammar, of a 
mere four chemical bases—in the process.   
 In the same year that Watson and Crick hit upon a molecular structure that “does what it 
is by making more of itself” (Roof 30), J. L. Austin began lecturing on speech-acts that 
performed what they signified in the “illocutionary force” of their utterance (100). This historical 
serendipity underscores the sense in which the double helix functioned as a disciplinary Rosetta 
stone that the life sciences had heretofore lacked: a word with a double valence, in which the 
anatomical “locutions” studied by descriptive biologists became synonymous with the 
“illocutionary forces” observed by embryologists and evolutionary theorists.32 More to the point, 
Austin’s speech-act maps squarely onto Schrödinger’s influential supposition that the gene is 
“law code and executive power . . . in one.” It was a hypothesis that the double helix appeared to 
confirm resolutely, and that genetic theory would subsequently enshrine as an article of faith, 
                                                             
32In disciplinary histories of biology, it is commonly characterized by two fields, only loosely united by their 
common object of study, and not at all by method. One is descriptive in a mechanistic sense and emphatically 
ahistorical; the other is historical and causally governed. For example, Mayr differentiates between “functional” and 




where it has largely persisted as such, in spite of the more nuanced picture of hereditary 
dynamics painted by subsequent research.33 This double valence—attributed to the gene-concept 
early on, materialized in the double helix, and eventually redistributed to the genetic program—
is the source of its elegance and also what makes it “something of a monster” in a rhetorical 
sense (Keller, Making Sense 131). The structure / function amalgamation is arguably the locus 
out of which the other rhetorical paradoxes of the genomic book of life emerge, entailing the 
redistribution of human agency; the virtual / material fate of the body; and a rescaling of life’s 
vital actions (see below). Ultimately, the striking agreement of structuralist and (especially) 
speech-act theories with early molecular biology has broadened the possibility of a redoubled 
relation between the (genetic, literary) text and that which is figured as exterior to it. More than 
ever, after DNA it is possible to understand the representational text as also materially 
contiguous with its referent. 
 That material contiguity was theoretically formalized at the molecular scale, which 
provided a common chemical substrate for organic and inorganic bodies alike in what was now a 
perfectly explicable way. Prior to DNA, life scientists had long held the diversity of the organic 
world to be inherent and irreducible. Up to the eve of the discovery of the double helix, the 
organism continued to pose a challenge and a provocation to the thermodynamic paradigm. It 
was by the “marvel” of organic permanence in the face of entropic ravages, the “residual pattern” 
that life cultivates evergreen on its degrading environment, that biology became an object of 
fascination for cybernetics and a continued goad to the unifying ambitions of physics 
(Schrödinger 31, Wiener 37). The DNA double helix changed that by providing a “script” for 
organic diversity that was chemically legible: atomic stochasticity could plausibly produce the 
                                                             
33Epigenetic research since 1980 has done the most to challenge the notion of the double helix as sole genetic author 
of the organism. But epigenetics was proposed as early as 1942 by C. H. Waddington, and experimental work on 
regulator genes and enzymatic adaptation was already challenging the notion in the 1960s.  
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molecular “errors” of DNA transcription and replication that lead to developmental mutations 
and, given enough iterations, to the full heterogeneity of the biome. The double helix provided a 
mechanism for flattening organic diversity, for making it over as discrepancy in one 
dimension—it factored out qualitative and formal differences of kind, reducing variety to a 
sequential phenomenon. Again the cryptographic valences of information theory played a 
leading role, here transforming the very concept of biological diversity by stripping away its 
normative attachments, for better and for worse. On one hand, the double helix undercut the 
biologist’s valorization diversity-as-such by reducing the inimitability of a species to iterative 
divergence and the uniqueness of an individual to sequence and luck. By the same token, though, 
it neutralized the negative connotations of the “ab-normal,” reinterpreting maladaptions of 
organic form from “flaws” to “errors.”34 
For Mayr, “It is the unquestioned achievement of molecular biology to have provided the 
chemical explanation for the phenomena of transmission genetics” (825, emphasis mine). On this 
view, DNA’s importance was less theoretical than substantial; instead of outmoding a half-
century of genetic theory, it demanded a retrofit of received theory to the new molecular 
parameters. By gathering biological phenomena under a chemical explanation that at last 
appeared to be fully self-sufficient, DNA exorcised vitalism from the life sciences—at least 
explicitly. “From particles to man . . . no change in essence,” Jacob claimed, and “no 
metaphysical entity hidden behind the word ‘life’” (qtd. in Doyle, Beyond 13). But the chemistry 
                                                             
34As Canguilhem describes it, this change introduces a fundamental change to the way that biosocial norms—norms 
like “health,” pathologies like “disease”—operate: “If, in principle, organization is a kind of language, the 
genetically determined disease is no longer a mischievous curse but a misunderstanding. There are bad readings of a 
hemoglobin just as there are bad readings of a manuscript. But here we are dealing with a word which comes from 
no mouth, with a writing which comes from no hand. There is then no ill will behind the ill fate” (Normal 278). Fate 
is the operative word, here, when thinking through the ramifications of DNA’s structural elucidation on public 
discourse. In the early years of the molecular biology paradigm, the fatalism of genetic prescription predominates as 




of nucleic acids is a strange bedrock on which to build a materialism; in the weltanschauung that 
results, “the organic and the machinic enfold each other helically” (Doyle, “LSDNA” 153). 
There is real tension, in other words, between the chemical and cybernetic views of life that 
DNA accommodates simultaneously. Are we nothing but our bodies, or are bodies nothing but 
patterns? DNA does not itself arbitrate between mechanist and cybernetic reductions, and as a 
result, the post-DNA organism vibrates between them.  
 This also means that, following DNA, notions of bounded subjecthood predicated on the 
delineation of interior and exterior become problematic. This is quite apart from later genetic 
fantasies of (and anxieties about) genetic self-control prompted by the advent of recombinant 
DNA technology, and the very real prospect of gene editing that recombinant DNA technology 
introduced. Simply as a result of the fact that we are, at once, chemical and informatic, the 
human subject after DNA is rendered ontologically intermediate along multiple axes.35 Not only 
does the body become a material scrim mediating between genetic pattern and physical 
environment, it also loses any claim to a conceptual position of centrality, originality, or 
universal measure in the order of things, finding itself merely an object of middling size. 
Consequently, the individual becomes a proxy for the conflict of very small (molecular) and very 
large (evolutionary; world-entropic). But the agency forfeited by the individual, and lost to the 
“human scale” more generally, is not simply gone. Instead, as life is narrated in the post-DNA 
episteme, it is reinvested in genes and molecular agents themselves. Getting genetic ideas “into” 
language—even theoretical language—requires rendering them subjects capable of action; 
                                                             
35The implication for literature is a return, after a sense, of the preoccupations of American Naturalist writers, but 
wherein the loss of individual agency “downward” and also “chemically” in some literal sense complicates this 
return—as in Thomas Pynchon’s V., which replaces the vitalism that animated many early 20th-century naturalist 
texts with a cybernetic vision in an entropic surround, all while retaining naturalism’s fascination with the 
individual’s encounter-across-scale with the environmental forces that constrain him. 
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through a personification at times unremarked, at others explicitly fantastical, DNA is imagined 
as a “scrivening molecular homunculus” (Roof 72). But the period witnesses more outlandish 
demonstrations of agential scale-shifting, too, that precipitate scalar conundrums by inserting 
oneself into oneself, as in a cartoon by cryptographer and molecular biologist George Gamow in 
which he imagines using a massive hypodermic needle to witness his own chromosomes in 
action (see Fig. 1.1).36  
 
Figure 1.1: George Gamow’s molecular voyage  
The conundrums of molecular biology call for explanatory attempts that do more than parse 
textual metaphors; as Gamow’s cartoon illustrates, attempts to elucidate the overdetermined 
paradigm of the double helix quickly turn explicitly fantastical.  
 
                                                             
36In chapter 3, I will explore how, in ecology, scientific visualizations of life were similarly rescaled in ecology, 
albeit some fifteen years prior. Diagrams of food chains and food webs—often presented with illustrations of each 
individual animal involved in the chain—gave way to ecosystem schematics, visually dominated by the macroscopic 
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Gamow’s hypodermic molecular adventure is uncannily recapitulated in John Barth’s 
1968 short story, “Night-Sea Journey,” a satire on existentialism narrated by a spermatozoa. In 
analogous fashion to Gamow’s cartoon, Barth’s story explores the agential dispossession of the 
monadic subject from the bottom up, by “injecting” the agentially-freighted narrative first-person 
down into the cells, where, it would seem, the real action is taking place. But “Night-Sea 
Journey” simultaneously works the life/language conduit in the other direction, too, in the sense 
that its otherwise by-the-numbers ouroboric narrative gambit is injected with humor and a bit of 
material viscosity thanks to its cellular deixis. In addition, then, to offering a rich and varied 
thematic reservoir for novelistic exploration, I believe that the genomic book of life provides a 
compelling framework for literary analysis for the two reasons just illustrated: first, for the 
inducements it offers for scientific and literary forms of speculation to coincide and overlap, as 
exemplified in the meeting of Gamow and Barth at the proverbial middle; and, second, for the 
redoubled purchase of texts that—thanks to the explicitly, and materially, textual emphasis of 
1960s biology—allows the fictions that take up those themes to address both of Snow’s two 
cultures in the same breath.  
Captivating as the rhetorical convolutions of molecular biology may be on their own 
terms, this project is ultimately about works, and writers, of fiction. Correspondingly, and in 
spite of their periodic dalliances in the weeds of biotheoretical discourse, the close readings that 
follow are intended primarily to animate the works and authors in question in ways that might 
build upon extant scholarship on 1960s literature. But even our current scholarly picture of the 
decade, I would argue, bears some traces of the nostalgic orientation of the public-intellectual 
debates about the novel discussed earlier in this introduction. In short, the intense focus on 
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retrospective canonization to meet the sociopolitical needs of the moment has persisted in the 
form of what Duncan Faherty, in another context, has called a “canonical interregnum.” 
The story goes something like this: by installing as it did a “double canon” of past 
masters comprised of “Old and New Testaments”—Emerson, Thoreau, Hawthorne, Melville, and 
Whitman on one hand and modernists like Eliot, Hemingway, Faulkner, and the protomodernist 
Henry James on the other—this nostalgic postwar critical impetus canonized the American novel 
genealogically, in “typological in ways that still determine the field today” (Greif 109-14, 113). 
Inevitably, this postwar consolidation of the “American Novel”-as-tradition is partial; it is self-
evident that this pantheon might underplay, for example, both the aggregate contributions and 
the internal stylistic and thematic diversity of fin-de-siècle American realism as the latter 
vacillated between the orderly realism of a William Dean Howells, with its “fidelity to 
experience and probability of motive,” and the impressionistic naturalism of a Stephen Crane, 
inhabiting to a greater degree the “constructed world of language” (Sundquist 8, 20). My point 
here is not to send up the distortions and elisions of these midcentury accounts, which any such 
exercise of cultural gatekeeping might be expected to display. Rather, it is to suggest that this 
moment was a particularly open-ended one when it came to the parameters of style, form, and 
subject by which a novel might succeed or fail. As Greif notes, this particular constellation of 
classics and moderns was self-defeating as a guide to novelistic style; “any given figure of the 
modernist generation could be an antitype to a type of the American Renaissance” (Age 113). 
One of the results of this state of affairs, I argue, is that the arena of novelistic production 
contemporaneous to these accounts was not affirmatively organized around particular formal 
characteristics, problematics, or strategies of the genre. The heavy emphasis on the individual 
talents that came to comprise the American canon instead fragmented the field of novelistic 
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practice, sending individual writers down the many branching paths offered by such a tradition. 
The canonical edifice of the “Great American Novel” was thus at once both claustrophobically 
felt and indeterminate: it loomed large, but offered few clear footholds for ascent.  
This considerable fragmentation of the decade’s literary output has tended to mean that  
periodizing work on 1960s literature has emphasized the decade’s transitional nature, casting it 
as either the end of a beginning or the beginning of an end.37 Which it is depends on who you 
ask. Genealogists of the novel genre tend to view the sixties novel as a late phenomenon, its 
narratives playing out—even as they sometimes play with—the increased obsolescence of the 
form. Theorists of postmodernity, on the other hand, find the fiction of the 1960s most 
significant for the ways in which some novels forecast, or articulate in embryonic form, the 
concerns of the “mature” postmodern novel of the 1970s. Both critical traditions, moreover, 
remain too committed to the tripartite periodization of emergent, dominant, and residual cultural 
forms (Williams 122-27) to understand 1960s literature on its own terms, as opposed to a belated 
Faulknerian modernism on one hand or an immature Pynchonesque postmodernity on the other.  
To be sure, this project benefits greatly from the incisive arguments of both scholars of 
the novel and theorists of the postmodern, arguments which succeed in throwing certain aspects 
of the sixties novel into sharp relief. Coming out of novel-genre studies is a welcome emphasis 
on the media ecology into which these novels were written. In this vein, Kathleen Fitzpatrick 
suggests that the advent of broadcast television fundamentally altered the novel’s position within 
the postwar American artistic landscape and that eulogies for the novel were both evidence of 
that change and strategic responses to it. As John Barth playfully remarked in his 1967 essay, 
                                                             
37 For two examples among many see, respectively, Marianne DeKoven’s Utopia Limited, in which 1960s literature 
“embodied simultaneously the full, final flowering of the modern and the emergence of the postmodern” (3); and 
Daniel Grausam’s On Endings which, retooling Brian McHale’s claim that 1966 represents “postmodernism’s year 




“The Literature of Exhaustion,” “No necessary cause for alarm in [the death of the novel] at all . 
. . one way to handle such a feeling might be to write a novel about it” (“Exhaustion” 71-72). 
According to Fitzpatrick, Barth’s position is unusually self-aware—and hence less disingenuous 
than some—but otherwise exemplary of the postwar novelist’s opportunistic relationship to the 
ill-health of his or her medium. Concerned not with “whether print culture is dying at the hands 
of the media, but rather what purposes announcements of the death of print culture serve” (3), 
Fitzpatrick comes closest to my own position on the purported obsolescence of sixties prose 
fiction from a genre history point of view: namely, that critics’ metaphoric abuse of the death-
trope is not indicative of a body of work that should be read as belated, nostalgic, or otherwise 
“late.” On the contrary, it is that very same critical hyperbole that provides sixties authors an 
opportunity to create fiction which is timely precisely to the extent that it exploits the 
“considerable cultural fact” of its own untimeliness (Barth, “Exhaustion” 72). Numerous genre-
centric approaches reinforce Fitzpatrick’s, reflecting on the novel’s changing role in postwar 
media ecologies, usefully dramatize the novel’s precarious position in the mass-media ecology of 
the postwar decades, establishing the intriguing possibility that we might understand the genomic 
book of life as another, particularly uncanny source of medium anxiety, in turn prompting an 
explicit novelistic response.  
Postmodernity continues to offer discursive possibilities as well, despite its ubiquity, with 
its heavy emphasis on art’s retreat into self-reference. Interestingly, its very ubiquity has opened 
a door for counternarratives like Chrisopher Breu’s Insistence of the Material, that, in staking out 
a “late-capitalist literature of materiality” defined against high-postmodern metatextuality (23), 
carves out an arena between the two in which the ambivalence of DNA—at once eminently 
material and textually self-referential—ramifies in a particularly productive fashion. 
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Nonetheless, scholars of postmodernism have themselves grown increasingly dissatisfied with 
the fact that “postmodernism,” however the term is defined, now supplies the default vocabulary 
for framing the criticism of literary works of the 1960s-80s. Recent monographs 
characteristically register a “frustration with the limits of the cultural and linguistic turns” seen as 
synonymous with postmodernism, and even scholars who choose to carry forward the 
postmodernist debate tend to view it as a necessary evil (Breu, Insistence 3). These sentiments 
underwrite the thrust of much postwar American literary criticism of the past twenty years, 
which may fairly be characterized as a series of attempts to think beyond the truisms of 
postmodern periodization.  
The turn to science has been a particularly successful strategy in this context. By 
construing fiction-writing as a theory-driven endeavor analogous to the quantum world-building 
of 20th-century scientists, physics-minded literary critics have managed to retain the most 
productive insights of postmodern critics—observations about the formal fragmentation and 
metafictional play of “postmodern” literature, for example—as expressions of quantum 
indeterminacy and observational uncertainty à la Heisenberg. But the slippage from science to 
physics is telling here. For one, a brief survey of the scholarship on quantum physics and 
literature is enough to see that the exemplary texts of this new approach are largely carried over 
wholesale; while these studies provide a compelling new take on the postmodern canon, they do 
not do much to challenge its entrenched periodization or text-selection preferences. And 
although the relationship between biology and literature has been elucidated for other periods—
Darwin’s influence on the 19th-century novel is well-documented—my research would fill a 




Between Two Cultures: Life, Language, and the Literal 
This is not a project about the figural thematization of the DNA double helix, per se. That 
book has been written.38 While each text does have explicit thematic investments that authorize 
and encourage a reading according to the concerns of 1960s molecular biology—Kesey’s 
mechanist/vitalist psychedelic imaginary, Barth’s cybernetic paternity plot, animalization as a 
persistent descriptive strategy in Himes—the deeper affinities of each text to the DNA episteme 
are admittedly indirect. In selecting these texts, I passed over a number of authors that would 
seem to be the more obvious choices: Ursula LeGuin, William S. Burroughs, Philip K. Dick, 
Jack Kirby and his X-Men. By omitting them, I intend no judgment as to their critical value. The 
double helix is a capacious and flexible symbol: those texts would, I am sure, yield 
complementary analyses equally as rich as those that follow. For this project, though, I have been 
interested in two things. First, texts that wrestle with the theoretical articulations of molecular 
biology’s early days, when the genome was a rigid code, rather than the mutable and 
manipulable genome that it would become with the advent of recombinant DNA technology in 
the early 1970s. Second, writers with significant philosophical and professional interests in the 
genre politics of what we have confusingly come to call “literary fiction.” What this yields, I 
think, is the opportunity to examine writers who find in the intersection of novel-form and gene-
book (or, in Himes’s case, the book of nature) a biologism that informs novelistic form and 
function as much as the resources of novelistic craft inform new representations, and 
theorizations, of life. 
                                                             
38I have in mind Judith Roof’s eloquent The Poetics of DNA, which trains its attention on “the DNA figure” itself as 
a kind of synecdochical “vector through which older ways of thinking can merge with the new, through which 
newer, more threatening ideas can emerge masked by the old, and through which older, more conservative ideas can 
survive” (2).  
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In chapter one, I revisit Ken Kesey’s debut novel, One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest 
(1962), reading its “experimental” countercultural reputation through the conceptual frame of the 
longstanding mechanism/vitalism debate within the life sciences. To introduce the novel and 
establish the contours of Kesey’s critical reception, I begin by comparing the novel to actual 
transcripts of Kesey’s first psychedelic trips, made while he was an experimental subject in the 
MK-ULTRA program. My ensuing analysis isolates an oscillation between (oral) witness and 
(written) retrospection within the novel’s narration, which I interpret as the fictional 
displacement of Kesey’s attempted navigation of his dual allegiances to the psychedelic 
community and the American literary canon, respectively. Invoking Richard Doyle’s description 
of the pseudoscientific genre of the “psychedelic self-experiment,” I read Kesey’s oscillation 
productively, as an attempt to turn the descriptive resources of fiction to the task of capturing 
psychedelic experience. The narrator’s psychotomimetic, or insanity-mimicking, narration 
functions in effect as a psychedelic drug, I argue, with the corresponding ramification that the 
novel comes to formally instantiate the psychedelic interval, the “trip.” In this destabilized 
context, the unreliability of the novel’s first-person narration is rendered psycho-active. Against 
the radical ontological insecurity of a discontinuous self, the symbolic stability of Bromden’s 
mechanistic visions, however frightening they may seem, ultimately console against a deeper 
biological fear: the post-DNA apprehension, at a subconscious level, of the subject’s own 
chemical, even molecular, fungibility. I end by concluding that, although neither Kesey’s novel 
nor his career ultimately reconciled his literary training to his psychedelic interests, Cuckoo’s 
Nest leaves us with an enduring figure of this psychotomimetic subject.  
In chapter two, I read John Barth’s allegorical campus novel, Giles Goat-Boy (1966), as a 
fictional goad to the presumptions of molecular biology and organicist literary theory alike. I 
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begin by analyzing the novel’s cybernetic paternity plot as a send-up of cybernetic reductionism 
that is thematically encapsulated in the farcical conflation of textual authorship and biological 
paternity by the novel’s sentient supercomputer, WESCAC. I extend that analysis to show how 
the novel recapitulates this cybernetic logic in its perversely dogmatic formal strategy: what 
Barth calls an allegorical “manner of speaking” produces his meganovel as a sort of recombinant 
code-script. I then turn to an extended comparative reading of the novel’s existentialist themes 
alongside a central text of molecular biology: Francois Jacob’s The Logic of Life (1970). Close 
reading Jacob’s theoretical articulation of the “genetic program” allows me to tease out both 
comic and melancholic registers of the goat-boy’s narrative as consequences of the scalar 
redistribution of agency implied in the metaphorics of the DNA paradigm. Thinly disguised as an 
existentialist fable, the story of the goat-boy’s journey for genetic self-understanding is, 
paradoxically, most joyous when it embraces genetic prescription and most bathetic when it 
seems to have conquered it. This anti-climax is insulated within several layers of fictional 
paratext that present the story of the Goat-Boy as an anti-novel: a religious testament in the place 
where a novel should be. In the chapter’s final section, I argue that, by presenting the novel in 
this way, Barth is consciously positioning his satirical novel as a rather direct rejoinder to two 
dominant literary-critical currents of the 1960s, New Criticism and “Death of the Novel” 
discourse. While the farcical adventures of the goat-boy perform a bathetic reduction of 
molecular biology’s cybernetic logic, the aborted drama of the “anti-novel’s” material origins 
weaponizes that same postvital scientific paradigm against the biologically conservative—
organicist, vitalist—models for literary-critical discourse that Barth aims to rebuke.  
In chapter three, I analyze Chester Himes’s series of crime novels, the “Harlem 
Domestics,” alongside 20th-century developments in ecological science—a comparison that 
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clarifies the ecosystemic logic that underwrites them. After introducing Himes’s novels by 
exploring his perspectival preoccupation with ecologically-inflected “aerial views,” I begin by 
tracing an abbreviated history of crime fiction, moving from Poe’s Dupin to Himes’s Harlem 
detectives by way of earlier hard-boiled writers, especially Raymond Chandler and Dashiell 
Hammett. This genre history highlights Himes’s innovations within the tradition, innovations 
which, I argue, turn the implicit ecological valences of the genre into explicit concerns through 
descriptive strategies of pejorative “animalization” (Ahuja 557) and a thematic interest in the 
moral-political dilemma of life as surplus, as “tumescent.” I go on to show how Himes effects 
this quintessentially biopolitical turn by systematizing Harlem according to what are essentially 
energetic vectors, though in fiction they are expressed rhetorically: “heat,” “action”; money, sex, 
and Black speech. A detailed account of the disciplinary rise of the New Ecology—which 
introduced the concept of the ecosystem to the life sciences and, to a large extent, remade the 
field of ecology according to a bioeconomic theoretical paradigm—supports my ensuing account 
of the metanarrative arc of the series, which, viewed ecosystematically, trends toward 
catastrophe. My reading anchors this oft-remarked metanarrative arc of decline to a mid-series 
turning point where the ecosystemic logic begins to “heat up,” becoming increasingly 
unresponsive to the biomanagerial repertoire of Himes’s detective duo, Grave Digger Jones and 
Coffin Ed. While Digger and Ed’s biomanagerial posture serves to bolster their hard-boiled 
authority across the first five novels, it leaves them ill-equipped to address their professional 
challenges in 1969’s Blind Man with a Pistol, an absurdist forfeiture of hard-boiled forensics in 
the face of systemic racial strife that renders Harlem both out of control and out of scale.  
* * * 
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The question at hand—how American writers adapt the form and function of their “bright 
book of life” to the interjection of the genomic book—is deeply interested in the discourse of 
science, but primarily, to paraphrase Richard Doyle, to the extent that the “discourse of the life 
sciences” collides with the “discourse on life” (Beyond 25-26). And, as anthropologist Stefan 
Helmreich has attested, the discourse on life is ontologically fugitive. My own critical project is 
constantly risking slippage between life’s social and scientific definitions, but that is because 
such slippage is, itself, the zone of opportunity into which the novelists that I study, write. In our 
attempts to define it,  
[l]ife moves out of the domain of the given into the contingent, into quotation marks, 
appearing not as a thing-in-itself but as something in the making in discourse and 
practice. “Life” becomes a trace of the scientific and cultural practices that have asked 
after it, a shadow of the biological and social theories meant to capture it. (Helmreich 
674) 
 
In contrast to the disciplinary propriety urged by Snow’s two-culture vision, I read novel-writing 
and scientific theorization as two cultural practices that “ask after” life in ways that cannot help 
but to inflect one another. The relationship between the two is, in some sense, symbiotic: by 
means of a reciprocal interdisciplinary opportunism, midcentury biologists exploit the figural 
resources of language, text, and book while postwar American novelists leverage the chemical 
facticity that DNA attached to the semantics of life. One half of this chiastic discursive 
structure—detailing the (essentially literary) rhetorical strategies employed by the theorizers of 
molecular genetics—has already been thoroughly mapped by scientific historians, rhetoricians of 
science, and scholars of Science, Technology, and Society (STS). My hope for this project is that 
it begins to supply the other stroke of the X by demonstrating how the very epistemology of a 




One needn’t rely on rhetoricians and scholars of science to remind us that “metaphors . . . 
are ubiquitous in science” (Kay 2), or that polysemy “can be a positive resource for drawing 
different research programs into a coherent agenda” (Keller, Making 120). An awareness of 
science’s figural investments is emphatically present in the work of eminent midcentury 
biologists like Delbrück and Mayr, both of whom, rather than looking to expunge biological 
theory of imprecision, held that the very nature of biological inquiry inclines the field towards a 
connotation-rich terminology that manifestly benefits from extra-scientific meanings. For 
Delbrück, evolutionary narratives are “decisively helpful” precisely in returning the absolutes of 
Cartesian physical laws, in fact “applicable only in the middle dimensions of space and time and 
energy” (“Mind” 353), to a larger frame and consequently to theories governed by looser, more 
contextual determinisms. To similar effect, Mayr remarks of Snow that “[h]e is right about the 
communication gap between physicists and humanists, but there is almost as great a gap 
between, let us say, physicists and naturalists.” Indeed, Mayr proposes that the life sciences are 
“something of a bridge between the physical sciences on the one hand and the social sciences 
and humanities on the other” (77), primarily because they share the latter group’s curiosity about 
concepts like causality, narrative, “quality,” and history. For these thinkers, too, biology is the 
one space—perhaps the privileged space—where the monolithic presumptions of a unitary 
science break down. 
 These generalizations take on special force when applied to the early period of molecular 
genetics, between the double helix and recombinant DNA. Metaphors may be ubiquitous in 
science, “but not all metaphors are created equal. Some, like the information and code 
metaphors, are exceptionally potent due to the richness of their symbolisms, their synchronic and 
diachronic linkages, and their scientific and cultural valences” (Kay 2-3). As the disciplinary 
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histories of Kay, Keller, Doyle, and others have remarked, the figure of the genomic book of life 
possesses its own discrete and navigable history, even within the condensed period of the present 
study during which the language of biology was changing at an accelerated pace. That history 
suggests a vector of habituation that crosses a threshold beyond which the book metaphor and its 
variant forms—life as code, genome as program, double helix as blueprint—were no longer 
remarked. This falling-away of metaphorical indicators, apparent enough in itself, is often fitted 
surreptitiously to a perspectivalist, anti-foundational critique of language that finds its roots in 
Nietzsche and early Barthes.39 According to such a narrative, metaphors become literal when we 
forget the fact of their constructedness; this amnesia opens language to ideological abuse. Many 
accounts of DNA rhetoric are trained on how, once naturalized, DNA’s rhetorical-theoretical 
apparatus becomes available for exploitation at the hands of cultural agents who would use it to 
re-inscribe gender essentialism, monetize genetic information, and agitate for human interference 
with the gene “book” with a variety of motives ranging from naïve to sinister.  
But early molecular biological discourse fits oddly to that narrative, in point of fact. Not 
because its linguistic negotiations are exempt from power, but because the debate is being 
hashed out very much in the open. The rhetorical trajectory is familiar enough—a “lively” 
metaphor “deadened” over time, ossified into a verbal artifact that no longer evokes the 
metaphoric tension that once animated it—but the disposition of the change is not. The 
literalization of the genetic book of life was neither gradual, subtle, nor passive. The metaphor’s 
adoption was explicit and its effects punctuated: not the resemblance but the literal identity of 
book and genome, word and protein, letter and base-pair triplet was seized upon as the key to 
                                                             
39 See the Introduction to Roland Barthes’s Mythologies and Nietzsche’s essay, “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral 
Sense,” for summaries of these respective thinkers’ understandings of the metaphoricity of purportedly “transparent” 
language and its particular suitability for ideological co-option.  
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understanding how life functioned. For geneticists, the relation of terms was not analogy but 
synonymy.  
The stubbornness of this literality suggests to me that biology might, having learned 
something of the recalcitrance that characterizes its objects of study, provide a sufficiently 
stubborn comparative framework to support a challenge to some of the persistent and totalizing 
critical narratives proffered by the “harder” sciences. As Mayr and others have compellingly 
argued, the assumptions and especially the values that guide biological inquiry are often at odds 
with those that guide physicists, though both are equally “scientific” (32-51). Now, admittedly, it 
is this postwar period—and the 1960s specifically—that witnesses biology’s emphatic 
disciplinary capitulation to the attitudes and methods of physics. Nonetheless, as I hope to show, 
disciplinary commitments to vitalism, organicism, and emergence are hard to shake entirely; and 
here, in the works of the novelists I analyze, they find themselves persisting through the genomic 
book of life in counterintuitive ways. The primary value of my research is to record the literary 
ramifications of DNA’s discovery, a major scientific event by any measure. But it may also 
discover in American novelists an alternative to the theory-driven mastery of chaos that both 








CHAPTER 1: FIRST PERSON PSYCHOACTIVE: KEN KESEY TRIPS THROUGH 
THE AMERICAN NOVEL 
 
While molecular biology was busy on its eighth day of creation, discovering, decoding, 
and analyzing the “secret” of life, LSD-25 was also proffered in the labs and then the 
communes and other crowds of the world as the secret of “consciousness.”  
—Richard Doyle, “LSDNA: Rhetoric, Consciousness Expansion, 
and the Emergence of Biotechnology” 
 
I could look out through the window and see the people in the hospital—the nuts—I 
could see them and knew from my altered state that they knew something that the doctors 
didn’t. They could see a truth that the doctors couldn’t see and I could see it too.  
—Ken Kesey, letter to Malcolm Cowley 
 
Introduction: Menlo Park 
In 1959, professionally frustrated and nearly broke, a young Ken Kesey reached out to his 
friend Vik Lovell for help. Lovell delivered in serendipitous fashion, landing Kesey the job that 
gave the future “pied piper of acid” his first taste of psychedelic adventure (Dodgson 128) and 
inspired his breakout novel, One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1962). Over the course of several 
months, as part of the now-infamous MK-ULTRA program, Kesey was paid to ingest a variety 
of psychotropics and record his drug-induced thoughts and sensations on tape. Reflecting on the 
experience in 1963 with Gordon Lish, a desultory Kesey described his involvement: “I took 
mescaline, psilocybin, IT-290, and some bad scene stuff . . . I had a tape recorder with me, free 
access to most of the place, and plenty of time to lie on my back watching whatever was moving 
around on the ceiling” (Lish 20).  
As real-time records of Kesey’s first psychedelic epiphanies, the transcripts of those 
psychedelic sessions—only recently transcribed and made available by Scott F. Parker, in 
2014—are strikingly premonitory of both Kesey’s first novel and his intellectual career writ 
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large. “I can see now with the Wollensak [tape recorder] in my hand here being my analyst, I can 
see where on this drug you might have great breakthroughs,” he marvels. “[I]t’s such a good 
drug . . . suddenly I am filled with this great loving and understanding of people” (8-9, 10). As 
one of the Merry Pranksters, Kesey would later travel the country in pursuit of such 
breakthroughs on and off the page. But the first recipients of Kesey’s expanded “understanding” 
were his neighbors on the ward, Menlo Park’s psychiatric inpatients. Kesey confides to his 
Wollensak that LSD “enable[s] me to look over at these guys and their minds are really shot” (7). 
Mediated by the “cogs and gears and electricity” of the Wollensak (3), Kesey begins to 
understand these psychedelic drugs as, themselves, another kind of perceptual technology. “You 
give me a chance to be on their team for a while,” he says, adding that “if I’m on their team I 
should be able to go out there and shoot the ball with them” (7). Kesey’s referentially-flexible 
“you” plausibly refers here to the drugs themselves, the tape recorder—which a tripping Kesey 
consistently personifies and addresses, calling it his “analyst” (ibid)—or the scientists who will 
be his eventual audience. Even in their sincerest moments, the tapes retain Kesey’s fascination 
with how communication is always, and multiply, mediated: here, by way of narcotic, 
technology, and discourses of institutional expertise. But it is Kesey’s deeply-rooted humanism 
that wins out; psychedelic drugs, via the descriptive alibi of visual perception, are ultimately 
deployed here as a prosthetic extension of Kesey’s empathetic sense. Tellingly, Kesey arrives at 
this empathetic largesse not in spite of the plural mediations of the experimental context, but 
because of them: his aspiration to join this “team” of the marginalized is predicated on the fact 
that psychedelic experience has allowed him to see these alienated Menlo Park inpatients as a 
community, even as they themselves do not. 
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That image of community would prove as intoxicating as the drugs themselves. In short 
order, Kesey would scrap “Zoo,” the manuscript he had been shopping, and begin work on 
Cuckoo’s Nest, a novel which recreates the environment—and actualizes, in its plot, the fraternal 
ideal—of the Menlo Park tapes. Published two years later to immediate acclaim, Cuckoo’s Nest 
recounts the arrival of charismatic misfit Randall P. McMurphy at an Oregon sanitarium under 
false pretense. Clever and lazy, McMurphy hopes to evade hard labor by faking a mental illness. 
But he quickly finds life on the ward tedious, and begins to act out. Despite the efforts of the 
sanitarium’s doctors, orderlies, and (especially) nurses, his antics succeed in rousing the 
stupefied inpatients, proverbially “shooting ball” with them in defiance of a psychiatric apparatus 
that the novel portrays as emasculating and repressive. The novel’s humanism, like the 
humanism expressed in the Menlo Park transcripts, hinges on the power of recognition through 
shared perspective: it is by adopting the exceptional point-of-view of the inpatients that 
McMurphy can return to them the (masculine) human dignity that pharmaceuticals, institutional 
capture, and a dogmatic psychiatric “rehabilitation” had taken from them. McMurphy functions 
as a benighted jester; his anarchic pranks set the stage for scenes of hard-won fellowship among 
the inpatients that, ultimately, allow them to derive a measure of psychic redemption from the 
“cogs and gears and electricity” in which the sanitarium, a machinelike carceral institution, is 
frighteningly construed.1 
 This fraternal victory is only half of the story, however. Like the Menlo Park trips that 
inspired it, Cuckoo’s Nest insists that any genuine attempt to extend one’s understanding into 
both psychedelic and psychiatric mental states necessitates a derangement of sense—and thus, in 
                                                        
1A thorough account of Kesey’s years at Menlo Park, and their relation to the composition of Cuckoo’s Nest, can be 
found in Rick Dodgson’s It’s All a Kind of Magic: The Young Ken Kesey (see, especially, ch. 5-6). Other accounts 
include Stephen L Tanner’s Ken Kesey (ch. 1-2) and Peter O. Whitmer’s Aquarius Revisited: Seven who Created the 
Sixties Counterculture that Changed America (ch. 20).  
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attempts to narrate that extension, a derangement of style. In both the Menlo Park tapes and in 
Cuckoo’s Nest itself, Kesey’s flamboyant imagery and fantastical, synesthetic descriptions 
predominate. The overhead fluorescents of Menlo Park, which Kesey describes as “great eyes” 
wired with “optic nerves leading to all the walls” (4), prefigure the paranoid conjuration of the 
panoptic, machinelike “Combine” by the narrator of Cuckoo’s Nest, Chief “Broom” Bromden 
(Cuckoo 6). The sounds of the Menlo Park EEG machine “scratched itself all across [Kesey’s] 
mind” in a prefiguration of the ominous descriptions of the novel’s Electro-Shock Therapy 
(EST) “Shock Shop” (“Trip” 14, Cuckoo 62). Descriptions fixating upon “the horrible blue, rolly 
flesh” of Menlo Park nurses, which strike Kesey as “like looking at Rorschach and seeing 
mashed testicles” are preserved in the novel’s grotesque characterization of Nurse Ratched, 
McMurphy’s main antagonist (5).2  
Kesey’s redeployment of his own psychedelic image-residues has the ironic result of 
bringing semantic and even moral order to the novel; Bromden’s nightmarish visions, in their 
emphatic repetition across the text, in fact stabilize the novel under the dyadic descriptive 
vocabularies of machine and body—and they obsess, especially, over the familiar figure of body 
as machine. Comparative analysis of the novel alongside its supremely trippy source material 
clarifies this conservative editorial ethos, revealing how Kesey consistently attached moralizing 
weight to those psilocybin visions, first uttered in tones of neutral, epiphanic detachment, in the 
transition from tape to page. Following Mark McGurl, this second-order mediation, whereby the 
derangements of sense are coopted to serve a high modernist, stream-of-consciousness narrative, 
springs from Kesey’s other institutional identity as a young man: at the time, he was an MFA 
student at Stanford (202-06). This inter-institutional narrative registers a stylistic shift: the tapes’ 
                                                        
2This particular likeness prompted a Menlo Park nurse, following the publication of Cuckoo’s Nest, to serve Kesey 
with a defamation lawsuit based on the descriptions of Nurse Ratched in the novel (Dodgson 157). 
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immediacy betrays the degree of moral and technical contouring in Kesey’s seemingly 
improvisational novel. Moreover, in an application of fictional craft that takes him from 
experimental subject to experimental author, Kesey’s politics begin to look less countercultural 
and more nostalgic, more muscularly humanist—indeed, chauvanist.3 Consequently, the 
surrealistic detail of the Menlo Park tapes ironically works to cement a conservative image of the 
novel in our critical rear view, confirming the latter as an outsized reiteration of man/system 
conflict arranged along the all-too-familiar lines of a vitalist/mechanist antipodal schema.  
This critical narrative is true but incomplete. The coherence of those origin stories belies 
the persistence of a legitimately inventive psychotomimetic derangement in Cuckoo’s Nest. It’s 
true that Kesey has always been a kind of humanist—“I don’t think you can veer very far from 
human problems and emotions and still suck the reader into turning the page,” he told Lish the 
year after Cuckoo’s Nest was published (Lish 21). Indeed, if they retain any of the tapes’ raw 
appeal, it is arguably in spite of Kesey’s artistic hand, which ultimately tames the novel’s 
interstitial exuberance by guiding it towards an elegiac, morally unambiguous conclusion. All the 
same, the narrative of institutional “disciplining” of the raw material contained in the Menlo Park 
transcripts sacrifice the genuine trace of sense derangement that not only spurred Kesey to write 
the novel but would also, in short order, propel him beyond the novel-form altogether.  
 I will argue in this chapter that, even as the psychedelic derangement of sense is tamed by 
the novel’s mechanist/vitalist symbolic schema, it is emphatically retained in a narrative tactic 
that I will call the psychoactive first person. This chapter apprehends Bromden’s narration as 
Kesey’s attempt to animate a constitutive feature of the novel genre—point of view—with a 
                                                        
3Numerous critics have rightly expressed some version of the opinion that “it’s hard not to see something deeply 
disturbing about McMurphy’s famous assault of Big Nurse at the end of the novel,” an assault that “becomes 
analogous to a rape act, meant to free the inmates from an impotent manhood” (Muñoz 670; Meloy 3). 
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problem he discovered as he attempted to narrate his own psychedelic experience: an explosion 
of the figural dimension, and mimetic function, of language itself—a breakdown in the 
distinction between seeming and being. In order to contextualize this argument, I read Cuckoo’s 
Nest as an instance of what Richard Doyle calls the genre of the psychedelic self-experiment. 
Practiced by both amateur acid-trippers and apostate scientific researchers, this discursively 
heterogeneous, methodologically unorthodox form is organized around the fundamental problem 
of making sense—of communicating psychedelic experience “back” to a lucid reader or 
“forward” to the experimenter himself after psychotomimetic effects subside. In the context of 
the psychedelic self-experiment, writing itself becomes the “prolix signature of the LSD 
experience” (Doyle 165) rather than its recapitulation, more trace than symbol.  
In this context, the DNA paradigm, in which life is not given semblance by language but 
is itself immanently textual, supplies the novel’s textual unconscious. As the referential function 
of Chief Bromden’s narration oscillates between simile and immanent sign, description and 
psychotomimetic witness, the vocabularies of vitalism and mechanism show themselves to be 
symptoms, not authentic themes, of a subject-position rendered vertiginous by psychotomimetic 
experience as it tries to find its footing. From the vantage of the first person psychoactive, these 
vocabularies are consolations: startling in their descriptive power and novelty, perhaps, but at 
bottom products of a familiar bio-theoretical paradigm that shore up a verisimilar prose aesthetic 
against its author’s growing suspicion that the difference between life and lifelikeness can no 
longer be ascertained. Finally, then, it is neither human nor machine, neither McMurphyan 
vitality nor Combine, that emerges from the novel as the enduring figure of this language-body 
encounter. It is instead, fleetingly, the cartoon realism of the grotesques that people the ward and 
the psychotomimetic imagination of Chief Bromden. This cartoon lingers as a cipher to the 
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seemingly exhaustive symbolic matrix that Bromden has built narratively, even to Kesey 
himself, as he attempts to leave the novel form behind altogether. 
Tripping Towards Speech 
 
I didn’t say it didn’t make sense, Chief, I just said it was talkin’ crazy. 
 —McMurphy to Chief Bromden 
 
I had to struggle to speak intelligibly. 
 —Albert Hofmann on LSD-25 
 
I’m a ceaseless babble. 
 —Ken Kesey on LSD-25 
 
Cuckoo’s Nest is narrated by Chief Bromden, an inpatient at an Oregon asylum who 
feigns deaf-muteness and is consequently misdiagnosed a “Chronic” case. Chronics, he explains, 
“are in for good . . . machines with flaws inside that can’t be repaired, flaws born in” (14). If 
Bromden’s misdiagnosis exempts him from the more aggressive forms of “therapeutic” 
ministration that are to be leveled at the “Acute” patients throughout the narrative, it also serves 
the neat metafictional purpose of situating him as an ideal narrator, since it does not occur to the 
doctors, nurses, and staff (to whom he is merely a “six-foot-eight sweeping machine” (67)) to 
restrict his movements or censor themselves in his presence. His misdiagnosis aside, however, 
Bromden is far from lucid; his narration makes clear that he does suffer from intermittent 
psychotic symptoms, and his perceptions are often distorted by the drug cocktails forced on him 
by asylum staff. Often, it is unclear to the reader which refractory cause is predominant at a 
given time. 
 With McMurphy’s arrival, Bromden’s deaf-mute façade begins to crack. As McMurphy’s 
insubordinate attempts to “put a betsy bug up that nurse [Ratched]’s butt” (72) escalate and begin 
to jeopardize her control over the inpatients, Bromden is reluctantly drawn out of his silence. His 
return to speech starts small, when an act of unexpected solicitude—McMurphy’s gift of a stick 
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of gum—elicits “a squawking sound . . . more like crying than laughing” from Bromden’s 
“creaky” tongue and “rusty” throat (206). Ultimately, the denouement of the power struggle 
between McMurphy and Nurse Ratched leaves him lobotomized and her power broken, and 
spurs Bromden to leave the sanitarium for good. Escape prompts the Chief to a torrent of 
uncontrollable speech. “I been silent so long now it’s gonna roar out of me like floodwaters” (8), 
Bromden warns the reader in the novel’s opening passage, a prolepsis that frames Cuckoo’s Nest 
as the textual residue of an irrepressible oral performance. 
 Formally, however—and in contradiction to his own protestations—Bromden is an 
altogether eloquent narrator. His descriptions of his fellow inpatients are precise and well-
crafted. Evincing none of the redundancy of spontaneous oral description, they make shrewd use 
of the telling detail and display considerable narrative economy in relaying personality in 
anecdote or simile. Thus Matterson, the oldest Chronic, is a “petrified cavalry soldier from the 
First War who is given to lifting the skirts of passing nurses with his cane” (16). “Rub-a-dub 
George,” a former mariner and “knotty old Swede,” resembles his own past with a head that 
“swayed like a crow’s nest on top of his mastlike spine” (215). Harding, a nervous case, is 
defined by “hands so long and white and dainty I think they carved each other out of soap, and 
sometimes they get loose and glide around in front of him free as two white birds” (18-19). 
Bromden’s narrative control is also evident in his precise temporal coordination. Smoothly 
shifting from past-tense incident to the onerous present imperfect of daily life on the ward and 
back, Bromden economizes exposition while quickly establishing his environment’s oppressive 
ambience. He further complicates this oscillation of time-frames by interspersing 
autobiographical details that take the form of long, lyrical flashbacks to his youth. Bromden’s 
logorrheic urgency recedes as the novel proceeds in such surefooted “extemporaneity,” the 
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timbre of the narrative voice resolving, despite surface-level idiosyncrasies, colloquialisms, and 
errors, into a well-orchestrated stream-of-consciousness articulation of its own inarticulateness. 
As the novel proceeds, in other words, Bromden’s initial claim that he lacks skill with language 
is undone by his rhetorical success in evoking that very lack. This irony haunts the novel with an 
ontological question that remains unsolved, and thus becomes constitutive: are we to read 
Bromden’s tale as the transcription of a (spontaneous) oral event, the (retrospective) composition 
of a self-conscious modernist subject, or, somehow, both at once?  
 Correspondingly, a survey of the criticism paints Cuckoo’s Nest as a text caught between 
codes; here, the modal tension between writing and speech subtends an idiomatic profusion that 
is largely responsible for the novel’s enduring critical purchase. Some, for example, find 
Cuckoo’s Nest amenable to psychoanalytic readings even as the pop Freudianism of postwar 
psychology is a principle object of its satire.4 (In one farcical scene, psychiatry interns attempt to 
outdo one another in producing ever-more-asinine diagnoses of McMurphy; “Latent Homosexual 
with Reaction Formation” is trumped by “Negative Oedipal” (Kesey, One 148).) This vacuous 
diagnostic language contends in turn with what Don Kunz has called the “terrifying, vivid, and 
convincingly ingenious” machine idiolect of Chief Bromden’s “schizophrenic vision” (85), 
which functions, for Kunz, as a kind of diagnostic reversal that indicts the psychiatric institution 
in its own terms.5 For critics who read McMurphy as the book’s pivotal figure, the broad-chested 
redhead wears a motley of iconographic systems: grail knight, psychic cowboy, comic Christ.6 
For critics like Elaine Safer, however, Bromden’s first person is too unstable to allow for the 
                                                        
4See Ruth Sullivan, “Big Mama, Big Papa, and Little Sons in Ken Kesey’s One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest.”  
 
5I will return to the novel’s mechanistic image repertoire in greater detail in section two of this chapter. 
 
6And the novel, by extension, has been read as chivalric romance, frontier myth, gospel. See Thomas H. Fick’s “The 
Hipster, the Hero, and the Psychic Frontier.”   
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novel to stabilize its semantics around any such symbology. Instead, his narration “fair makes the 
mind real” [sic] by way of a surrealist logic for which the novel’s symbolic overdetermination is 
a feature, not a bug (Kesey, qtd. in Safer 133).  
 Despite their superficial diversity, these interpretations imply a range of answers to the 
same (rather too simple) question: does Cuckoo’s Nest continue the tradition of American fiction 
or break from it? Unsurprisingly, the critics who isolate the allegorical intelligibility of one of the 
book’s many codes tend to read Cuckoo’s Nest in continuity with canon, whereas accounts 
emphasizing the novel’s narrative instability and symbolic excess view it as aesthetically and 
politically iconoclastic. Still others prefer to cut straight to the “canon vs. counterculture” debate, 
as George J. Searles does in this assessment:  
The book’s real importance derives more from its relationship to this longstanding 
tradition [of American fiction], and its purely artistic merits, than from its status within 
the countercultural canon. Despite its feel of almost spontaneous composition, One Flew 
Over the Cuckoo’s Nest is exceptionally well-crafted, as even the most minor details 
function purposefully to realize Kesey’s larger intentions. (1) 
 
Searles’ conclusion is built on a familiarly suspicious hermeneutics: only apparently 
experimental, Cuckoo’s Nest is, for him, a fundamentally traditional American novel. This 
opposition is contoured by Searles’ conflation of craftsmanship with the tradition of the 
American novel and his positioning of “countercultural” aesthetics as a quintessentially 
extemporaneous or improvised form. With spontaneity and “craft” thus opposed, the modal 
tension between writing and speech within the novel re-emerges in the literary-historical debates 
surrounding the broader signification of the book-as-cultural-event. 
The novel’s ambivalence towards its own “craftedness” (and, therefore, towards the 
American literary tradition writ large) also appears in Kesey’s cageyness on the editing of the 
manuscript. Despite his occasional suggestion that Cuckoo’s Nest did not require crafting—when 
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asked by Gordon Lish about the extent of his rewrites, Kesey replied “not a whole hell of a lot” 
(Lish 21)—biographical details should prevent us from thinking that the novel’s assembly was 
anything short of meticulous. In a letter to Ken Babbs, a friend and fellow MFA student at 
Stanford, Kesey acknowledges that he “tried working on [Cuckoo’s Nest] from the PV of an 
aide, me, and realized how much the narrative sounded like other promisingyoungwriter [sic] 
narrative” (qtd. in Tanner 23). An unpublished short story called “The Kicking Party,” written in 
the short period between the Menlo Park experiments and the drafting of Cuckoo’s Nest, reads 
like a sketch of the novel to come; it lacked only the “narrative key” that came when Kesey split 
the story’s protagonist into two men, a “hero of event” and a “hero of consciousness,” who 
became McMurphy and Bromden, respectively, in the subsequent novel (Tanner 24). Like 
Bromden, his creation and proxy, Kesey disguises a great deal of literary contouring with the 
claim of spontaneous expression.  
For all his countercultural bona fides, then, Kesey’s canny compositional eye shows him 
to be a product of what Mark McGurl has called “the Program Era.” The profound orthodoxy at 
the heart of the young, white literary man’s semiautobiographical and “experimental” cry of 
protest is clearer to us now, informed as we are by the incisive feminist critiques of the Beat 
generation; McGurl is hardly the first to draw out Kesey’s conservative orientation in plot and 
theme.7 But McGurl does provide particular insight into the “canon or counterculture?” 
opposition that has tended to frame Cuckoo’s Nest in critical discourse by drawing out the 
novel’s deep-seated—and double—institutionality: born in the observation rooms of the Menlo 
Park VA but incubated in the seminar rooms of Stanford University’s graduate writing program.  
                                                        




Given the veneration of high modernism promulgated by the “apostles of craft” who 
taught at Stanford, McGurl argues, it is “[n]o wonder that the narrative, as it unfolds, is really 
nothing like the onrushing rant Bromden tells us to expect.”8 Instead, the reader is confronted 
with “an unusual fusion or palimpsest of silence and speech: Bromden’s wordlessness amidst the 
events he describes in the present tense remains palpable even as it is being systematically 
negated in the (extradiegetic) telling” (204). And the volubility of “speech” in this formulation—
as we have seen, a volubility that is the function of a quintessentially literary prowess—is a 
volubility developed institutionally and over time. McGurl’s institutional history has 
particularized our understanding of the nature of Kesey’s affinity for the American canon, and in 
doing so has drawn out the context-specific meaning of “literary craft” within the environment of 
Kesey’s training as a young author. And because a crafted, Stegnerian modernist aesthetic is 
almost always what is implicitly at stake when reviews and critiques of the novel pass judgment 
one way or another on the novel’s countercultural bona fides—as we saw in Searles’ conflation 
of experimentalism with spontaneity, tradition with calculated effect—McGurl’s institutional 
history has brought aesthetic specificity to the entire critical disposition according to which this 
countercultural novel’s “hidden” conservatism is brought into focus. By providing a detailed, 
historically specific account of the creative praxis and philosophies of technique of the American 
creative writing program, McGurl’s institutional account of Kesey’s literary output during the 
1960s has given depth and shape to the author’s affinity for the American canon.  
                                                        
8Stanford’s creative writing faculty famously included Wallace Stegner and Malcolm Cowley. And while Kesey’s 
antipathy towards Stegner was both well-documented and, by all accounts, reciprocated, Kesey’s correspondence 
with classmate Ken Babbs demonstrates beyond doubt that Stegner’s instruction influenced Kesey during the 
composition of Cuckoo’s Nest. Cowley, on the other hand, was instrumental in seeing Cuckoo’s Nest to print, and he 
remained Kesey’s close correspondent and friend long after Kesey left Stanford. 
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But Kesey was the product of two institutions, not one, Burroughs’s scion no less than 
Stegner’s. A deeper understanding of the institutions and genres of 1960s psychedelic discourse 
is necessary to balance our portrait of the institutional Kesey, to draw out the properly scientific 
implications of a term of art that is, for Kesey, the equally important obverse to literary craft: 
experiment. Critical paeans to Kesey’s technical prowess have tended to greatly reduce the 
connotative range of “experimentation” and cognate terms that in fact signified broadly to Kesey 
and fellow psychedelic writers. Such praise often presumes, within a literary-critical vernacular 
of authorial prowess, a narrative control antithetical to attempts to write psychedelic experience 
and nearly turn “experiment” into its own antonym: the master-stroke of technique. Thus “an 
outstanding instance of masterly authorial control” becomes “also an impressive example of 
literary daring and innovation, as Kesey’s experimental treatment of narrative point of view [. . .] 
invests the novel with an additional dimension” (Searles 1). The novel’s speculative gamble is 
gainsaid by such praise; it minimizes the role of discovery in, even as, the act of writing. Searles’ 
analogical picture of literary experimentation adequately leverages the commonplace image of 
laboratory scientist as technician, but it cannot encompass the kinds of experimentation, 
including experimentation with and on the self, that predominated in psychedelic culture and 
even, to a surprising extent, in laboratory research on psychotropic drugs. 
In “LSDNA: Rhetoric, Consciousness Expansion, and the Emergence of Biotechnology,” 
Richard Doyle unpacks the profound challenge posed to formal scientific discourse by LSD and 
other psychotomimetic drugs. Hallucinogens pose “a question of endurance for the experimental 
self: usual experimental protocol demands that everything is involved in an experiment except 
the self, and yet here it is precisely only the self and its responses that are the very assay of LSD-
25” (161). To cross the impasse, Doyle describes how LSD-25 pioneer Albert Hofmann arrived 
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at something of an “extraordinary non sequitur” (161) in scientific logic: he “decided on a self-
experiment,” made his body both the medium of the trial as well as—through a combination of 
recollected detail and automatic writing in the moment—its instrument of measure. Insofar as 
“[h]allucinogenic discourse, both of a scientific and ‘recreational’ nature . . . must report on an 
event that is in principle impossible to represent,” this “rhetorical dilemma” is one that 
psychedelic discourse shares with ecstatic religious traditions; indeed, that affinity was oft-
remarked by the psychedelic community itself (159).   
The terms of this dilemma held true for both the researchers working on LSD and the 
drug’s popular advocates. This shared problematic gave rise to a hybrid discourse of iconoclastic 
scientists and alt-scientific “spiritual researchers” (Leary v). A quarter century after Hofmann 
was producing heterodox scientific “findings” by using a notebook to record his psychedelic 
impressions in real time, acid gurus like Timothy Leary “dropped out” of formal scientific 
discourse and turned increasingly to experimental compositional techniques—notably the “cut-
up” aesthetic of writer William S. Burroughs—as superior means of capturing the full 
phenomenological immediacy of their acid sessions. Problems of representation or “reportage” 
(Doyle 159) were fundamental to work with psychedelics; we can infer from the fact that 
investigators decades and disciplines apart came face-to-face with the same communicative 
obstacles, and hit upon cognate methods for circumventing those obstacles, that the dilemma 
found its crux in the representational limits of language at the far reaches of psychedelic 
experience. 
Kesey was already steeped in the discourse of consciousness expansion during its early 
years, when it was still more “social network” than movement.9 Perry Lane, the community 
                                                        
9Peter O. Whitmer borrows Burroughs’s description of beatnik “social networks” here to describe sixties 
counterculture in its early years. In conversation with Lovell, Whitmer enumerates the serendipitous and quite 
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where Kesey lived with his wife, Faye, was an early incubator for psychedelic discourse: 
Kesey’s introduction to the Menlo Park tests came through Lovell, his neighbor on the Lane, and 
the community produced many of the Pranksters-to-be of “Further,” the bus cum psychedelic 
lab-on-wheels that was later immortalized by Tom Wolfe in The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test 
(1968). Reports of the Harvard Psilocybin Project, headed by Leary and Richard Alpert, were 
carried west by Alpert—who later became guru Baba Ram Dass—while he held concurrent 
positions at Stanford and Harvard. Living just down the road from the Lane were Robert Hunter 
and Jerry Garcia, who would soon form The Grateful Dead; they too participated in the Menlo 
Park tests. But it was the person and prose of William Burroughs that captivated Kesey most. 
“When Burroughs’s Naked Lunch appeared on Perry Lane,” Lovell recalls, “it was incredibly 
influential to all of us in saying, ‘there are new directions.’ Especially Kesey. He was very much 
influenced by it. I recall us standing up, reading sections to each other so that we could hear the 
sound of it” (qtd in Whitmer 201, original emphasis). Burroughs’s name became something of a 
watchword for Kesey, signifying the brightest prospect for a radical literature on one hand and an 
evocation of the truth-value of psychedelic experience on the other.10 The informal 
experimentation that dominated Kesey’s personal and social life was mirrored by Kesey’s 
continued involvement with the Menlo Park VA. In 1960, not long after his stint as a paid 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
intimate connections that began to lay the groundwork for what would become a cultural movement on the national 
stage: “Lovell introduced his therapist to marijuana, then introduced his therapist to Kesey. Richard Alpert was 
teaching with Leary at Harvard, but also hanging out around Stanford . . . Lovell ran into Alpert, who was there 
watching the fog roll in with Allen Ginsberg” (203).   
 
10In a 1965 speech to the National Defense Education Act (N.D.E.A.) that articulates his increasing dissatisfaction 
with the institution of literature writ large, Kesey remains hopeful where Burroughs is concerned: “I don’t think 
anything really new has happened in writing for hundreds of years, with maybe the exception of Burroughs” (Parker 
30). The Menlo Park transcripts suggest the extent to which Kesey’s first trip, and by extension his lifelong 
involvement with psychedelic drugs, was conditioned by Burroughs’s writing, with which Kesey had evidently 
become familiar by 1960. At one point, he interrupts his train of thought to narrate a scene unfolding just outside his 
observation room: “Outside the window there’s mad conversation going on. It’s a real Burroughs scene. William S. 
Burroughs does exist! He’s all split-out spewing like characters out of horror movies, all of ‘em. Guy over here 
beating a bad rhythm blues. [Singing:] Ba-ah. Ba-ah. Ba-ah” (10). 
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research subject ended, Kesey returned to work at Menlo Park as an orderly, where his schedule 
of duties afforded him the free time in which he composed the bulk of the novel. He frequently 
wrote while tripping on psychedelics “liberated” from the office of Leo Hollister, the same 
doctor who had been in charge of the earlier experiments (Dodgson 135-38).  
These biographical facts warrant a psychedelic claim on Cuckoo’s Nest that exceeds the 
assertion, now commonplace, that “the fantasies of Chief Bromden . . . are modeled after ones 
Kesey had experienced in the hospital experiments” (Tanner 21, my emphasis). They suggest 
that Menlo Park was more than just conceptual origin and impetus for Cuckoo’s Nest; it was also 
the immediate milieu of the novel’s composition, the “set and setting” (Leary 1) of a clandestine, 
Pranksteresque “acid test” in prototype. As Kesey told Gordon Lish in 1963, at Menlo Park, LSD 
made “another world happen . . . [i]t showed me scenes I’d otherwise never know” (Parker 20). 
The vocabulary of revelation typifies Kesey’s recollections of his early encounters with 
psychotropics; he positions himself squarely within the epiphanic framework of psychedelic 
discourse. Such habits of description bolster the already strong biographical case for reading 
Cuckoo’s Nest as a document of psychotomimetic witness, the fictional logbook of its author’s 
earliest psychedelic self-experiments.  
Language that was first put to page in the psychotomimetic immediacy of his Menlo Park 
trips was later subjected to the measured pragmatics of the MFA workshop, however; A strong 
psychedelic reading of the novel would, in this sense, run counter to the respect for craft and 
canon that runs beneath the surface iconoclasm of Kesey’s person and art. Kesey’s entrenchment 
at Stanford precluded the written word from serving him, as it served the practitioners of the cut-
up, as a tool to “interrupt the grip of the authorial ego, which might interfere with the more direct 
recording of LSD experience” (Doyle 165). To the extent that the discourse of psychedelic self-
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experimentation searched for unmediated forms of epiphanic witness and aimed to present its 
unconventional data the most direct fashion, Cuckoo’s Nest can only appear ersatz: a psychedelic 
record adulterated by its immersion in the advanced fiction seminar and debased by the 
indirections of Kesey’s prose aesthetic. On such a view, Cuckoo’s Nest is the textual hybrid of 
two discourses produced by two institutions that were not just stylistically distinct, but 
incongruous in a more fundamental sense that had to do with the relationship between writing 
and the observable world. As a result, Kesey’s prose fiction would have a much harder time than 
did Burroughs’s “cut up” in severing writing-as-such from the semantic (meaning-making) and 
verisimilar (imitative) predilections of established literary aesthetics. Indeed, despite his deep 
admiration for (and clear stylistic debt to) Burroughs, Kesey’s novel does not much resemble 
Naked Lunch, Leary’s High Priest (1968), or the journal entries reproduced in Albert Hofmann’s 
LSD: My Problem Child (1979).   
However, reading Kesey’s novel as psychedelic report need not neglect the fact that it 
was constructed over time “in the shuttling from one kind of institutional space to another” 
(McGurl 206); its interpolation into the tradition of the psychedelic self-experiment need not 
amount to an insistence that the novel function indexically, by rendering a pristine, unmediated 
textual imprint of the hallucinogenic brain, as the other psychonauts attempted to do. It is surely 
possible to understand Kesey’s relationship to the written word as fundamentally different from 
Burroughs’s while maintaining that both pursued the same overriding project of 
psychotomimetic witness. Admittedly, Kesey’s example is less straightforward, insofar as the 
literary mode that he employs traffics heavily in the very logics of semblance and similitude that 
psychedelic witness sought to surpass. This meant that for Kesey, style, voice, structure—the 
obstacles of the “authorial ego”—would have to be reconceived as resources.  
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He attempted this transformation by rethinking novelistic perspective on the model of 
psychotropics themselves. Where Burroughs aimed to shatter the “doors of perception” (Huxley 
1954) by inserting a radical break between text and context, Kesey’s ambition was to exploit the 
device of first-person narration in a perceptually “kaleidoscopic” manner, using it to forge a new 
descriptive vantage onto psychedelic experience. From his first trips, Kesey understood 
psychedelics as revelatory rather than creative: like psychedelic discourse more broadly, Kesey’s 
sense of psychedelic experience is epiphanic. The epiphanic schema by which psychedelic 
discourse understands its truth-claims defines the role of psychotropics in a particular way. 
According to this schema, mind-altering drugs did not create psychedelic phenomena in a direct 
sense. Instead—for Kesey at least—psychotropics operated as optical technologies, experimental 
tools that sat alongside more traditional instruments on the researcher’s shelf:  
I’ve found [drugs] keys to worlds that have always existed, that have to be talked about. 
The kaleidoscopic pictures, the geometrics of humanity, that one experiences under, say, 
mescaline, aren’t concealed in the white crystals inside the gelatin capsule. They are 
always in the mind. In the world. Already. The chemical allows the pictures to be seen. 
To know the world you need to see as many sides of it as possible. And this sometimes 
means using microscopes, telescopes, spectroscopes, even kaleidoscopes. (Lish 21) 
 
Just as psychedelics reveal rather than create the drug-user’s perceptions, they clarify, rather than 
produce, the literary object. For Kesey, drugs did not create the “lyrical and fantastic descriptions 
in Cuckoo” any more “than Joyce’s eyeglasses created Ulysses. They merely help one to see the 
paper more clearly” (21). Not only, then, are drugs instruments that provide the (heretofore 
absent) “geometrical” vantage onto the human condition, that object of novelistic perception par 
excellence; they might also serve, in Kesey’s mind, as catalyzing and clarifying functions within 
the compositional process that most psychedelic literature sought to bypass entirely.  
In other words, Kesey’s strategy was to import the literary concept of perspective into 
psychedelic discourse, remaking the latter as a “kaleidoscopic” instrument for experiential 
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capture. Within Cuckoo’s Nest, Bromden (who Kesey “discovered” while tripping on peyote)—
and, by extension, novelistic point-of-view in general—function as optical prostheses on the 
model of psychotropics themselves. They are (literary) devices that allow Kesey to witness and 
record a hidden range of experience that would otherwise pass unseen and unsaid. During the 
composition of Cuckoo’s Nest, Kesey wrote to Ken Babbs that their teacher “Wally [Stegner] 
may have been much more correct than us avanting guards wanted to give him credit for—
maybe the largest problem in fiction is PV” (Tanner 11). Later, in a letter to Kirk Douglas, Kesey 
expressed the need for Bromden’s unstable perspective in order “to make the characters big 
enough to be equal to their job. McMurphy, as viewed from the low-angle point of view of the 
Chief, is a giant, a god, he’s every movie show cowboy that ever walked down a mainstreet . . . 
in the distorted world inside the Indian’s mind these people are exalted into a kind of 
immortality” (qtd. in Tanner 23). Often characterized as the least scientific within his cohort of 
sixties counterculture icons, Kesey nonetheless cultivates a common understanding of drug and 
literary technique alike as perceptual apparatuses, effectively reconciling the most conservative 
elements of his literary training to the radical zeitgeist in the service of psychedelic report.11 
Crucially, the root of Bromden’s perspectival distortion is indiscernible to readers of the novel; 
Bromden displays both evidence of actual schizophrenia and the temporary effects of “those 
funny pills that make me something I’m not” (32). In a manner analogous to psychotomimetic 
drugs, Chief Bromden functions for Kesey as an experimental sensory prosthesis, allowing views 
from beyond the spectrum of those available to the lucid human perspective.   
Put another way, Kesey’s solution to the dilemma of psychedelic report was to pursue a 
positive form of medium-specific practice, rather than a negative one. While cut-up practitioners 
                                                        
11For the various strains of psychedelic culture as they related to one another, see Chris Elcock’s, “From Acid 
Revolution to Entheogenic Evolution.”  
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were trying to remove, circumvent, or otherwise mitigate the mediated, and belated, 
characteristics of the medium of the written word, Kesey attempted to embrace the medium-
specific aspects of writing—most particularly, the perspectival resources of fictional prose 
writing—and employ them proactively to better achieve a record of psychedelic revelation. In 
this context, his novel’s modal oscillation between the (writerly) insistence of its style and the 
(oratorical) insistence of its narrative frame—Kesey’s insistent return to speech, over and against 
writing, as a proxy for experiential immediacy—acts as a sort of apology at the narrative level 
for the text’s relative composure at the level of articulation. While “LSD appears to have 
provoked a graphomania of sorts among Leary’s crowd” (Doyle 166), Kesey’s early experiences 
with psychotropics were defined not by a notepad but by a tape recorder. Framing Cuckoo’s Nest 
as self-experiment—and thus the direct successor of those first Menlo Park recordings—
underscores the heightened awareness Kesey showed, even in the tapes, of the very media 
aiming to record his experience in its most immediate form. “[W]hen you’re doing it with a 
paper it’s between you and something and the paper begins to represent a person like Fay or like 
Vik, who is going to be the reciprocate of it” (3), he observes early in his first session. As the 
experiment continues and the drugs take hold, the Wollensak captures Kesey’s attention to an 
increasing degree, becoming an interlocutor of a stranger sort: “it really becomes this great beast, 
this toad-like thing, all hunkered down listening, not only listening but sucking it in probably 
better than most people do” (5). Writing becomes a technology for producing resemblance, 
understanding, and “reciprocates” [sic] while the audio tape, “the unwinding reel that is [the 
Wollensak’s] brain,” is a medium that not only records speech, but proactively elicits it. An early 
musing about how “placebo may be even more of a drug than anything” (4) feeds Kesey’s later 
apostrophes to his Wollensak—“you waiting toad, you big listening toad” (5)—that characterize 
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the recording device as the instantiation of scientific expectancy: “the trouble with you,” he tells 
it, “is you are not really patient. You would think that a tape recorder would be the most patient 
thing in the world, but look at you there, you make this tiny little humming sound” (5). These 
complaints voice a performance anxiety expressed throughout the transcript: Kesey’s fear that he 
will fail to produce a meaningful record, that he will fail to be scientifically interesting. 
“[K]nowing the doctor’s going to listen to this tape and I want to give him something,” he frets. 
“I’m trying too hard. I’m not being myself. I’m not being natural. I’m not allowing myself to 
associate. Maybe because I’m afraid there isn’t anything in here worth giving so I have to 
manufacture a good thing” (9). The Wollensak, not unlike Bromden’s expectant reader, elicits a 
logorrheic oral performance that intersperses epiphany with long stretches of testimony that 
augur nothing more than the obligation to say anything at all.12 “That Wollensak, a woolen sack, 
what a thought. See the trouble with the tape recorder is you begin to think, ‘I’m rambling for 
ramblin’s sake,’ like I would not have said ‘woolen sack’ under ordinary circumstances. Or to 
have even taken the trouble with pencil and paper” (4). Where Hoffman’s “struggle . . . to speak 
intelligibly” (12) presented the original challenge for the psychedelic self-experiment, Kesey’s 
literary detour through orality reframes the problematic of psychedelic reportage away from 
speechlessness and in the direction of extreme loquacity. They are two sides of the same coin: 
mute witness gives way to the “onrushing floodwaters” of epiphanic babble. 
We can thus begin to see how Cuckoo’s Nest instantiates the psychedelic report not just 
narratively but also formally, in the novel’s very structure. The sanitarium of the novel’s setting 
delineates, in narrative space and time, a fixed interval that is at once indescribable (Bromden is 
mute) and immanent description (it is made out of Bromden’s insistently present retrospection). 
                                                        
12Bromden’s paranoia—or what the reader assumes to be paranoia—also takes note of that exemplary technology of 
surveillance, the tape recorder, by often observing “A faint reeling rhythm, what I figure is a tape recorder 
somewhere getting all of this” that he imagines hidden within the sanitarium’s walls (59).  
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The sanitarium is the epiphanic “happening of another world” that Kesey first experienced at 
Menlo Park. Before the novel’s retrospective framing becomes apparent, Bromden’s narration 
begins in situ, with an arrestingly surreal description of Nurse Ratched “swelling up” into a 
mechanical beast “big as a tractor” and wielding “sectioned arms” (4-5). Bromden’s awed 
phantasmagorical witness of “the shape of [Ratched’s] hideous real self” (5) persists until he is 
snared by a pair of orderlies, who attempt to restrain him and shave his head. When the electric 
razor approaches Bromden’s temple, “It’s a . . . button, pushed, says Air Raid Air Raid, turns me 
on so loud it’s like no sound” (7, second emphasis mine). The razor “turns on” the extradiegetic 
Bromden; at that moment, his narration toggles from the present tense of his terrified subdual to 
the present tense of Bromden’s narrative reconstruction of ward routine. 
Seeming to open in medias res, the novel’s opening situates the text from within as a 
psychotomimetic spectacle that is louder than sound and real beyond representation: “it’s the 
truth even if it didn’t happen” (8), Bromden insists, and in so insisting asks the reader to suspend 
mimetic criteria for the duration of his account. The ward ultimately becomes synonymous with 
Bromden’s narration of it, and the architecture of both is epiphanic: Bromden can only articulate 
his experience in retrospect because the parameters of that experience rendered him mute while 
he endured it; at the same time, it demands the immediacy of the present tense even in the 
framework of recollection. The ward is the instantiated world of the acid trip; Bromden is the 
bewildered fellow-traveler of Albert Hofmann, who “struggled to speak intelligibly” while in the 
grips of psychotomimetic experience. Not only because of the historical conditions of its 
composition, then, but also in its formal construction—a construction that suspends Bromden’s 
account between recollection and witness, voicelessness and deafening babble—Cuckoo’s Nest 
takes its place alongside Naked Lunch (1959) and such (literally) experimental literature as 
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Hofmann’s LSD: My Problem Child (1974) and The Psychedelic Experience: A Manual Based 
on the Tibetan Book of the Dead (1964)—which Leary, Alpert, and Ralph Metzner were busy 
assembling during the year of Cuckoo’s Nest’s publication—in the archive of psychedelic 
inscription.  
Psychoactive Mechanics and Cartoon Optics 
 
Reading Cuckoo’s Nest as a report on psychedelic self-experimentation offers a way to 
make historical-institutional sense of what Elena Semino and Kate Swindlehurst, following 
Roger Fowler, have called the novel’s “mind style” (143). Mind style, or the “construction and 
expression in language of the conceptualization of reality in a particular mind” (144), has been a 
common starting-point for the critics of Cuckoo’s Nest, whether or not they use the term 
explicitly to frame their readings. Tanner, for example, argues that Bromden’s narration 
establishes an “opposition of Nature and Machine [that] is the primary conflict of the novel, and 
this opposition constitutes the central nervous system for the patterns of imagery” (25) that it 
contains. The neurological purchase of a concept like mind style is especially appropriate for the 
way in which Kesey’s novel presents Bromden’s descriptive predilections as prior to 
psychology, prior to subjectivity—as even such casual analogies to the “central nervous system” 
suggest.  
The novel’s mind style is immediately apparent in its opening lines, which relay 
Bromden’s horror at the clockwork Nurse Ratched, who moves with “precise, automatic 
gesture[s],” whose face “is smooth, calculated and precision-made, like an expensive baby doll, 
skin like flesh-colored enamel”—and who carries a “bag full of a thousand parts she aims to use 
in her duties today—wheels and gears, cogs polished to a hard glitter, tiny pills that gleam like 
porcelain” (5, 4). Bromden is emphatic and consistent enough in these imaginings that few 
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readings of the novel fail to account for its mechanistic tropology, whether to characterize 
Bromden as “a poet working his way to understanding” with “image patterns” that “integrate 
nature and machine” (Porter 14) or to show, as Kunz has thoroughly, how Kesey’s “fusion of 
specified conceptual sources comprises an ingeniously comprehensive symbolic matrix and gives 
. . . new meaning” and renewed currency to the American literary predilection, rooted in Puritan 
allegory, for the “symbolic method” (81-82). We may choose to read them as psychotropically- 
or pharmaceutically-induced hallucinations; schizophrenic visions; waking dreams; or, simply, 
extremely vivid metaphor—the airtight narrative solipsism of Bromden’s first-person perspective 
precludes a definitive verdict. All we can really be sure of, according to John Hunt, is that 
Cuckoo’s Nest aspires to “a truth which generates its own facts” (14).   
However they signify, those facts, according to Bromden, are clear: “Yes. This is what I 
know. The ward is a factory for the Combine. It’s for fixing up mistakes made in the 
neighborhoods and in the schools and in the churches, the hospital is” (38). The Combine is 
Bromden’s own paranoiac coinage, “a huge organization that aims to adjust the Outside as well 
as the Inside” (26) in order to produce a compliant citizenry in appearance, behavior, and 
thought. The Combine and its methods entail a “robotic theory of man” (Kunz 83) that 
Bromden’s account makes literal: even the well-adjusted subject is a machine that “finally runs 
down after a pre-set number of years” (Kesey, One 38). Defective models like the inpatients are 
kept in line by agents of the Combine, “bastards apt to slip one of their machines in on you” (6) 
by, for example, disguising them as pills.  
The combine sizes up, or sizes down, to accommodate Bromden’s mechanistic 
apprehensions. Inpatients assembled out of “miniature electronic elements . . . microscopic wires 
and grids and transistors” (33) are themselves component parts of the Big Nurse’s “outfit,” a 
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“smooth, accurate, precision-made machine” (26) operating on the scale of the sanitarium and of 
society writ large. According to its supervisor, Doctor Spivey, the ward is “is a little world Inside 
that is a made-to-scale prototype of the big world Outside” (47). At once synecdoche and ideal, it 
is exemplary in a double sense. But when Bromden gets a rare vacation from the ward, the 
Doctor’s scale-model view of society resolves into the dystopian panorama of “five thousand 
houses punched out identical by a machine and strung across the hills outside of town, so fresh 
from the factory they’re still linked together like sausages” (228). The nested, Matryoshka 
regression of interlocking machines transforms the ward into a clockworks, imbuing every aspect 
of life there with a mechanical ambience. Every morning “the walls whirr and hum into full 
swing,” and the inpatients’ activities are guided by silent imperatives: “Everybody: breath in . . . 
breath out . . . in perfect order; hearts all beating at the rate the OD cards have ordered. Sound of 
matched cylinders” (31). Effecting a reversal of cause and effect, Bromden’s apprehension of the 
Combine has the inpatients receiving physiological “orders” from the very tools that are meant to 
record, rather than dictate, their circadian rhythms. 
Bromden’s machines are never more spectacular than when they break, and the ward, 
home to broken machines, offers plenty of examples of the Combine’s “adjustments” gone awry. 
After a former Acute named Ruckly has been “overloaded” by way of lobotomy, Bromden 
opines that “[y]ou can see by his eyes how they burned him out over there; his eyes are all 
smoked up and gray and deserted inside like blown fuses” (15). Another Chronic named Pete is 
“[l]ike an old clock that won’t tell time but won’t stop neither, with the hands bent out of shape 
and the face bare of numbers and the alarm bell rusted silent, an old, worthless clock that just 
keeps ticking and cuckooing without meaning nothing” (53). Watching the orderlies face down 
Pete’s psychotic episode, Bromden reports that “they shook and smoked and I could hear gears 
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grinding. I could see them twitch with confusion, like machines throttled full ahead and with the 
brake on” (51). In a sense, Bromden’s account starts and ends with McMurphy because it is his 
sabotage that makes the Combine’s machinery visible—up to and including the Big Nurse 
herself, whose discountenance in the face of McMurphy’s insubordination is betrayed by a “red-
hot wire [that] had got hot enough to melt, shimmer a second, then click solid as the molten 
metal sets” (96-97). McMurphy’s introduction to the ward is like a wrench thrown into its 
gearbox that precipitates mechanical conniptions at every interlocking level.  
In a departure from modernist first-person precursors like Fitzgerald’s Nick Carraway 
and Faulkner’s Quentin Compson, Chief Bromden’s unreliability does not revolve around the 
vicissitudes of memory; his mechanistic descriptions do not signify the subjective poeticization 
of the past. There are no inflections of Jamesian unreliability in his narration, which is, on the 
contrary, forthright in its metaphoric investments and figurally consistent almost to a fault. 
Bromden’s mechanistic mind style—the ubiquity of organism-machine comparisons and the 
consistency with which the machine is made nightmarish, the natural celebrated— is explicit and 
unsubtle. But understanding Bromden’s descriptive monotony as a kind of presubjective wiring 
strengthens the case for reading him as an instrument of psychotomimetic perception particularly 
calibrated to that descriptive register: a camera recording always and only from a fixed, “low 
angle” that not only makes McMurphy a giant and Ratched “that age-old ogre of tyranny” 
(Tanner 23) but that also renders them consistently, as if through an optical filter, as the “ten-
thousand-watt psychopath” pitted against the “watchful robot” who surveils the ward by 
monitoring “hairlike wires too small for anybody’s eye but [Bromden’s]” with “mechanical 
insect skill” (26). Neither suggestive nor subjective, Bromden’s descriptions are reiterative and 
emphatic in their effects.  
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This “comprehensive” insistence introduces its own form of narrative unreliability (Kunz 
81). We begin the novel having already left the province of realism behind: “you think the guy 
telling this is ranting and raving my God” (8), Bromden declaims at the outset, preempting the 
skepticism of the trained suspicious reader, “this is too awful to be the truth! But, please. It’s still 
hard for me to have a clear mind thinking on it. But it’s the truth even if it didn’t happen” (8). 
The speculative gambit in Bromden’s plea is reinforced by the novel’s dedicatory nod to Lovell, 
“who told me dragons did not exist, then led me to their lairs” (v).13 Together they frame the 
novel as an endeavor in speculation: in the flat verbal immanence of Bromden’s narrative, fact 
and fantasy coexist in the as if of the possibly true. Understood as a document of 
psychotomimetic witness composed in the tradition of the self-experiment, this only makes 
sense: in Bromden’s psychoactive first-person, the compounding problems of phenomenological 
parameters in flux (intoxication, psychedelia, psychosis) and a solipsistic first person (the text’s 
absolute narrative commitment to Bromden’s perspective) make plausibility impossible for us to 
judge. Sheer insistence will need to be the characteristic narrative gesture because we have been 
thrown into a genre to which the criteria of realism no longer apply.  
In making McMurphy out to be a vitalist avatar and pitting him against the nightmarish 
machinery of the Combine, Kesey is activating an age-old opposition within the natural sciences 
that, by Cuckoo’s Nest’s publication in 1962, had once again become topical. In the opening 
pages of his Order and Life (1936), Joseph Needham frames vitalism—defined as any biological 
theory “which postulate[s] some entity in the living organism in addition to the chemical 
elements”—as one of the “the ultimate problems of biology” and dissensus over its legitimacy as 
a major roadblock to “the [great] need for a comprehensive biological science” (6). Needham 
                                                        
13In the 1963 Lish interview, Kesey clarifies that his dedication did, indeed, refer to Lovell’s facilitation of his 
participation in the Menlo Park trials. 
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exemplifies the longstanding habit of thought among biologists that maps their discipline onto 
the opposition between vitalism and mechanism, a polarity with Cartesian antecedents that well 
predate Lamarck’s coinage of “biology” itself in the early 19th century. In the decades leading up 
to the 1953 discovery of the double helix, vitalism was increasingly disparaged as 
pseudoscience. Correspondingly, scientists moved to embrace research programs informed by a 
mechanist perspective, their questions framed around the possibility that vital effects might in 
fact be reduced to material, mechanical causes at cellular and sub-cellular levels. Avery et al.’s 
1944 findings, pointing to a chemical and thus mechanistic solution to the longstanding “riddle 
of life,” paved the way for the double helix to intervene decisively in the longstanding vitalism / 
mechanism debate. With DNA, “all remaining doubts about the material reality of the gene were 
dispelled” (Keller 3); assertions like Francois Jacob’s claim that “[t]he reproduction of an 
organism has become that of its constituent molecules” (1) became dogmatic. Consequently, “the 
way was cleared for the gene to become the foundational concept capable of unifying all of 
biology” (Keller 3); under the explanatory aegis of a mechanistic biochemistry, Needham’s 
“great need” had been answered.14 In short order, genetic theory made the theoretical triumph of 
mechanism terminologically explicit by coining the genetic “code” and “program.” These terms, 
still preeminent today, delineate a model for life that is explicitly based on the cyberneticist’s 
analogy between organism and computer.  
Under the aegis of cybernetic discourse, biological mechanism constituted a metaphorical 
lingua franca that acid trippers and life scientists shared. Doyle argues that “Timothy Leary and 
                                                        
14It is likely incorrect to treat vitalism as it is deployed by biologists as synonymous with vitalism in a more 
developed philosophical sense—the vitalism of Henri Bergson, for example. Further, as Richard Doyle’s On Beyond 
Living convincingly demonstrates, at a disciplinary level the opposition between vitalism and molecular biology is 
only “apparent,” despite the repudiations of the latter. On this view, Jacob’s claim that “the aim of modern biology 
is to interpret the properties of the organism by the structure of its constituent molecules” (9) simply masked the way 
that even molecular biology, in order to fix its disciplinary object in place, still “relied on an unseen unity that 
traversed all the differences and discontinuities of living beings, ‘life’” (Doyle 11). 
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Frances Crick were speaking the same language, the language of information where the organic 
and the machinic enfold each other helically” (153). Not only did nucleic acids serve as “crucial 
rhetorical vectors composing hallucinogenic discourse of the 1950s and 1960s,” there were also 
“many experiments among researchers attempting to ingest DNA and RNA itself” conducted on 
the model of psychotropic self-experimentation (158). These fruitless and rather naïve attempts 
to ingest genetic material directly highlight the incongruity between these two discourses that 
(deceptively) shared a language. From the perspective of early molecular genetics, DNA was a 
“fundamentally stable semantic phenomenon or ‘secret’” to be decoded (Doyle, “LSDNA” 157). 
The mechanism was fixed, the genetic program “rigid” (Jacob 8); genetic theory did not consider 
DNA to be malleable—inter- or psychoactive—within individual organisms. The genetic theory 
of the 1960s was still relatively distant from the advent of recombinant DNA technology in the 
mid-1970s; direct genomic intervention was not much more than a vague hypothetical for formal 
life-science discourse. On the other hand, the psychedelic community approached DNA in ways 
“fundamentally pragmatic rather than semantic”; to them, the biomechanical gene was “more 
recipe than message”—an invitation to tinker more than a book to be read (Doyle, “LSDNA” 
158). During the years when the focus of genetic research was properly epistemological—trained 
on deciphering the double helix, which it saw as a cryptographically complex, but fundamentally 
stable, text—psychedelic discourse was already exploring, with the aid of psychoactive drugs, a 
more manipulable and chemically fungible idea of life.  
The mechanistic theory given body by Bromden’s descriptive “mind style” is hard to 
miss. Idiolectically recapitulating a momentous sea-change in the life sciences, it is also 
exceedingly timely. However, the triumph of genetic mechanism in biology was not the last 
word in the theoretical annals of the life sciences. Arguably, the self-experiments of the 
65 
psychedelic project, rigorous after their own fashion, were already anticipating the eventual 
opening of the biological machine to the mutability of genetic recombination. Similarly, the 
psychotomimetic spectacle of mechanism to which Bromden bears witness is not the full story of 
Cuckoo’s Nest. This tropological overdetermination is due, rather, to the gap that existed 
between the operative assumptions of psychedelic discourse and the emergent scientific 
paradigm of molecular biology—a gap or theoretical incongruity disguised by the fields’ shared 
mechanistic argot. As a document of the psychedelic project, Cuckoo’s Nest trades in the 
renascent mechanistic determinism of the contemporaneous scientific episteme even as it 
anticipates the “undoing of life, and concomitant ‘loss’ of integrity in the organism” that 
recombinant DNA would later herald (Doyle 157). In other words, the novel participates in the 
psychedelic movement’s anticipatory exploration of genetic mutability, but, unlike its 
psychedelic fellow-travelers, it retains an investment in a philosophy of fixed biological 
mechanism that was arguably more literary than scientific. In contrast, then, to more 
untrammeled examples of psychedelic composition, what Kesey’s novel provides is an interface 
where two distinct mechanistic theories meet. The mental ward provides the stage upon which 
we witness bodies stuck between them, organic machines presented in various states and stages 
of spectacular malfunction. Meanwhile, for Bromden, the “loss of the integrity of the 
organism”—experienced as the dissolution of Bromden’s subjective boundaries—threatens 
narratively to literally dis-integrate into “babble.” Bromden’s “symbolic matrix” of mechanism 
and vitalism is “overloaded” by the semantic voltage it is asked to carry.  
Under the weight of this incongruity between mechanism and recombinant plasticity, 
Bromden’s mechanistic symbology fissures as the novel progresses. This fissuring is twofold. In 
the first place, within the mechanistic imagination: Bromden’s insistence upon the overriding 
66 
conflict between vitalism and mechanism obscures inconsistencies among his mechanistic 
metaphors—especially between analog clockworks and electrified systems—that hail from 
markedly different scientific paradigms and thus carry significantly different implications. In the 
second place—and very much despite itself—Bromden’s mechanical world-view, which is 
everywhere attempting to harden, particularize, and render discrete, begins to dissolve. 
We can see the mechanistic symbolism of the novel begin to crack in passages that 
elevate the machine motif to something more like a parametric condition of Bromden’s diegetic 
world. This does not stop at the “machinery in the walls” or the “steady cruising speed” heard in 
the ambient machine-sounds of the smooth-functioning ward (75, 36). With Nurse Ratched at the 
helm, Bromden imagines the ward machinery as capable of controlling the parameters of his 
experience at every level, down to the passage of time and the circadian rhythms of the cycle of 
night and day: 
The Big Nurse is able to set the wall clock at whatever speed she wants by just turning 
one of those dials in the steel door; she takes a notion to hurry things up, she turns the 
speed up, and those hands whip around that disk like spokes in a wheel. The scene in the 
picture-screen windows goes through rapid changes of light to show morning, noon, and 
night---throb off and on furiously with day and dark, and everybody is driven like mad to 
keep up with that passing of fake time . . . till the Big Nurse sees everybody is right up to 
the breaking point, and she slacks off on the throttle, eases off the pace on that clock-dial, 
like some kid fooling with the moving-picture projections machine.  
. . . 
But generally it’s the other way, the slow way. She’ll turn that dial to a dead stop 
and freeze the sun there on the screen so it don’t move a scant hair for weeks . . . You sit 
solid and you can’t budge, you can’t walk or move to relieve the strain of sitting, you 
can’t swallow and you can’t breathe . . . the only thing you can move is your eyes . . . and 
instead of fog sometimes she’ll let a clear chemical gas in through the vents, and the 
whole ward is set solid when the gas changes to plastic. (73-74) 
 
The clock is the appropriate mechanism here not only for the obvious reason that its purpose is to 
measure time, but also because it imagines Bromden’s universe as an intricate clockworks in 
which the movement of the small gear—Bromden’s ability to swallow—is in fixed relation to the 
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movement of the largest—the day/night cycle—through elaborate, interlocking mechanisms 
controlled by a single, central dial. Before McMurphy’s arrival on the ward, this is the perfectly 
suffocating machine-world that Bromden imagines: one governed by pristine Newtonian 
causality, a physics without entropy to degrade or otherwise interfere with the speeding up, 
slowing down, or even total arrest of the whole interlocking mechanism according to the whims 
of its pilot. 
 McMurphy’s introduction to the ward functions to disrupt this immaculate Newtonian 
clockworks. He simply “can’t keep still” (100). So he disrupts it by introducing chance: a 
compulsive gambler, he throws a pad of butter against the wall and begins taking bets from the 
inmates on whether it will reach the floor before the clock strikes seven-thirty. In the conflict 
between McMurphy and Nurse Ratched, the wagers exchanged between the men mark a 
symbolic victory for McMurphy’s long game. His instigation here serves the double purpose of 
winning the affection of the ward inpatients and beginning to make the ward over according to 
his cardsharp’s plans for it. But then there is the butter itself, “easing down the wall like a yellow 
snail . . . starting, hanging still, shooting ahead and leaving a shiny trail behind it on the paint” 
(101). Banal as it may seem, the butter’s unpredictable descent is what gets the clock, which had 
been lying “about how we only been sitting here fifteen minutes when you can tell it’s been at 
least an hour,” moving again (100). Here, again, McMurphy’s very presence provides the 
contrast that makes mechanism visible and, therefore, narratable. McMurphy is not only the vital 
counter-force to the mechanical routinization of the ward, he is also a new kind of mechanism: a 
chance engine, a “ten thousand watt psychopath” whose logic is electrical rather than analog and 
resembles a motor rather than a clock. In confounding the clockworks of the ward, he also 
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disrupts Bromden’s descriptive schema, insofar as McMurphy’s struggle with Ratched has 
become a duel between machines, not between machine and man. 
We might consider the symbolic overdetermination of Cuckoo’s Nest evidence of just 
how fraught the (already tenuous) project of “realistic” narration becomes under the influence of 
psychotropics, when the distinction between impression and reality is made turbulent and the 
walls of psychic integrity have broken down. Indeed, what is most remarkable about Bromden is 
the tenacity with which he deploys that “symbolic matrix” to guard his psychic barriers and, as a 
result, retain the cogency of the first-person narrative position throughout the novel. One of 
Bromden’s visits to the library prompts an autobiographical tangent that bears out this tactic. “I 
walk over to the technical section, stand there looking at the titles of books on electronics, books 
I recognize from that year I went to college; I remember inside the books are full of schematic 
drawings and equations and theories—hard, sure, safe things” (171). The resolute materialism of 
theoretical mechanism in the sciences here takes shape as in the catalog of “tiny pills that gleam 
like porcelain” (4) and “cogs polished to a hard glitter” (3). The Combine is a hard, sure, safe 
paranoia for Bromden. By its logic, Bromden’s subjective effects are projected outward in order 
to allow him to maintain a modicum of sovereignty over his own body and mind as he perceives 
them. When Bromden understands his sedative-induced lethargy as the work of a “fog machine” 
or as immurement in clear plastic (109), he is creatively interpreting psycho-physiological 
impairments as atmospheric conditions, forms of constraint applied from without. The Chief thus 
stubbornly guards his interiority, attributing drug effects to external influence: “the Big Nurse 
put a thousand pounds down me and I can’t budge out of the chair” (9). This perception remains 
the case even for those threats to which Bromden’s reaction is most hysterical—namely, the 
ingestion or insertion of machinery or “miniature electronic elements” by way of pills (33). Even 
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Electro-Shock Therapy (EST), to which the Chief bears gruesome witness—“I hear them in there 
pry up his forehead like a manhole cover, clash and snarl of jammed cogs” (269)—is made more 
bearable as a mechanical adjustment.  
Perhaps this is what comes of finding oneself an instrument calibrated to interpret what it 
sees in biomechanical reifications: mechanism, far from being the revelatory vision of the 
narrator, is a symptom of his attempt to contain, order, and narrate psychotomimetic experience. 
This becomes clear over the course of the novel with the disintegration of Bromden’s 
mechanistic vision, which comes to look more like a symptom than a symbology as the 
inconsistencies of its system of imagery—Kunz’s “symbolic matrix”—multiply. In a kind of 
inverted pathetic fallacy, the vocabulary of mechanism allows Bromden to externalize 
psychotomimetic experience: the derangement of his schizophrenia and the effects of the 
pharmaceuticals he is forced to take can both be reimagined as machines. This psychological 
operation works to guard the integrity of Bromden’s subjectivity.  
But the mechanism/vitalism conceptual battle in Cuckoo’s Nest is transected by an 
oscillation that is congruent to, but even more fundamental than, the text’s modal oscillation 
between writing and speech: an axis of uncertainty regarding the referential status of language 
itself, as it vacillates between seeming and being. Here the flat immanence of Bromden’s 
onrushing account—which has already, as we have seen, exceeded mimetic criteria by 
pronouncing itself “so loud it’s like no sound” and real beyond mere “happening”—renders his 
own narration “psychoactive,” insofar as his descriptions would appear to possess “the ability to 
affect the mind, emotions, or behavior” (OED, online) of its utterer. The sanitarium is the text is 
the trip; Bromden’s utterance is coterminous with his period of detention and his psychopathy, 
which appears to lift as he escapes the ward to close the novel. The interval of phenomenological 
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derangement that constitutes Cuckoo’s Nest as a book exhibits no meaningful beyond; 
Bromden’s first-person becomes synonymous with sanitarium, text, and trip.  
With the heady atmosphere of the 1960s now well behind us, the “canon or 
counterculture?” question about Cuckoo’s Nest has been settled to critical satisfaction. Today, 
Cuckoo’s Nest is most often read as an institutional parable for postwar America, especially 
notable for its author’s mastery of the literary resources of symbolism and point-of-view; explicit 
countercultural themes and stylistic markers are broadly understood to belie a more fundamental 
canonical traditionalism. Reading Cuckoo’s Nest as an entry in the genre of psychedelic report 
allows us to begin to challenge the terms of that either/or by showing how the novel participates 
in the countercultural movement, and the psychedelic project in particular, by way of its 
institutional investments, not in spite of them. In effect, this reading allows us to invert the terms 
of a biographical claim: instead of suggesting that Kesey’s personal psychedelic experiences 
serve as material for fiction—though that is also true—reading Cuckoo’s Nest into the genre of 
the psychedelic self-experiment ends by showing how, somewhat counterintuitively, Kesey 
turned the novel form into a medium for personal record and psychotomimetic expression.  
The logorrheic immanence of Cuckoo’s Nest—by which I mean the synonymy it 
establishes between speech and story, experience and witness—raises the stakes of medium-
specificity in the project of psychotomimetic witness in a new way. It also fundamentally 
reconfigures that project, away from the challenge of ineffability and towards one of linguistic 
effulgence. For Kesey, the gap between oral testimony and written recollection constitute not 
only the structuring conceit and thematic pursuit of Cuckoo’s Nest, but, over the course of the 
1960s, a leitmotif that would define his subsequent career:  
When [Kesey] later turned from writing novels to concentrate on achieving heightened 
consciousness and perception through psychedelic drugs, he used a technique similar to 
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that used in these first [Menlo Park] experiments. Many of the tapes in the Kesey 
Collection are of him recording, as they occur, his impressions under drugs. They display 
singular skill in vivid spontaneous description. (Tanner 20) 
 
Reading Cuckoo’s Nest within the tradition of the psychedelic self-experiment has the virtue of 
dislodging the novel from its static canonical reputation; Cuckoo’s Nest comes to serve, instead, 
as evidence of an artistic endeavor in transition, one which captures a stage in Kesey’s career 
when he was actively attempting to reconcile his humanist predilections and literary training 
with a burgeoning interest in psychedelia. That reconciliation plays out across the novel’s 
descriptive fabric—a fabric dominated by a biological lexicon of mechanism and vitalism that 
can be understood, in a psychedelic context, as more than merely figural. As a document of 
psychedelic witness, Cuckoo’s Nest stages the narrative conflict between mechanism and 
vitalism as a kaleidoscopic life-study, a colloquial biology that means to apprehend the stuff of 
life-as-such in a postwar moment when the definition of life was very much up for grabs.  
Coda: Further 
As literary timekeeping goes, Kesey’s trip through the American novel was a quick one. 
By 1965, with his second novel Sometimes a Great Notion still in production, he was already 
telling audiences that “I’m not a writer. I haven’t written anything since I finished the last drafts 
of Notion, and I don’t honestly look to write anything else” (Kesey, “NDEA” 30). He would go 
on to write and publish a great deal more, of course, but his return to the page was belated, and 
Cuckoo’s Nest and Notion remain his two seminal works. In a speech to the National Defense 
Education Act (NDEA) that same year, he indicates why:  
You learn to do a thing, you get so you’re able to do it with some ease and some 
cleverness, and then you begin to do it over and over because you find that there’s 
a market. . . . Once you realize that you’re writing commercials, that’s it. . . . And 
within this framework nothing new happens. I don’t think anything really new has 
happened in writing for hundreds of years, with maybe the exception of 
Burroughs. I found that no matter how hard I would try to find new areas of my 
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mind or of another person’s mind in my writing I would be walking through a 
territory and see there was Shakespeare’s sign, he did it, he did it, and we’ve just 
been doing it over and over again (29-30). 
 
Reading Cuckoo gives one a sense that this departure from the novel form is already imminent; 
Kesey’s ambivalent relationship to the lyrical realism he had learned at Stanford appears 
intractable even within the bounds of the novel. The curious conceptual alliances that resulted 
from the novel’s setting, alongside the fundamental psychotomimetic equivalence it suggests 
between consciousness expansion and mental illness, prove untenable; the overriding mechanist 
diagram of the novel dictates its trajectory from the start. As the influence of Big Nurse wanes 
and her gears begin to skip and lock, a more conventionally lyrical first-person narrative voice 
begins to speak through the Chief’s parched throat. His biomechanical visions become less 
frequent. Ultimately, he takes his leave of the ward, disappearing to the woods of the American 
Northwest. This departure, though it scans as a simultaneous return to sense, novelistic form, and 
vitalist thematics, is also the moment of Kesey’s authorial disengagement, however. His 
psychedelic interests outside the novel, and the concentration of his descriptive verve within it, 
both trend against McMurphy’s martyrdom—which is, after all, an anachronistic victory in both 
literary and scientific contexts—because despite its sinister implications as a social metaphor, 
mechanism is simply more interesting, especially to the psychoactive imagination, than the 
humanist moral that the novel ultimately obligates itself to deliver.   
Kunz and others rightly argue that the “ingenuity” of Kesey’s imagery in Cuckoo’s Nest 
gave “new validity” to the use of symbol that has been understood as central to prior American 
literary practice. That may be so, but Cuckoo’s Nest also shows Kesey already dissatisfied with 
the symbolic mode, even as he participates in its revitalization; he is artistically constricted by a 
tradition he nonetheless lionizes. McMurphy bears this ambivalence, outed as the heir apparent 
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to the great individualists of the American literary canon when Bromden catches him with his 
pants down: “The shorts under his work pants are coal black satin covered with big white whales 
with red eyes. He grins when he sees I’m looking at the shorts. ‘From a co-ed at Oregon State, 
Chief, a Literary major.’ He snaps the elastic with his thumb. ‘She gave them to me because she 
said I was a symbol’” (81).  
An uncharacteristically self-conscious gesture on Kesey’s behalf, McMurphy’s 
overdetermined “symbolization” here breaks frame with Bromden’s narration in several ways. 
Not only are the terms of the analogy unclear—McMurphy’s explanation suggests that he is the 
whale, while his personality and tragic monomania within the novel’s plot suggest that he is 
Ahab—but moreover because this moment that interpolates Cuckoo’s Nest into the American 
literary canon also (uncharacteristically) functions according to an older, stabler referential 
paradigm: dramatic irony, which relies positionally on the reader’s mastery to snag a reference 
that the relatively naïve narrator by design cannot. It is the sort of audience-facing wink that the 
novel only engages in once, and it distills a great deal of meta-fictional pathos for its author, who 
clearly desires to participate in that canonical tradition even as his stultifying wink to camera 
demonstrates just how little energy he can muster to continue to write under such prescribed 
regimes of signification.  
The other character who bears witness to the literary-historical impasse of Cuckoo’s Nest 
is Harding, a highly educated neurotic case whose dialogue plays counterpoint to McMurphy’s 
rough-hewn vigor and to the Chief’s counterrealism. Harding is not as physical as the other 
characters, seeming to serve a different narrative function by giving Kesey a valve through 
which to inject high cultural signifiers into the lieu quelconque of the sanitarium. His one 
emphatically physical attribute are his beautiful hands. Nervous and possessing a life of their 
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own, these hands are the precise formal echo of the hands of Wing Biddlebaum of Sherwood 
Anderson’s Winesburg, Ohio (1913)—another uncharacteristically “literary” gesture that indexes 
Kesey’s ambivalent relationship to canon. Harding is the voice of defeatist nostalgia in the face 
of modern life, consistently evoking a lost cultural ideal against which McMurphy will riff in 
rousing fashion. In an early passage, Harding tells McMurphy, of Bromden: “Look at him: a 
great janitor. There’s your Vanishing American, a six-foot-eight sweeping machine, scared of its 
own shadow” (66). During McMurphy’s last scheme—an after-hours party among the inpatients 
for which McMurphy smuggles in women and commandeers the Nurse’s pharmaceutical stock—
Harding’s disbelief echoes the Chief’s paradoxical claim to a truth that may or may not have 
happened, but in negative terms that contain none of the Chief’s sense of possibility: “‘It isn’t 
happening. It’s all a collaboration of Kafka and Mark Twain’” (290). We should read, here, an 
anticipation of Kesey’s suspicion that “nothing really new” can happen within the constraints 
erected by literary convention: at best, we can only conjure a new “collaboration” among the old 
masters.   
Critic Robert E. Rosenswein, while admitting that “the last decade [before the publication 
of Cuckoo’s Nest] had seen an accelerating trend away from institutionalizing the insane and the 
profound questioning of the [psychiatric] model itself” (41), speculates nonetheless that Kesey’s 
novel had a real impact on the movement to modernize mental health care. It may be that he is 
right, but we might well ask why, for Kesey’s part, he chooses to set the novel in an environment 
that the novel itself admits is anachronistic. Again it is Harding who registers this belatedness 
with his ironic lament that “we are witnessing the sunset of EST” and that nurse Ratched “is one 
of the few with the heart to stand up for a grand old Faulknerian tradition in the treatment of the 
rejects of sanity: Brain Burning” (178). His literary invocation cuts two ways: linking Faulkner 
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to the practice of EST not only emphasizes the regressive nature of the practice by associating it 
with Faulkner’s archaic themes, it also links the American literary canon to an aging and 
increasingly supplanted carceral regime. Positioned at the cusp of a countercultural movement in 
which he would figure prominently, Kesey chooses to make hay of an old paradigm in Cuckoo’s 
Nest. Attending to that fact asks us to reconsider not only the novel’s reputation of cultural-
historical “spontaneity,” but also its referential function more broadly. When, following Notion’s 
publication, Kesey turned his back on the novel form, he claimed it was because he “would 
rather be a lightning rod than a seismograph” of the counterculture (qtd. in Parker 7). Reading 
Cuckoo’s Nest as a psychedelic text means taking to heart the anti-mimetic bias that such a 
statement contains. Leave the seismography to Tom Wolfe, and leave the well-crafted American 
novel to the titans of the past—go find yourself a seat on the psychedelic bus. Cuckoo’s Nest, 
Kesey’s first and most famous novel, is a text pre-emptively nostalgic for its author’s departure 








CHAPTER 2: LIVELY SCRIPTS: BIOLOGICAL DETERMINISM AND CYBERNETIC 
CODING IN GILES GOAT-BOY OR, THE REVISED NEW SYLLABUS1 
 
Introduction: Life beyond Bodies 
In the mid-1950s, the organism was displaced from a position of privilege at the heart of 
the life sciences. This displacement was attributable, in large part, to the rise of two theoretical 
discourses: first-order cybernetics and molecular biology.2 In the first case, Norbert Wiener’s 
cybernetics aimed to “attack the problem of control and communication in general” across the 
human, natural, and applied sciences (17). A vocabulary of feedback loops and information 
flows allowed Wiener to claim that “the living individual and . . . some of the newer 
communication machines are precisely parallel in their analogous attempts to control entropy 
through feedback” (26). This analogy, central to early cybernetic theory, renders the defining 
qualities of the organism incidental at best, serving only to characterize the living body as a 
feedback-sensitive construct no different in its fundamental operations than a computer. Around 
the same time, James Watson and Francis Crick demystified the secrets of heredity in dramatic 
fashion when, in 1953, they discovered the DNA double helix. Molecular biology was the 
disciplinary outgrowth of that discovery, which decentered the organism in favor of “the coil of 
life” that it housed (“Penetrating” 30). The double helix—and, along with it, the semantic 
                                                             
1 This chapter previously appeared as an article in Occasion. The original citation is as follows: Norton, Lee. “Lively 
Scripts: Biological Determinism and Cybernetic Coding in Giles Goat-Boy or, The Revised New Syllabus. Occasion, 
vol. 12, 2018, pp. 1-15. Arcade: Literature, Humanity, and the World, 12 June 2019, arcade.stanford.edu/occasion/ 
lively-scrips-biological-determinism-and-cybernetic-coding-giles-goat-boy-or-revised-new. 
 
2Hereinafter I will simply refer to “cybernetics” when referring to the first-order cybernetics of Norbert Wiener and 
those who took it up in the 1950s and -60s. First-order cybernetics differs in important ways from the second-order 
cybernetics of, for example, Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela. Indeed, second-order cybernetics arose in 
the 1970s as a response to, and correction of, many of the rhetorical configurations of first-order cybernetics (and by 
extension early molecular biology) mentioned in this essay—configurations that were ultimately untenable. 
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framework of the genetic “code”—became the preeminent objects of biological inquiry even as 
they threatened to reduce the life sciences, as a discipline, to a specialized branch of physics.  
Historian of science Richard Doyle has demonstrated how genetic theory in the DNA era 
resorts to a form of speculative fiction—time travel—in order to elide “the problem of how the 
genome borrows an organism from the future” to house the creation scene by which the authorial 
genome creates that selfsame body (Beyond 76). In this chapter, I track the fate of this borrowed 
body when, in a final turn of the wheel, it is routed once more through the fictional speculations 
of John Barth’s 1966 campus novel Giles Goat-Boy or, The Revised New Syllabus. Barth’s fourth 
novel stages an ostentatious religious allegory in which a naïve prophet-figure, Giles, 
matriculates at a “universal university” (viii). His task is the reconciliation of “passage” and 
“failure,” an end-of-term reckoning that would “graduate . . . all studentdom” (638). But Giles—
whose name is an acronym of “Grand-tutorial Ideal, Laboratory Eugenical Specimen,” a prophet-
breeding program executed by a malevolent supercomputer—struggles to find agency. His life 
quite literally pre-scripted in DNA culled from “male studentdom” at large, Giles cuts the 
tragicomic figure of a genetic aggregate struggling to understand itself as an individual. Oddly 
poignant, the anticlimactic denouement of Barth’s novel grants the GILES-aggregate, this “goat-
boy,” just enough reflexivity—just enough of the embodied particularity we call identity—to 
witness its own decomposition back into the linguistic-genetic substrate from which it was 
composited.  
Giles Goat-Boy is Barth’s parodic rejoinder to a chapter in the history of science during 
which we understood semantic construct and biological essence to be, in a near-literal sense, one 
and the same. To be sure, even at their most theoretically exuberant, molecular biologists still 
understood the genetic code as an operational metaphor. And yet the notion that DNA was a 
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code to be read and copied, an “instruction manual” for building bodies and even persons—a 
veritable “genomic book of life” that operated by a regular syntax and fixed, discoverable 
referential rules—was taken up with a literal-mindedness unique to the twenty-odd years 
following DNA’s 1953 discovery (Kay 3).3 The language of that period, casual as well as 
theoretical, is remarkable in its openness to entertaining the linguistic analogies for DNA at 
length. The blatant metafictional thematics of Barth’s embrace of bio-textual determinism appear 
stifling; cultural and biological codes conspire to pre-script his characters in mutually reinforcing 
fashion. After “life itself ” detached from the organism and affixed itself to “code,” bodies were 
twice marginalized: they became, at once, epiphenomenal— superficial, carbon-based flourishes 
of a deep molecular script—and passing: one transient iteration of an enduring evolutionary line. 
Biologically, the individual started to look like a phenomenon of secondary importance. 
Novel threats to concepts of identity thus emerge at this juncture, but so do novel 
strategies for thinking the self. Barth described Giles Goat-Boy as his professional pivot “from 
the Black Humor of the Fifties to the Fabulism of the Sixties” (Giles vi). This fabulist turn, in 
setting aside the criterion of mimetic plausibility, allows Giles Goat-Boy to stage the “impossible 
retroactivity” entertained by early molecular biology—largely, but not solely, by dint of the 
novel’s cybernetic paternity plot (Doyle, Beyond 4). An allegorical “manner of speaking” 
becomes, in a fabulist context, more than the institutional satire it might’ve been, had it surfaced 
in Barth’s early existentialist texts (Barth, Giles v). A straight-faced borrowing from cybernetic 
discourse, this “manner of speaking” allows the novel and its protagonist to be stupid—
                                                             
3As an example of the literal-minded enthusiasm provoked by the topic, here is science writer Irving Bengelsdorf in 
the 1965 Los Angeles Times attempting to quantify the task of “writing” man: “To write down the description of 
man – as contained in the coded information carried by his DNA-genes, would require 1,000 volumes, with 680 
pages per volume, with 500 five-letter words printed on each page” (16). Turning the descriptive task into a 
volumetric problem—“how many pages will it take?”—is precisely, as this chapter will show, how cyberneticist 
discourse and the DNA paradigm have left an enduring mark on our notions of life “itself.” 
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strategically naïve to the figurative valence of molecular biology’s “fantastic rhetorical 
configurations” (Doyle, Beyond 65). Taking genetic theory at its word, Barth narrates the fantasy 
of a “nucleic acid world” from within its “postvital” architecture and according to its own 
reductive logic (66). He then undertakes an experiment: he reintroduces a subject to the 
biological body that, in its rhetorical transformation from subject to code-script, it had forfeited 
perforce. The results of this reintroduction are oxymoronic, discovering a ground for free choice 
and rhetorical play on the far side of strict genetic determinism only to see it dissolve into the 
retrojected tense of genetic deep time. 
Reduction Machines: Allegory in the Cybernetic “Manner of Speaking” 
In On Beyond Living, Doyle demonstrates how genetic theory in the 1950s-60s 
accomplishes a remarkable rhetorical sleight-of-hand. In short, by isolating DNA as the 
“sovereign” and “miraculous agent of life,” the metaphors of genetic theory made DNA the 
author of the body—an impossible author, since the body that it authors is also the necessary 
environment within which DNA “writes” (6). In an identical act of just-so fabulism, Barth 
installs a supercomputer called WESCAC at the heart of Giles Goat-Boy, where it serves as the 
unmoved mover of the novel’s plot and unmade maker of its allegorical world. “Oy, Bill, this 
WESCAC!” exclaims disgraced professor Max Spielman to his student, the titular goat-boy. 
“What a creature it is! I didn’t make it, nobody did—it’s as old as the mind, and you just as well 
could say it made itself. Its power is the same that keeps the campus going . . . [t]he thing that 
tells you there’s a you, that’s different from me, and separates the goats from the sheeps” (50). 
Spielman presents as a bathetic disciple of the same analogizing force that he imagines 
WESCAC to fully incarnate, a walking Levi-Strauss poop-joke, his reputation made on solving 
the “riddle of the sphincter” and debased Haeckelian “Maxims” [sic] like “proctoscopy 
 80 
recapitulates hagiography” (7). Hence, perhaps, his posture of ecstatic debasement: rapture at the 
possibility of such a structuring structure; dread at the comparative fragility of his own 
disciplinary paradigm, which the insatiable WESCAC will indeed unceremoniously “devour,” 
digest, and assimilate to its own programming.  
Here, already, is an apt indication of why fabulism is a fitting mode to this time and 
subject: in the computer that magically “made itself,” as with the “miraculous agent of life” that 
is DNA, semantic and material production are rendered synonymous. We are not meant to trust 
the expertise of Spielman, a disgraced professor of “analogical proctoscopy and 
psychosymbolistic cosmography” (7, 50), and a a send-up of structural anthropology that is as 
transparent as it is scatological. But in the parodic economy of Barth’s allegory we don’t have to, 
since it is Barth’s characteristic gambit in Giles Goat-Boy to ridicule the fantasizer while taking 
the fantasy seriously. According to that fantasy, WESCAC instantiates the dream of a 
transcendental signified: the “single, immanent node” from which semantic differentiation 
radiates (Doyle, Beyond 66), a veritable genome out of which the fabric of Barth’s allegorical 
deixis—and, in a metafictional doubling, the novel itself—is written. 
Patterned after the barn-sized vacuum-tube computers that became increasingly 
prominent features of American research universities after WWII, WESCAC’s narrative and 
thematic centrality for the novel is a clear figural extension of 1950s cybernetics discourse, the 
latter equally hungry to digest the fruits of traditional academic disciplines by transcoding their 
claims in a ubiquitous vocabulary of “communication and control” (Wiener, Human 17).4 Early 
computing machines figured heavily in cybernetics as privileged examples of feedback-sensitive 
                                                             
4Examples of early mainframe computers include the Eckert-Mauchly Co.’s UNIVAC series (first produced in 
1951), the ILLIAC computers designed by the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton (produced 1951–74), and 
the IBM 704 (1956). WESCAC, short for West Campus Automatic Computer, follows the acronymic naming 
conventions of many of the early mainframe devices. 
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machines capable of counter-entropic—which is to say, intelligent—action. No less than 
organisms, as described by cybernetics, these machines might possess sense organs 
(photoelectric cells), work from memory (recorded on punch cards or magnetic taping), and 
approximate a “kinaesthetic sense” by adjusting their performance to environmental input (23-
24). In addition, the binary code that governed the function of early mainframe computers via its 
punch-card programming provided a model counterpart to the theory of language both implied in 
and demanded by the cybernetic turn from sign to “information,” where information is defined 
simply as “the content of what is exchanged with the outer world as we adjust to it, and make our 
adjustment felt upon it” (17). Qualitatively poor and always precisely equal to what J.L. Austin 
would call its “illocutionary force” (Austin 100), the cybernetic message is measured as a sum 
and a material effect; “meaning” is quantitative and the attrition of meaning is a coefficient. The 
ones and zeroes of computer code corroborate another binary distinction of a more abstract 
order—information and noise—upon which the cybernetic model of communication is premised.  
The qualitative diversity of life has no place in this picture. “It is in my opinion, 
therefore, best to avoid all question-begging epithets such as ‘life,’ ‘soul,’ ‘vitalism,’ and the 
like,” Wiener declares, “and say merely in connection with machines that there is no reason why 
they may not resemble human beings in representing pockets of decreasing entropy in a 
framework in which the large entropy tends to increase” (32). Under this paradigm, organic and 
mechanical bodies both become like “whirlpools in a river of ever-flowing water . . . not stuff 
that abides, but patterns that perpetuate themselves” (97). This redescription recapitulates in 
miniature the story of “how information lost its body,” as Katherine Hayles has put it, and 
became “virtual”—a transition complete enough that, in 1974, philosopher of science Michel 
Serres can already eulogize a traditional classification of beings” with the organism at its center 
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“that no longer makes sense since matter, life, and sign are nothing but properties of a system” 
(Hayles 14; Serres 73).  
The story of how WESCAC maneuvered itself to the disciplinary and operational heart of 
Barth’s University forms the prehistory of the “Revised New Syllabus,” purportedly the gospel 
account of the goat-boy’s adventures. (The “Syllabus” comprises the vast bulk of the novel; it is 
framed within Giles Goat-Boy by a publisher’s disclaimer, a cover-letter, and other [fictional] 
attributional paratexts that, taken together, have the combined effect of rendering the provenance 
of the “Syllabus” hopelessly unclear.) The narrative begins, however, when WESCAC turns its 
energies to the production of organic life. Refusing to recognize a meaningful difference between 
organisms and smart machines—or simply lacking the capacity to do so—WESCAC’s artificial 
intelligence additionally appears to mistake his metaphorical position of universal authorship 
with actual, biological fatherhood. The goat-boy’s birth is the eventual result of that double 
semantic slippage; he is the final output of WESCAC’s “Cum Laude Project,” a computer 
program designed to fabricate a kind of prophet, a “Grand Tutor,” to deliver the University from 
its Cold War-flavored interfactional strife.  
What begins as a cybernetic riff on Joseph Campbell’s monomyth detours through 
clinical psychology en route to becoming a full-blown eugenics program. According to the self-
authored protocols of the Cum Laude Project,  
WESCAC would abstract from thousands of historical and biographical texts a sort of 
quintessential type of the ideal West-Campus Graduate, or a number of such ideal types; 
it would then formulate a genetic and psychological analysis of these models, and with 
reference to the similar analyses of every New Tammany undergraduate (already in its 
memory), it would indicate which young men, paired with which young women, could 




Taken together, the “historical and biographical texts” at WESCAC’s disposal resemble a “great 
books” syllabus only thinly veiled in the novel’s allegorical register—the “ideal West-Campus 
Graduate” is accordingly modeled on the amalgamated characteristics of the likes of “Enos 
Enoch” (Jesus), “The Living Sakhyan” (Gautama Buddha), and “Taliped Decanus” (Oedipus) 
(73, 124, 264). What looks like a comparative and interdisciplinary undertaking fit for what 
Clark Kerr was first to call the “multiversity” in 1963, the Cum Laude Project is theoretically 
reductionist despite its apparent domain eclecticism (136). Theory reductionism describes the 
attitude developed by some philosophers of science “that the theories and laws formulated in one 
field of science . . . can be shown to be special cases of theories and laws formulated in some 
other branch of science” (Mayr 60).5 While most histories of biology stress the reductionist 
pressures applied by physics and chemistry, cybernetics is aggressively reductionist in this sense 
insofar as its explicit goal is to factor out contextual meaning altogether—a fact that the Cum 
Laude Project’s methodological tone-deafness serves to farcically illustrate.  
Ultimately, WESCAC creates the “Grand-Tutorial Ideal, Laboratory Eugenical 
Specimen,” a genetic cocktail concocted out of semen extracted from all male students and then 
“analyzed, classified, and culled . . . to the standards evolved” in the Project’s earlier, literary-
critical stages (321). How exactly WESCAC manages this genetic mixology is unclear, and 
indeed the recombinant DNA technology required even to begin thinking through the creation of 
chimerical sperm of the sort imagined here would not be invented until the early 1970s.6 
                                                             
5Here I follow biologist Ernst Mayr’s description of “theory reductionism,” in contrast to “constitutive 
reductionism,” or atomism, and “explanatory reductionism,” which amounts to the assertion that all rigorous 
descriptions work from the ground up. In adopting Mayr’s definition, I also endorse his critique of theory reduction 
as inherently fallacious for the simple reason that “it fails to consider the fact that the same event may have entirely 
different meanings in several different conceptual schemes” (60–63). 
 
6For a full account of the paradigm shift from the (fixed) genetic “code” and “program” to the recombinant genetic 
script, see J. Lear’s Recombinant DNA: The Untold Story (1978). Barth’s lack of detail around the mechanics of 
gene-mixing (in a book long on detail and in love with mechanics) is, I would argue, quite telling. I take it as an 
 84 
WESCAC then inseminates a hapless campus librarian with “the GILES specimen.” In time, she 
gives birth to the goat-boy, abandoning her cybernetic Moses to the disused library service 
elevators (5, 7). Rescued by an addled janitor and transferred to Spielman’s care, the goat-boy 
spends his youth in the idyllic pastures of the Agriculture quad, where he is called “Billy 
Bockfuss” and raised “goatish” (98). Adolescence occasions the goat-boy’s fall into 
knowledge—the revelation of his humanity and, soon after, the story of his remarkable 
conception. This prompts him to depart the goat-barn and begin the “hero-work” that will take 
him across the sprawling allegorical terrain of the University’s West Campus in his attempt to 
redeem the student body (98).  
Deemed “a proposal fantastic in every respect” by the novel’s computer scientists (64), 
the Cum Laude Project is strangely plausible according to what Katherine Hayles has called the 
“condition of virtuality,” a byproduct of the rise of cybernetics in the early 1950s that she defines 
as “the belief that information can circulate unchanged among different material substrates” (14, 
1). Just as WESCAC’s differentiating powers flow from its own impossible priority as an 
Aristotelian unmoved mover, the proposition of the Cum Laude Project that personality can be 
extracted from narrative as “ideal type,” transcribed as computer script, and fabricated out of the 
“genetic . . . models” near-to-hand bespeaks the cybernetic ambition of finding a universal 
language in the rhetoric of message transmission and the “virtual” assumption that genetic 
information could circulate losslessly across different disciplinary frameworks, material and 
media substrates, and forms of knowledge production. With the Cum Laude Project, Barth 
fancifully bakes literary history into Giles’ genome, collapsing the traditional nature/culture 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
indication of the preoccupations of the period that Barth would be considerably more interested in, or capable of, 
exploring the notion of DNA as “a fundamentally stable phenomenon or ‘secret’” than playing with the 
“spectacularly mutable technology of replication and differentiation” that it became after the discovery of 
recombinant DNA in the mid-1970s (Doyle, “LSDNA” 157).  
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polarity into a ubiquitous prescriptive register. Archetype and genotype are fused in the atonal 
imperatives of the program. 
Like WESCAC, Barth is an omnivorous reader and writer fond of his own operations. 
Giles Goat-Boy remains one of the longest books authored by the profligate maximalist, who 
once quipped that he would rather not review The Recognitions by William Gaddis “on the 
minimalist pretense that anything worth saying can be said in 806 pages” (“Long Story” 79). The 
proliferation of characters and narrative digressions it contains has seemed, to some, incongruous 
alongside the cybernetically reductive impetus of its storytelling. Critics’ reluctance to theorize 
that incongruity has translated into curious gaps in extant scholarship on the novel. For one, 
Daniel Grausam has pointed out the “extraordinary critical obliviousness to the central conceit of 
Giles Goat-Boy: that it is an unmistakable, albeit comedic, allegorical portrayal of the Cold War” 
(27). In fact many critics do point towards the novel’s allegorical landscape—its perennially 
bickering East and West Campuses, its thinly-veiled reference to endless nuclear standoff—in 
passing. But Grausam is not wrong about the critical allergy to Barth’s pairing of a reductive, 
stylistically flat regime of signification with sheer length. Barth’s allegory is long and obvious—
“Giles Goat-Bore,” one reviewer called it, complaining that “it did not have the good sense to be 
short”—and literary-critical reading practices appear unsuited or uninterested in offering an 
account of its literally monotonous style pursued at such extreme length (Lifson 41). In a recent 
appraisal, Mark McGurl sounds a note of qualified praise when he remarks that “the ingenuity 
and doggedness with which Barth finds allegorical analogues to world history and the cold war . 
. . and reconfigures them as features internal to campus life is impressive” (Program 37-38).7 
                                                             
7McGurl’s account is one of the few that, to my mind, give appropriate credence to the tensions of unity and 
heterogeneity in a maximalist context, though his reading hinges on the synthesizing impulse of the humanities, 
rather than cybernetics. 
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However impressive the analogizing labor of Barth’s campus allegory may be, “ingenuity and 
doggedness” are hardly literary virtues, and they ultimately work against allegorical readings of 
the novel, which find themselves with little to say once they have pointed out the text’s 
“universal” super-coding—less a depth structure of allegorical signification than a kind of 
omnipresent historical euphemism that the novel makes self-evident at every opportunity.  
Barth’s interest in the allegorical mode is perverse and repurposive: in his hands it 
becomes an omnivorous reductionist operation; a way to restage WESCAC’s machine folly at 
the formal level; an interminable, tone-deaf pun. In a foreword to the novel’s 1987 Doubleday 
edition, he recollects the historical elements that “echo through the novel, transmogrified into the 
simple—I would even say the deliberately, programmatically ‘sophomoric’—terms of the 
allegory, which is not an allegory at all in the Dantesque or Kafkaish sense, but merely a manner 
of speaking” (v). Devoted readers will no doubt recognize the incorrigibility that compels a final 
pun on his own “sophomoric” campus novel. But “programmatic” is perhaps the more interesting 
double entendre here, implying a routinized referential strategy that is iterated and reiterated—
but not organically developed—over the course of the book.8  
By authorizing allegorical readings while deprecating the allegory itself as “merely a 
manner of speaking,” Barth’s self-gloss begins to gesture at how reductionism, far from being at 
odds with maximalist poetics, might actually demand it. In an essay entitled “It’s a Long Story: 
Maximalism Reconsidered,” Barth offers the following speculation: “[M]ay we not imagine,” he 
asks, “all the written sentences that any of us reads in a lifetime, from ‘See Dick run’ to ‘Rest in 
peace,’ as adding up to one maxi-novel? . . . I believe we may” (86–87). This thought experiment 
renders the novel both virtual and literally exhaustive—a kind of life-book circulating across 
                                                             
8Here I have followed Peter Mercer in identifying the book’s extensive allegoric structure as a superficial 
phenomenon that provides “a context for the book rather than a form” (149).  
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material containers, a prose negative to the life that generates it. Moreover, it demonstrates 
Barth’s attraction to the same kind of combinatory storytelling, built additively out of a limited 
set of fixed terms—cliché, in this example—that Watson and Crick immediately perceived as a 
potentiality in the double helix. “It follows,” they conclude in their initial 1953 report, “that in a 
long molecule many different permutations are possible, and it therefore seems likely that the 
precise sequence of the bases is the code which carries the genetical information” (965). One 
“maxi-novel,” one life; one chromosome, one organism. In combinatory grammars—the base-
pair alphabet or Barth’s spuriously simple, cliché-ridden catalog of world literature—extreme 
length is the precondition for the articulation of higher orders of complexity. 
The Hero Program: Exemplarity after Molecular Genetics  
In spite of its cybernetic investments, I stop short of joining David Porush in calling Giles 
Goat-Boy a “cybernetic fiction,” in the sense that the novel might be thought to “imitate 
machines, purport to be [a] machine[, or be] structured like a highly polished and integrated 
mechanical device” (93). Half religious tract, half grail quest; Menippean satire meets a 
Pilgrim’s Progress across Cold War America—Barth’s novel, like its goat-boy hero, is a 
mongrel, perhaps a cyborg, above all a fantasia on the uneasy rapprochement of biology and 
language. Man by “nature,” goat by training, computer by filiation, and prophet by vocation, the 
novel’s goat-boy narrator is the focal site of that organic/semantic collision. Whatever aesthetic 
traction the novel creates occupies the space between the digestive work of its reductionist 
machines—WESCAC and, at a metafictional remove, its own allegorical weltanschauung—and 
the irrepressible complexity, embodied as the goat-boy, that is emergent from the patterns of 
code that these machines articulate. This in-between space belongs to molecular biology, what 
Doyle calls “a tropological space where the resistances of ‘the’ body interface and entangle with 
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the shapes and torsions of language” (Beyond 7-8) The goat-boy’s narrative first-person is the 
novel’s way of elucidating that tropological space as it oscillates between the routinized 
abstractions of cybernetic thinking—in which the frictions of embodiment fall away—and 
sudden raptures of embodied selfhood that emerge, interstitially, from the glitches of cybernetic 
logic.  
When the goat-boy eventually hears the story of his parentage, his infallibility strikes him 
with epiphanic force: “if I was indeed Grand Tutor then I would choose infallibly the Grand-
Tutorial thing—how could I do otherwise?” (207). The ludic pastiche of picaresque, saint’s life, 
and hero’s labors that comprises the novel’s subsequent plot is narrated from the position of 
logical invincibility that this “Grand-Tutorial Apriority” affords the goat-boy. Over the course of 
his adventures, Giles is rarely decisive, but never wrong; being wrong strikes him as strictly 
impossible in the sense that his task, as he construes it, is to be what he is: “A hero doesn’t have 
to know ahead of time what he’ll do, does he? All he knows is who he is” (98). Through a 
naïveté equal to the literality of the cybernetic reduction that fathered him, he breaks through the 
ubiquitous prescription of his genetic program to discover, on the far side, this empowering 
tautology of heroism by genetic fiat. If literary genres like saints’ lives can be genetically 
hardwired in Barth’s irreal “universal university,” the goat-boy is that holy fool who strikes upon 
a converse slippage by which, in the same world, genes might best be read, realized, and 
expressed exegetically.9  
The reciprocal fungibility of literary and genetic code in Giles Goat-Boy literalizes the 
theoretical preoccupations of 1960s biology. At that time, the discipline was in the midst of a far-
                                                             
9Several critics have provided useful and convincing expositions of the various literary texts and genres that function 
as source-codes to Giles Goat-Boy, intertextual links that Barth cites to varying degrees of explicitness. See 
especially Marjorie Malvern, “The Parody of Medieval Saints’ Lives in John Barth’s Giles Goat-Boy or, The 
Revised New Syllabus” and David Morrell, “Giles Goat-Boy.”  
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reaching reorganization necessitated by Watson and Crick’s dramatic discovery of the DNA 
double helix. Molecular biology supplanted a relatively fragmented set of research agendas to 
become the center of gravity of a new and unified biology.10 DNA provided a shared term that 
would allow the descriptive projects of cell anatomists and the conjectures of evolutionary 
theorists to be understood as part of a common venture. The “master molecule” thus took over 
many of the discipline-organizing functions that had previously been served by the relatively 
inchoate concept of life “itself” and consequently allowed the discipline to proclaim its 
independence from the embarrassing conceptual trappings of the now-outmoded vitalist 
paradigm (Mayr 52). Remarkably, these large discursive shifts were triggered simply by the 
disclosure of DNA’s structure, which was sufficient to imply a radical reinterpretation of what 
life was and how it functioned.  
However, the new suite of questions implied by the structure of the DNA molecule 
required new concepts adequate to those questions. Before the gene gained a molecular referent, 
the relatively crude language of “gene action” was sufficient for the descriptive statements of 
Mendelian genetics. But after the double helix model was broadly accepted, it became clear that 
the gene, an incredibly productive agential fiction when it came to the study of phenotypes and 
the conditions of their expression, was an abstraction impossible to locate at the molecular 
level.11 While classical genetics would usefully retain the concept of gene action for some time, 
“[molecular g]eneticists required a new kind of narrative for thinking about development; and to 
                                                             
10According to Ernst Mayr, “[t]he understanding of the double helix opened up an immense new filed of exciting 
research and it is no exaggeration to say that as a result molecular biology completely dominated biology for the 
next fifteen years” (825). 
 
11See, for example, Evelyn Fox Keller’s contention that, “[o]nce the gene could no longer freely oscillate between 
atom and organism, it could no longer serve so readily both as the fundamental unit of heredity and, at the same 
time, as the pilot of life’s developmental journey” (Making Sense 134). 
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fill the gap . . . a correspondingly new figure of speech was introduced: the genetic program” 
(Keller, Making Sense 121).12  
Francois Jacob, whose work with Jacques Monod on the role of regulator genes in gene 
expression had put him at the vibrant center of the discipline by the early 1960s, was one of the 
most influential exponents of the program model. Doyle aptly characterizes the discursive feat of 
Jacob and Monod’s seminal 1961 article as “a continuation of the dream of knowing ‘what life 
is’ begun by Watson and Crick” in which “Jacob and Monod transform a threat to the 
sovereignty of DNA [regulator genes] into an ally, one that constitutes both the sovereignty of 
DNA and the mastery of themselves” (Jacob and Monod 318-56; Doyle, Beyond 84). Their 
dedication to that particular rhetorical conceit is, in retrospect, particularly remarkable given the 
nature of their work, since regulator genes might be thought to pose a direct challenge to the 
autonomy of DNA that the program paradigm tended to posit.  
In his single-authored history of the life sciences The Logic of Life (1970), Jacob offers a 
theoretical synopsis of that 1960s work, consolidating the theories of the genetic program that 
had developed in a more diffuse manner in experimental contexts. As a piece of writing and a 
theoretical consolidation of the rhetoric of the genetic program, The Logic of Life exemplifies the 
double sense in which DNA’s discovery triggered the disciplinary convergence of genetic theory 
with theories of language. The text bears witness, first, to the “linguistic” nature of the 
“theoretical work involved in constructing explanations of [biological] development”; and, 
second, in the fact that the metaphor struck upon as most apt—the program—is itself a language 
                                                             
12Keller contends that it was the very imprecision of the term “gene” as its meaning fluctuated between functional 
and structural definitions that made it so productive as a conceptual goad to research. With the opening of the double 
helix, that imprecision was no longer sustainable and the conceptual scheme of the program, rife with its own 
inconsistencies, took over the former’s function as a contested central term and goad to research. Qua Doyle, it may 
in fact be argued that the genetic program was a successful precisely because it preserved the inconsistency or 
double valence between structure and function that the concept of the gene had once contained (but could no 
longer). See, again, the discussion of WESCAC’s impossible duality earlier in this chapter. 
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(Keller, Making 117). Jacob is both explicit and precise on this point of equivalence. “The 
organism [is] the realization of a programme prescribed by its heredity,” he states, before 
clarifying that “[t]he programme is a model borrowed from electronic computers. It equates the 
genetic material of an egg with the magnetic tape of a computer” (Logic 9). Something like 
“software” to the “hardware” of the cell nucleus, the genetic program would activate and then 
direct the growth of the organism whose heredity it had encoded, cell by cell.  
As if aware of how difficult it will be to contain the semantic contagion of his metaphor, 
Jacob is at pains to suggest precisely how far the equation of genome and program may be 
expounded.13 Immensely suggestive as it is, the program metaphor actually threatens to be too 
productive for the purposes of scientific description; Jacob immediately begins to circumscribe 
its proper meaning by listing the many ways in which computer and genetic programs are not in 
fact identical. These many caveats, however, reduce to one fundamental difference—a 
difference, oddly, that suggests an organic program in some ways less alive, not more, than its 
computer counterpart. Unlike computer programs, genetic programs are deaf to feedback; as 
Jacob puts it, they are “inaccessible to acquired experience and remain unchanged” by it; they 
are “rigid” (9, 3). This rigidity is size-specific: at the scale of individual bodies, and uniquely at 
that scale, the genetic program lacks the ability to incorporate feedback by modifying its own 
script. This rigidity is crucial to Jacob’s model of life and an article of faith in molecular biology 
at that time. Without rigidity, there is no conservative principle at play, no defensible explanation 
for life’s ability, fundamental and absolutely characteristic, to beget like from like and thus 
persist in the face of general entropy.  
                                                             
13He was probably wise to do so, even if the attempt did little good constraining the rhetorical play of the DNA trope 
in the decades that follow. See Judith Roof ’s The Poetics of DNA (2007) for one recent, wide-ranging account of 
the DNA trope’s extreme rhetorical contagiousness. 
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Of course, Jacob is not suggesting that individuals do not have access to their prior 
experiences or that they remain unchanged by them, simply that those experiences are not and 
cannot be written into the genome or transmitted through biological reproduction.14 Indeed, he is 
at pains to distinguish between genetic and conscious memory, a distinction that allows him to 
excise the problems of consciousness from his explanation. But to be literal-minded about this 
discrepancy is to acknowledge a cybernetic stupidity at the heart of the individual organism for 
which the mental realm of memory and intention must compensate; genetically—as contrasted to 
the constant dynamism of cellular life and the adaptive flexibility of the germline over 
generations—the individual is uniquely stupid. 
Moreover, what Jacob brackets out of the substantive theory—that is, the language of 
individual subjective experience—forces its way back into his account in his theoretical 
vocabulary. By purportedly bracketing out consciousness and its derivative phenomena, he in 
effect reserves the attributes of agency, choice, teleology, and design for use elsewhere in his 
account.15 Consequently, at the individual scale, his prose is redolent with formulae that appear 
to describe the whole organism but lack the language that would bring that description to life. 
Thus ontogenesis amounts to the “the execution of a plan.” Birth is re-described as the “eternal 
recommencement” of that execution. And in a particularly suggestive formulation, Jacob implies 
a profound diminishment of human agency along cybernetic lines when he claims that, after 
DNA, “the intention of a psyche has been replaced by the translation of a message” (2, 5, 2). In 
at least a rhetorical sense, one consequence of making the program metaphor “rigid” at the level 
                                                             
14The subsequent discourse of epigenetics would, of course, call this article of faith into question. 
 
15This is both the “elsewhere” of the human sciences more concerned with the phenomena of conscious experience 
and, as I will elaborate in the next section of this chapter, “elsewhere” in Jacob’s own explanatory schema when he 
considers life at the temporal remove of evolution and the scalar remove of the species. 
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of individual execution is the individual’s dispossession of meaningful agency, intention, and 
free will. 
Giles Goat-Boy is a satire about linguistic rigidity, farcically denaturing the ways that 
religious, generic, and deoxyribonucleic codes project patterns into the contested future tense. 
Giles’ heroic labors—“end the border dispute”; “re-place the Founder’s scroll”—are assigned as 
a kind of cryptic homework by WESCAC in advance of a “final examination”; most of these 
labors themselves involve the arbitration of this or that tangled riddle, the belated severing of so 
many Gordian knots constraining social relations on the cold-war campus (383). Giles’ 
“candidacy” for beatification-by-final-exam is also threatened by the goat-boy’s tardiness; he is 
confounded time and again by the elusive Harold Bray, a “false tutor” who is perennially one 
step ahead on the “assignment sheet” and often leaves Giles without a labor to undertake. Barth’s 
characterization, like his emplotment, is broad and flat by design, reveling in typologies a good 
deal blunter, and more literal, than the term “stereotype” can adequately convey. The characters 
Giles encounters on West Campus are less caricatures than they are the risible embodiments of 
so many cultural codes, systems, and ideologies. Capitalism, communism, tribalism; aesthete 
nihilism, realpolitik bureaucratization, secular humanism, and amoral science: Giles encounters 
all their avatars, dispensing religious counsel to each with frequently disastrous results.  
Barth has a great deal of fun at the expense of these types, as he does at the arcane guidance that 
Spielman offers Giles out of his proctological readings of Grand Tutors past and sphincters 
present. And yet that guidance plays a necessary role. “I wanted an advisor, that was all,” Giles 
laments when he and Max are first separated. “To do the hero-assignment was my function, not 
to choose it” (110).  
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As an anti-bildungsroman of the “rigid program” model of individual life, we might 
imagine that the novel presents the goat-boy as a tragic figure—an innocent hapless and doomed 
from the moment he squares the circle, naming himself after ‘himself’ by taking the acronymic 
“GILES” as his surname in an oxymoronic assertion of free will that seems to confirm that he 
has none. Understanding Giles tragically opens the novel’s first-person narrative to a suspicious 
reading, insofar as “Grand-Tutorial Apriority” becomes an injunction against free will that is 
cloaked in Giles’ delusional good cheer. In the context of such a reading, Giles’ meditation on 
the givens of existence takes on the quality of fatalist epiphany, as, for example, when he admits 
in a somber moment that  
[a]t best I found it moderately poetic that every action had an equal and opposite reaction 
. . . [but] for the most part I regarded natural laws with the same provisional neutrality 
with which one regards the ground-rules of a game or the exposition of a fable, and the 
reflection that one had no choice of games whatever (when so many others were readily 
imaginable) could bring me on occasion to severe melancholy. (80-81) 
 
But a tragic reading errs in forcing the fabulism of Giles Goat-Boy to capitulate to the 
yardsticks of realist fiction like subtle characterization, layered subjectivity, and narrative 
unreliability. Moreover, it ignores the ways in which Giles coopts, as a means of self-assertion, 
the same fungibility of language and biology that WESCAC had mobilized to create the GILES 
specimen to begin with. Grand-Tutorial apriority becomes a free pass to improvise an ethics, 
much to the consternation his straight-laced disciples, who expect him to better resemble the 
solemnity of Grand Tutors past. When, during a madcap chase scene, the high-minded Anastasia 
attempts to chasten Giles by asking him, “How can a Grand Tutor encourage reckless driving?” 
he is unrepentant:  
I admitted cheerfully that I didn’t have the least idea whether my attitude was proper for a 
Grand Tutor; but I added (the notion having just occurred to me): “It must be all right, 
though, come to think of it—since it’s my attitude, and I’m the Grand Tutor” . . . I 
considered her frowning face. Despite the racket and wild motion I sensed a good 
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peculiar power in myself: a clarity of muscle, a tonus of thought, such as I’d rarely or 
never known. (159-60) 
 
As in this example, Giles’ greatest successes come not from thinking outside the cybernetic 
“ground rules” of Barth’s fable but through them, forgetting the priority-relations of means and 
ends in raptures of false equivalence.  
A strategic idiocy is at work in Giles’ rejoinder to Anastasia, a confusion of cause and 
effect that surfaces elsewhere in the novel as a deafness to the difference between literal and 
figurative description. Time and again, Giles will encounter characters who would reproach him 
for deviating from the Grand-Tutorial Ideal; by invoking “Grand-Tutorial Apriority” as the only 
justification he requires, he turns tautological self-definition into the precondition for a kind of 
artistic self-fashioning. “I looked upon my life,” Giles recalls, “and the lives of others as a kind 
of theatrical impromptu, self-knowledge as a matter of improvisation, and moral injunctions . . . 
as so many stage directions” (81). By asserting his goathood at one moment, his Tutorhood the 
next—every once in a great while, his humanity—Giles performs a kind of virtuosic code-
switching that transfigures prescription as play.  
Built out of the premise of Jacob’s cybernetically stupid individual is, paradoxically, this 
counter-cybernetic jouissance, a completion of the chiasmus that the logic of the Cum Laude 
Project proposed in part. If literature can be written into one’s genes, Giles’ adventures in 
propheteering seem to ask, can’t we also open the genome to literary and rhetorical play? 
Whereas the metaphorical coherence of the genetic program “depends upon the amputation of 
the body it heralds” (Doyle, Beyond 7), the goat-boy’s embrace of that disembodying logic 
paradoxically returns mind to body in an experience of interpenetrated presence, “a clarity of 
muscle, a tonus of thought.” As the “Syllabus” describes it elsewhere, “His choice was free 
because His nature wasn’t, He being in any case a Grand Tutor” (208): when the chiasmus is 
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completed, the body that “the GILES” program had borrowed from its future rebels, gathering a 
“good peculiar [agential] power” from the language buried in its genetic past. Time travel of a 
different sort, this genetic repurposing opens a space for active self-determination upon the 
grounds of a biologism that seemed, at first, to preclude the self altogether. 
The prescriptions of the “nucleic acid world” that threaten to dispossess individuals of 
agency are thus trumped by the goat-boy’s naïve sophistry (Doyle, Beyond 66). But there 
remains a melancholy to Giles Goat-Boy that cuts against the grain of its broad humor; despite its 
ludic sensibility, the novel does not ultimately entail the triumph of Giles’ protean virtuosity over 
the genetic and narratological injunctions of his code-script. It ends on a metafictional note as 
Giles finishes dictating into WESCAC’s data banks the adventures that, in the form of the 
“Syllabus” that Barth’s reader has just completed, are to become the founding writ of the religion 
of “Gilesianism.” No longer for him is there any “glamour to the work, nor any longer to the 
term: Grand Tutor, WESCAC, fountain-pen—all names of neutral instrumentalities” (670). The 
anticlimactic poignancy of its postscript registers the melancholic tipping-point at which Giles 
begins to observe his own dispersal into what Jacob would call the “history and drift of 
programs” (Logic 8). It is a dispersal always already written into his acronymic surname, the 
Damoclean threat of which is that it might, at any moment, unspool, again, into the “Grand-
Tutorial Ideal, Laboratory Eugenical Specimen,” dissolving by proxy the goat-boy’s identity 
back into the mélange of anonymous genetic code and world-literary canon that gave him rise.  
This melancholy indexes the moment in Jacob’s program paradigm when agential 
language makes its unexpected reappearance. It reappears to personify what Doyle has called the 
“sublime object of biology” after the double helix—an object that DNA has displaced and 
“decentered,” qua Serres, from the individual organism to the self-perpetuating pattern of the 
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genetic line (Beyond 22). In spite of molecular biology’s claim to have demonstrated “that there 
is no metaphysical entity hidden behind the word life,” this displacement suggests the return of 
an agent of life “itself” that coalesces the perspectival remove of history’s longue durée; its 
melancholia in Barth’s novel is not simply the affective obverse of what McGurl has called the 
posthuman comedy of “the inhumanly large and long” (“Posthuman” 539), but the 
impoverishment of life’s dynamic possibilities when conceived on such a scale, where the 
outsized melodrama of an individual life resolves into the incremental adjustments of a genetic 
line to its environment.  
Agency resurfaces at the interface of organism and species in The Logic of Life, with 
Jacob’s explanation for the way in which we can train our theoretical optics to capture the 
program in deep time: 
. . . a posteriori, everything happens as if [Nature] had chosen one by one . . . as if she 
had fashioned each molecule and put the finishing touches to each detail. In the genetic 
program, therefore, is written the result of all past reproductions, the collection of 
successes, since all traces of failures have disappeared. The genetic message, the 
programme of the present-day organism, therefore, resembles a text without an author 
that a proof-reader has been correcting for more than two billion years. (287) 
 
This retrojection spectacularly inverts the future-oriented “time travel” of Jacob’s earlier 
rhetoric: instead of “borrowing a body from the future” for genetic regulation in the present, here 
he orients the stochastic spread of the distant past toward the present in order to retroactively 
imbue it with a design that has been realized “as if” by choice (Doyle, Beyond 78). What results 
is a kind of theoretical dignity for terms we might otherwise consider antithetical to scientific 
discourse, or at least extrinsic to its vocabularies: memory, design, intention, telos. Nonetheless, 
Jacob insists that he is deploying these terms deliberately—insists, with a flourish, that “[t]he 
concept of programme has made an honest woman of teleology” by granting it, or her, a 
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terminological respectability that makes it eligible for explicit naming and serious debate (Logic 
9).  
As crucial as the rigidity of the individual program, then, is the fact that Jacob restricts 
rigidity to what he calls the “integration levels” of the individual organism: the cell, the organ, 
the body (302). By contrast to the fixed structure of these latter integrations, population and 
species systems can’t be bound by the same rigidity. Evolution proves as much, and as Jacob 
describes them, these integrations exhibit animated, nigh-intelligent adaptive qualities. The very 
ubiquity of the term “program” in Jacob’s rhetoric is what inflates the difference between species 
and individual into an oppositional contrast between the virtual program “itself” and the dumb, 
embodied instances that it iterates in order to supercede: “[o]n the one hand,” he states, “it is 
necessary to analyze the structure of the programme, its logic and its execution; on the other, to 
examine the history of programmes, their drift and the laws governing their changes throughout 
generations in terms of ecological systems” (8). In the two directions Jacob charts for the life 
sciences, the relatively short span of the life of an organism is flattened into purest synchrony—
either in the temporal arrest that allows a snapshot-like perspective onto its “structure” and 
“logic” or the interminable and ongoing now of its “execution.” This preserves the descriptive 
resources of diachrony—narrative causality (“history”), movement (“drift”) and, crucially, self-
correction through feedback—for the longue durée of species life.  
Maximalist though it may be, Giles Goat-Boy’s episodic narrative belongs to the shorter 
span, a fact that the book’s paratextual apparatus serves to demonstrate. The goat-boy’s pathos 
resides here—not in the figure of genetic or generic prescription, whose terms he accepts in order 
to invert, but in the shapeliness and incremental drift of the aggregate Grand Tutorial line to 
which his outsized personality is forfeit. Giles’ program-life thus succeeds in persisting, after a 
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sense, but the “endless tapes” that Giles has composed, so reminiscent of the flat, coiled strands 
of DNA, can only usher him into the future in adulterated form: they are bent to the retrojected 
design of an evolving program, in this case the genre of the holy writ, “One day to feed Him who 
will come after me, as I fed once . . .” (699). Whatever details manage to escape convention, defy 
doctrine, or hoodwink the cybernetic reduction will simply be lost in translation.  
Further accentuating this piquancy is the nice irony of the Cum Laude Project’s quixotic 
logic, which sees no incongruity in using genetic blending to create, of all things, a prophet-hero. 
The only discernable commonality among the Cum Laude Project’s source texts—Christ, 
Buddha, Oedipus, and Hercules are among those allegorically invoked—is the distinctive and 
singular nature of each. What could it mean to perfect a Grand Tutorial “stock,” when the only 
characteristic that its models share is the fact that each one is sui generis? “The eugenical 
specimen whereof I was the issue had been drawn as it were from all studentdom, whose scion 
therefore I was”: the only uniqueness Giles can claim is combinatory—the only sort, after all, to 
be hoped for under the paradigm of the genetic program (638).  
This, then, is the fate of identity when it collides with a literal-minded biologism under 
the metaphorical regime of early molecular genetics. Giles Goat-Boy is funny when, through a 
kind of willed, exuberant stupidity, it adopts a cybernetic tone-deafness to the figurality of 
language and then uses that tone-deafness to deconstruct the cybernetic rhetoric that undergirds 
the “program model” of life. Its melancholy derives from the ubiquitous threat of the code-
script’s dispersal. Put another way, the result of a code-script thinking itself an organism—“the 
GILES specimen” becoming Giles the goat-boy—is satire. The organism witnessing its 
translation to codescript—Giles becoming the “Revised New Syllabus”—is pathos. In the sad 
case of the goat-boy, the coherence of the first-person singular is at best a precarious vantage 
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onto the anonymous genetic substrate that comprises and will supercede it, an uncertain staging 
ground for the novel’s vaster concerns: those points of genetic encounter at the outer edges of 
identity or—as in the acronymic tenuousness of “the GILES specimen”—identity’s innermost 
seams. 
The Deaths of the Anti-Novel 
It’s little surprise that the disintegrative ending of Barth’s novel would lead critic 
Webster Schott to complain that Barth “develops no characters . . . finds no emotional ranges and 
searches no human depths” (qtd. in Morrell 68), or propel Edward Margolies to the conclusion 
that “no clear sense of an American self emerges” from Giles Goat-Boy (211). In their 
presumption that such an emergence was felt lacking is the widespread expectation from critics 
and readers that postwar novels ought to consummate in the development, discovery, or 
emergence of an American subject. According to Mark Greif, “[t]he novel became a chief agent, 
for critics, of a certain kind of humanism associated with the restoration of ‘man,’ reconceived 
by some as a nationalist or American project” in the decades following World War II (“Novel” 
16). As a genre, it was well-positioned to serve in this capacity, at least according some: witness 
Lionel Trilling’s 1948 claim in the pages of the Partisan Review that “[t]he novel is a kind of 
summary and paradigm of our cultural life” or Leslie Fiedler’s, in 1960, that “[w]e are living not 
only in the Age of America but also in the Age of the Novel, at a moment when . . . literature has 
become for most readers quite simply prose fiction” (Trilling 266; Fiedler 23). The novel’s 
relative prestige among American literary genres after the war “led us to make a legend out of it . 
. . the Great American Novel, as solitary and omniseminous as the great White Whale,” claims 
Trilling, modeling the rhetorical condensation that transformed a multifarious genre into the 
“chief agent” of restoration-of-man humanism (Trilling 278; emphasis in original). 
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The negative syntax that frames the critical judgments of Schott and Margolies—both of 
whom conjure the novelistic ideal in relief by asserting its absence—indicates the extent to 
which that ideal was, to some extent, felt to be compulsory. Owing to the elevated stakes of the 
novelistic enterprise, the shortcomings of wayward novels like Giles Goat-Boy were taken as 
symptoms of the ailing health of the novel genre writ large. The hyperbolic trope of genre-death 
set the terms of literary-critical debates about the novel after the war—perhaps not for the first 
time, but certainly with a sense of urgency and social import that similar debates had not 
achieved before.16 The tone and sheer volume of critical tracts pronouncing for or against the 
death of the novel contributed to this exigency, but nothing did more to fabricate it than the 
critical tendency to leverage the biological urgency of the novel-death trope. Genre death had 
been a passing metaphor for formal anachronism in the hands of modernist critics; in the 1950s it 
hardened into the full-blown conceit of cultural critics, who staged scenes of the novel’s demise 
that evoked the death of a living being in increasingly vivid ways.17  
Even as it restages the new biology’s disintegration of organisms into textual ephemera, 
Barth’s novel becomes a necessary entry in these death-of-the-novel debates, which participate 
in a much older tradition of literary organicism that had sought to understand and judge texts by 
analogizing them to forms found in nature. Giles Goat-Boy is a proactive rejoinder, what Gross 
rightly calls “an anti-novelistic assault on itself,” its author, the genre of the novel, even the 
narrative impulse (102). In the “Cover Letter” to the Revised New Syllabus, Barth claims by way 
                                                             
16See Mark Greif and also Kathleen Fitzpatrick’s The Anxiety of Obsolescence: The American Novel in the Age of 
Television (2006) for accounts of the midcentury “death of the novel” discourse. What both accounts rightly make 
clear is not the historical novelty of the discourse—as they both point out, such claims had been made before the 
Second World War, and many a declaration of the death of a form preceded even the invention of the novel itself—
but the particular volume and tenor of the discourse in the wake of the war, and the many new opportunities for 
novelistic expression such critical hand-wringing paradoxically made possible and sustained. 
 
17I observe this as a tendency rather than a rule. Susan Sontag’s “Against Interpretation” stands as an example of a 
midcentury critical text that hews closer to a modernist discourse organized around the novel’s formal obsolescence 
without indulging in the tropology of biological death. 
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of ventriloquism that “I’m not a writer, and it’s not a novel” (xxi)—but of course he is and it is, 
and such tongue-in-cheek recusals serve only to further entrench Giles Goat-Boy in death-of-the-
novel debates as critical rejoinder as well as novelistic datum.  
In the “Cover Letter,” it’s the idea of a novel that dies; the would-be novelist “J.B.” 
submits the Syllabus, deposited on his desk by a “caprine” young man, in its place. Before he 
does, the two typescripts languish alongside one another, “the one unread, the other unwritten,” 
for months (xxxi). Their pages intermingle. Eventually J.B. sends the Syllabus in order to meet 
his contractual obligations, in the hope that it “will more than make good on the losses 
sustained” on J.B.’s quashed novel and his underperforming prior books (xxxiii). Novel-death 
frames the reader’s encounter with the Syllabus in a manner at once emphatic and arbitrary, not 
only because the manuscripts appear materially interchangeable but also because J.B.’s 
description of the novel he had wanted to write—the story of “a lover, so to speak, but not a 
knower; a passionate naïf” (xxiv)—describes Giles and his Syllabus just as well.  
A novel by any other name: the implication of Giles Goat-Boy’s frame-narrative seems to 
be that the death of what we call the novel is unlikely to result in less novelistic activity.18 
Likewise, the ambient gene-swapping of J.B.’s stillborn novel and Giles’ holy writ presupposes a 
fundamental stylistic grammar subtending the delineations of genre, as if the revelation of the 
“nucleic acid world” was an obscure condition of possibility for a kind of cybernetic parody that 
Fredric Jameson would later call pastiche, which is, “like parody, the imitation of a particular or 
unique, idiosyncratic style, the wearing of a linguistic mask, speech in a dead language. But it is 
a neutral practice of such mimicry, without any of parody’s ulterior motives, amputated of the 
satiric impulse, devoid of laughter” (Postmodernism 17). WESCAC composes in the neutral 
                                                             
18Here, see “The Exhaustion of Literature,” by Kathleen Fitzpatrick, in which she argues that Barth deploys a similar 
argument to culturally conservative ends in his essays. 
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mimicry of pastiche, the GILES specimen standing for its attempt to imitate the unique and 
“idiosyncratic” style of heroic iconoclasm by wearing the “linguistic mask” of a past genetic 
code. At least apocryphally, the “Revised New Syllabus” is literally the work of cybernetic 
pastiche, as the “Cover Letter” informs us: claiming to be George Giles’ son, the man who 
delivers the manuscript to J.B. reports that WESCAC had appointed itself the arbiter of the 
Gilesean canon and so takes it upon itself to “assemble, collate, and edit” the partial and often 
contradictory first-hand accounts, “interpolate all verifiable data from other sources,” and 
“recompose the whole into a coherent narrative from the Grand Tutor’s point of view” (xxix). 
The mise-en-abyme that this creates is claustrophobic, in effect re-describing Barth’s 
“deliberately programmatic” allegorical euphemism as the omnipresent pathetic fallacy of an 
incessant narrating machine. 
The cybernetic/allegorical “manner of speaking” that permeates the “Syllabus” is 
ambivalent in a literal sense; the question and fate of biological genre becomes corollary to the 
angst over the life of text. To WESCAC, these are one and the same. Early in the novel, after 
WESCAC is upgraded with the “NOCTIAL” id-programming that awakens its sex drive, the 
virtual logic of pastiche begins to glitch in spectacular fashion. When asked to build a better 
mousetrap, for example, a post-noctic WESCAC 
displayed an unprecedented inefficiency: instead of formulating a better poison or 
designing a rat-proof grain elevator, it proposed to mate with enough cats to develop a 
spectacular rodent-hunter, and to miscegenate these Überkatzen with the rats themselves, 
to the end of evolving a species that would prey upon itself and choose no other mate but 
WESCAC, which then would breed them all sterile! A proposal fantastic in every respect. 
. . . (65) 
 
Giles Goat-Boy is replete with decadent termini like the extinction event that awaits the 
autophagic Überkatzen, whose species-death could hardly be more different in quality from the 
pastiche-death of J.B.’s novel in the “Cover Letter.” Procreative sex—and with it, the survival of 
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genre—is doubly parodied here, first by interspecial union that creates the cat/rat hybrids and 
then by the reciprocal predation that takes its place. The relation to parody here, in other words, 
is hyperbolically satirical rather than satirically deadened. Boundaries of the organic body are 
everything and interspecies miscegenation (read as: genre mixing), rather than symptomatizing a 
fatigued declension in the direction of “neutral” genetic pastiche, is the first step towards a 
terminal solipsism of the genetic line. This, then, is the other way the textual body dies in Giles 
Goat-Boy: of sexual decadence, by achieving a genetic rarefaction so fine that it terminates in 
sterility.  
When postwar critics worried about the novel’s death, what exactly was the object, idea 
or category under threat? Who was the reader that would feel its loss—the citizen, the critic, the 
artist or society at large? Giles Goat-Boy’s interpellation in the death of the novel debates is a 
confused one because the novel traffics in elements of more than one biological paradigm at 
once. (That it does so is a product of both its interstitial bio-theoretical times and something of a 
perversely catholic interest on behalf of Barth himself.) This confused interpellation has the 
effect of restaging scenes of novel-death in ways that are not always consistent across the novel. 
The fault-lines along which these discrepancies appear within the novel symptomatize the 
overdetermination of the “death of the novel” trope in the postwar American literary-critical 
field, and, in turn, further distantiate two discrete organic logics at work in the literary criticism 
of the 1950s and -60s. Though the austere organicism of the American New Critics appeared 
largely incompatible with the engendering thrust of Lionel Trilling’s novel criticism—not just in 
terms of their respective thematics or theories of organism but, more fundamentally, in the 
biologized model by which each position understood the proper relationship between reader, 
critic, and work—Barth’s cybernetic rejoinder allows us to see how both positions remain 
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attached to a shared bio-theoretical tropology: easily romanticized, scientifically antiquated, and 
ripe for parody. 
The American New Critics espoused an explicitly organic theory of literary form that 
stressed the shapeliness, internal harmony, and bodily integrity of the text. Theirs was first and 
foremost a structural—which is to say, anatomical—analogy, with the poem as its privileged 
instance. For Cleanth Brooks, a prominent New Critic, the poem “represents an organic 
structure; and the intensity of the total effect is a reflection of the total structure” (Well-Wrought 
142). Though Brooks speaks here of an “intensity of total effect” (163), the vital activity of the 
text is only incidentally an activity produced by the poem to be felt by its reader. Rather, its 
organic dynamism is internal; in the symbiotic feedback among organs that sustains a body, the 
New Critics find a powerful metaphor for the energy that unifies and animates a poem. Not only 
does Brooks assert that “[t]he relation between all the elements [within a poem] must surely be 
an organic one,” he stresses these internal relations over even the poetic elements themselves:  
[T]he poem is not [merely] a collection of beautiful or “poetic” images. If there really 
existed objects which were somehow intrinsically “poetic,” still the mere assemblage of 
these would not give us a poem. For in that case, one might arrange bouquets of these 
poetic images and thus create poems by formula. But the elements of a poem are related 
to each other, not as blossoms juxtaposed in a bouquet, but as the blossoms are related to 
the other parts of a growing plant. The beauty of the poem is the flowering of the whole 
plant, and needs the stalk, the leaf, and the hidden roots. (“Irony” 82-83) 
 
Brooks is clearly repurposing Aristotle’s theory of dramatic form here: substitute tragic drama 
for the poem and the figure of an animal for Brooks’ flowering plant and this passage could just 
as well be Aristotle’s description of the ideal “unity and wholeness” of dramatic action organized 
by and around the “principle of life [psyche; soul]” of the tragic plot (1451a).  
In fact, Brooks makes the Aristotelian line of influence explicit in order to underscore 
compositional unity and poetic economy as properly biological virtues when he goes on to assert 
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that “in a good poem, as in a good drama, there is no waste motion and there are no superfluous 
parts” (“Irony” 83). New Critical rhetoric invigorates the poem, affording it the superlative 
rhetorical valences of health and life; beyond that, its claims impute to the literary work a 
purposive sense of compositional integrity and retroactive design—each element present is 
perforce necessary while no missing element could be—without requiring the intervention of 
authorial intent. It does so in a way that capitalizes on what Ernst Mayr calls the “holism-
organismic” tradition of biological inquiry that emphasizes the irreducible nature of biological 
phenomena at a given level of systemic organization and the emergence of novel properties at 
that given level.19 Poetic images cannot be bundled into poems “by formula” any more than a 
thousand picked flowers can make a living plant, and Brooks’ biologism was, as we now know, 
astoundingly successful in making the institutional case that poems—and by extension literary 
works of any genre—could not be fully understood as mere data-points of literary history. 
Instead, the literary work would require a mode of analysis tailored to capture and describe the 
aesthetic effects that emerged when it was considered in isolation. Here, the New Critics 
proposed the doctrine of close reading, the disciplinary praxis that anchored academic literary 
study in the United States until at least the onset of theory revolution in the late 1960s, and 
arguably continues to do so in today’s academy in daily pedagogical practice, if no longer as 
dogma. 
 Brooks’ reticence on the novel as such appears particularly pointed during a period when 
so many looked to the novel, for better or for worse, as an important cultural bellwether. But it is 
also understandable, insofar as the kind of life New Critics sought to reveal in literature 
                                                             
19See Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought. Holist-organicists are those “who concentrate on the study of 
isolated objects and processes. They deal with them as if they existed in a vacuum. Perhaps the most important 
aspect of holism is that it emphasizes relationships” (66-67) Holism-organicism stands in contrast to purely 
atomistic-reductionist approaches to biological problems and questions. 
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emphasized the sovereign and autonomous status of the literary work while postwar novel-
watchers appealed to a literary vitality predicated on interchange. Novelists and novel-critics 
looked to the novel not as the object of aesthetic contemplation but as an engendering agent that 
might actually revivify its readers by at once modeling and provoking the ethical, even spiritual, 
awakening of its audience. For Trilling, at a time when “the will of our society is dying of its 
own excess . . . the novelistic intelligence is most apt” to the task of restoring and reconstituting 
that will (266-67). Trilling mobilizes biological tropes in ways that differed sharply from New 
Criticism’s organicist appeals. But the two critical positions share a common history, insofar as 
the New Critics’ indifference to the novel-as-such is importantly rooted in an earlier episode in 
novel-death discourse when, in the 1920s, Ortega y Gasset and—more pertinently for the New 
Critics—T. S. Eliot announced the novel’s generic exhaustion.  
Compared to the novel-death debates of the 1950s, Eliot’s rhetoric of organism in his 
1923 essay, “Ulysses, Order and Myth,” is muted: “I am not begging the question in calling 
Ulysses a ‘novel’; and if you call it an epic it will not matter. If it is not a novel, that is simply 
because the novel is a form which will no longer serve . . . [t]he novel ended with Flaubert and 
James” (177). Already for Eliot, not only the novel but the question of the novel is obsolete—and 
indeed it is that neutral word “obsolescence,” rather than decay, impotence, or sickliness, that he 
uses to characterize the novel in its moment of literary-historical supersession. Provocatively, 
Eliot couches his indifference towards the novel in a larger argument for classicism in literature: 
the counterintuitive thrust of his essay is to hold forth Joyce’s “‘great, [allegedly] undisciplined 
talent’” as the neoclassical inspiration that rediscovers in myth a “way of controlling, of 
ordering, of giving a shape and a significance to the immense panorama of futility and anarchy 
which is contemporary history” (176-77; emphasis in original). It is not in a living—or dying—
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aesthetic form but in the “living material” gathered up in Joyce’s mythic method that the 
language of life appears in Eliot’s otherwise abstract argumentation. Brooks’ “organic relations” 
are presaged in Eliot’s admiration for Joyce’s mythic order as Ulysses’ principle of life even 
though, in Eliot’s case, those relations are not yet explicitly biological.  
By suggesting that myth is the hidden form of Joyce’s sprawling book, Eliot in effect 
claims the novel possesses form in name only: “instead of being a form,” he asserts, the novel 
“was simply the expression of an age which had not sufficiently lost all form to feel the need of 
something stricter” (177). Pronouncing the novel dead was a way to clear space—not just for the 
poetic tradition, but for the clear-eyed critic among whose tasks it was to ascertain the scale at 
which the organic whole of the artwork could be discerned. It is in this spirit that Brooks is later 
drawn to Faulkner’s oeuvre, as a rare novelist worthy of his New-Critical ministrations: not as a 
series of novels in which the unit of the book has anything but a superficial relevance, but as the 
epic of Yoknapatawpha County, the ideal order of which Brooks sets himself to the task of 
discovering in a 1963 monograph.20  
As John Guillory has demonstrated, Eliot’s reaction to Joyce’s (already post-novelistic) 
epic novel, taken alongside his vision of literary history in “Tradition and the Individual Talent” 
(1921), conditioned the theories of New Criticism to a remarkable extent. Guillory contends that 
“a large part of the adversarial agenda of the New Criticism in the thirties and forties was 
expressed as a direct extension of Eliot’s revisionary literary history, in the form of a double 
polemic on behalf of modernist poets and the metaphysicals” (156). Predictably enough, 
however, at the moment of New Criticism’s academic institutionalization, Eliot’s notion of 
literary tradition is “displaced into allegorical explications of the ‘internal structures’ of the 
canonical texts, which all exhibit the features of paradox, irony, or ambiguity formerly attributed 
                                                             
20This would be Brooks’s William Faulkner: The Yoknapatawpha Country. 
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specifically to the metaphysicals and the moderns” (157). To this observation I would add that it 
is in large part the New Critical introduction of organicist rhetoric that made such a displacement 
possible: the torsions of paradox, irony and ambiguity are for Brooks the very “organic relations” 
that animate the poem, and both paradox (and its ilk) and the language of organism are 
sufficiently abstractable to allow the New Critics to universalize principles of form ostensibly 
specific to poetry (and drama, to a lesser degree) and position them at the heart of academic 
literary study more broadly.  
In other words, though New Criticism’s embrace of organic form is built upon poetry’s 
supposed supercession of the novel, the organicism of the New Critics was nonetheless brought 
to bear upon novels, as indeed it was on the whole of the literary canon. The echoes of organicist 
formal presumptions resound in Schott’s castigation of Giles Goat-Boy as “a gluey mass of serio-
comic belligerence that hardens into epoxy,” the worst kind of artwork “by formula” that uses 
the notional equivalents of synthetic adhesives to patch together what a vital dynamism ought to 
nurture into being (qtd. in Morrell 68). For Beverly Gross, the book overshoots paradox, “plays 
its duality too hard and finally works against itself” to find nihilism, rather than organism, 
“embedded in its very form” (99). Whether by WESCAC’s editorial hand, or J.B.’s, or by the 
literal cast of mind of Giles himself, the syllabus is formally “Prepared for the Furtherment of the 
Gilesian Curriculum” by neat division into two volumes of three “reels” of computer tape, each 
of which is further subdivided into seven chapters apiece. Explicitly presenting itself as an 
imposition on lived experience rather than an elaboration of it, the rigid form of the “Syllabus” 
underscores the seriality of the plot that reviewers so often found tedious, as Giles works and 
reworks the assignment sheet towards a promised revelation that never arrives. 
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After New Criticism, organism became euphemistic for the “simultaneous order” of 
literature that backgrounded Eliot’s “Tradition” essay: in other words, a decontextualized quality 
of literary virtue that might be found in superficially diverse local variation—exhibited by 
masterworks in prose or verse across centuries and in a variety of styles—but partook of a 
fundamental literary life-force that lesser works had missed. As Guillory observes, Eliot’s 
simultaneous order is amenable to the iconoclastic critic but not the iconoclastic artist given its 
way of 
. . . enjoin[ing] a strategic modesty upon practicing poets. The idealization of the 
very order of the monuments means that what the new poet threatens is disorder; 
the new poet must present himself or herself with a demeanor of conformity . . . 
the emphasis thus falls upon the minuteness of the readjustment, the “ever so 
slightly” of the alteration. (143) 
 
Tradition, which Eliot calls “the presence of the past . . . not what is dead, but what is already 
living” through and alongside the contemporary writer, becomes an organic series with the New 
Critics. But the modesty it imposes on the practitioner profoundly diminishes the range of viable 
artistic strategies in the present. The artist’s maturation must be, in Eliot’s own words, “a 
continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality”—until the artist becomes like a 
catalytic “shred of platinum” whose presence facilitates the formation of the work of art as a kind 
of chemical reaction but does not survive in the “impersonal” final product (Eliot 39-40). As in 
Jacob’s “history and drift of programmes,” the hereditary line—particularly when synchronically 
flattened into a “simultaneous order”—constrains to a considerable degree the level of individual 
iconoclasm that will ultimately be legible within the context of that inherited “tradition.” 
 The autonomy of New Critical form is thus subtended by an historical and institutional 
dimension for which its organicism does not account: canonicity. Only after the individual talent 
capitulates to tradition and the perspicacious critic who delineates it can the literary work begin 
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to demonstrate vitality in its fully dehistoricized autonomy. Giles Goat-Boy stages the “self-
sacrifice” of this capitulation in the “Posttape” to the events of the “Syllabus.” Situated in the 
complex tense of a kind of anticipatory posthumousness, Giles records a melancholic protest 
against the textual claims levied against him by the future. As it nears completion the “Syllabus” 
looms, a living but “monstrous work” in which Giles no longer believes. Its claim to life has 
made him into the “neutral instrumentality” whose role is more catalytic than authorial. He no 
longer recognizes his goatish “gambols” in its epical structures of “cycles on cycles ever 
unwinding: like my watch; like the reels of this machine” (699). His erstwhile disciples now run 
ahead of him as his exegetes, preempting the gospel that he has yet to finish narrating while he 
languishes in a “cagèd, sunless place,” detained for his own protection by those same “loyalest 
Tutees” (699, 703). 
In “the GILES specimen” WESCAC manages, in spite of itself, to create a living text in 
George Giles, who is that New Critical blasphemy that DNA makes imaginable and even 
mundane: a text built “by formula” that lives, and lives spectacularly, nonetheless. Barth then 
stages the canonization of the goat-boy’s textual proxy, the “Syllabus,” as a kind of deathbed 
scene for Giles. The incrementalism permissible to the practicing poet in Eliot’s account of 
tradition is precisely the post-DNA forfeiture of individual agency brought about in Jacob’s 
rhetoric of retroactive design. In a cybernetic atopia premised, since the coverletter, on the 
interchangeability of organism and artwork as two kinds of living text, what we see in the 
supersession of Giles by his “Syllabus” is that the Syllabus is also superseded, in turn, by the 
“history and drift” of the canon itself. If anything, the genetic fiat by which Giles is eligible for 
canonization at the close of the novel pushes the organicist logic of the New Critics beyond 
itself, suggesting the extent to which its methods of close reading for paradox, irony, ambiguity 
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and the like are predisposed to find (read as: install) organic tensions in any text already 
supposed to contain them. That the “organic relations” the critic purports to discover in the 
literary object are illuminated in conformity with a critical act with its own extraliterary motives; 
that the canonical order has a life of its own, one that buttresses but also warps the internal 
dynamics of the “organic” work, despite all its supposed autonomy: these are the reflected truths 
found in the postvital, bio-theoretical mirror that Giles Goat-Boy holds to New Critical practice. 
 The publication of Brooks’ The Well-Wrought Urn in 1947 coincided with the 
institutionalization of New Critical method and the canonization of Eliot’s revisions to literary 
history.21 The Partisan Review published Lionel Trilling’s “Art and Fortune” the following year. 
Trilling has the ascendant New Critical orthodoxy in his sights as he endeavors to “understand 
under what conditions the novel may live” through its midcentury imperilment (255). In the 
essay, Trilling takes particular umbrage at the poetical principles that have been installed at the 
heart of novel criticism and practice. Somewhat sardonically and at considerable length, he 
castigates “a prose which approaches poetry” that  
. . . has no doubt its own value, but it cannot serve to repair the loss of straightforward 
prose, rapid, masculine, and committed to events, making its effects not by the single 
word or by the phrase but by words properly and naturally massed. . . . For the modern 
highly trained literary sensibility, form suggests completeness and the ends tucked in; 
resolution is seen only as all contradictions equated, and though form thus understood has 
its manifest charm, it will not adequately serve the modern experience. (271-73)  
 
Trilling deploys a gendered distinction between “masculine” prose and “charming,” effeminate 
verse form to rather self-evident ends in this passage, valorizing the narrative style of rapid and 
“massed” novelistic prose over a formally fastidious poetic ideal according to an all-too-familiar 
tropology of male potency. The life Trilling wants for the novel is not an internal harmony but a 
productive and irrepressible energy more likely to overspill formal boundaries than consent to 
                                                             
21See John Guillory’s Cultural Capital (156-57). See also Gerald Graff’s, Professing Literature: An Institutional 
History (150).  
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being harmoniously “tucked in” to them. The massing of words “properly and naturally” 
becomes a principle of composition for Trilling, where the New Critics saw such accumulative 
methods as formulaic. Superfluity of content is no longer the symptom of lifelessness in a 
literary work. Instead, it is the very proof of life, a byproduct of abundant talent: “the headlong, 
profuse, often careless quality of the novel, though no doubt wasteful, is an aspect of its bold and 
immediate grasp on life” (278). Despite the blunt manner in which Trilling gender-codes the 
contrast between New Critical ideas and his own, however, the discrepant ends to which the two 
theories employ biological rhetoric betrays the fact that they are not really comparable along 
such a binary axis. Trilling does not seek to articulate a more masculine formalism, in other 
words; he seeks an account of how literary ideas disseminate within and act upon the social 
fabric in masculine fashion, an account uninterested in questions of aesthetic form per se. His 
ideal novel demonstrates vitality in its effects, not in its resemblances. Against organic form he 
poses vital activity: if the poem is the paradigmatic New Critical object, the novel is to be at once 
the transcription of a novelist’s own vitality and itself a revivifying agent for Cold War 
America.22 
In Trilling’s thought, life often presents adjectivally, as a “roughness of grain of the novel 
[that] corresponds with something in the nature of the novelists themselves” or the “living, 
reciprocal relation” that is possible between a reader and “active” literature (“Art” 278; 
“Meaning” 294). It is a quality that Trilling will never quite define, but the terms “will” and 
“activity” become its repositories through repeated use, and the masculine tropology that Trilling 
uses to describe it accrues for this notion of life a seminal, even “omniseminous,” charge. 
                                                             
22For Jameson, this opposition between activity and shape, and the novel’s affiliation with the former, is simply a 
characteristic of the genre. “The ‘novel’ as process rather than as form: such is the intuition to which apologists of 
this narrative structure have found themselves driven again and again, in an effort to characterize it as something 
that happens to its primary materials . . . rather than a finished object whose ‘structure’ one might model and 
contemplate” (Political 152).  
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Trilling is an unacknowledged, colloquial vitalist. For him, an élan vitale pulses through 
novelists, novels, and readers alike; however nebulous, this vital force can, under the right 
circumstances, pass from novelist to novel and then, it is to be hoped, from novel to reader. 
Paul De Man observed that in the thought of Georg Lukács, the form of the novel “can 
have nothing in common with the homogeneous, organic form of nature: it is founded on an act 
of consciousness, not on the imitation of a natural object” (56). Trilling is the inheritor of the 
Lukácsian tradition in novel criticism, and not just because he follows Lukács in rejecting the 
analogy between novel and organism. The two share an argumentative disposition that readily 
abstracts from novels to the Novel—a consolidation that allows them to position the reified novel 
as an agent capable of broad historical impact and social influence.23 For both Lukács and 
Trilling, the novel cannot be a formal imitation of life because life is already bound up with the 
novel as one of the terms of the novel’s dialectic. In Lukács that dialectic negotiates “between 
the urge for [Hellenic, i.e. organic] totality and man’s alienated situation” in a the world without 
god; in Trilling the dialectic arrives at “the meaning of a literary idea” through a similar 
mediation between desire and life, between the “haunted air [that is t]he life in ideology” and the 
“actualities” of lived experience (De Man 54-55; Trilling, “Art” 275-76).24 (Elsewhere, Trilling’s 
dialectic is redescribed slightly, as the interpenetration of the social world that is the novel’s 
                                                             
23De Man again: “[Lukács’ The Theory of the Novel] is written from the point of view of a mind that claims to have 
reached such an advanced degree of generality that it can speak, as it were, for the novelistic consciousness itself; it 
is the Novel itself that tells us the history of its own development” (53). See, by comparison, Trilling’s rhetorical 
consolidation of “the Great American Novel” (278), which is characteristic. 
 
24Trilling wrote an essay called “The Meaning of a Literary Idea” shortly after “Art and Fortune,” in 1949. Therein, 
Trilling elaborates on several of the statements made in passing in “Art and Fortune,” among them his preference for 
“active” literature and his polemic for a “literature of ideas” in which the “literary idea” is a nigh-Hegelian 
interpenetration of concrete particular and ideal abstraction. The essay elaborates these concepts en route to 
Trilling’s takedown of the “passivity” of recent American novels, once again tying the rhetoric of activity to a robust 
novel genre and reading cause for alarm in its relative absence. 
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appropriate “field of research” with the “direction of man’s soul” as betrayed in the play of 
manners that is the novel’s proper “material of . . . analysis” (“Manners” 212).) 
To put it another way: the novel of Lukács and Trilling is related to the stuff of life by 
participation rather than analogy. The “biological datum” of the novelist and the life of his 
society are too intimately involved in the production of the novel—and, conversely, the task of 
the novel is too closely tied to begetting or sustaining a type of moral life that Trilling calls the 
“will”—for the novel to capture life at arm’s length in a composed act of formal mirroring. But 
in fact the analogy persists, though it is displaced: from the spatial array of the organism that 
holds its vitality in its homeostatic, internal relations and onto the novel’s narrative trajectory. 
For Lukács “[t]he uninterrupted and irrepressible flow of time is the unifying principle that gives 
homogeneity to the disjointed parts [of the novel] . . . Time gives order to the random agitation 
of men and confers upon it the appearance of organic growth” (qtd. in De Man, “Georg” 58). 
Trilling is even more explicit about the possibility when he states that dialectic, “that is, a 
developing series of statements . . . is just another word for form” in the novel (“Meaning” 
282).25 For Trilling it is the dialectical trajectory of the will that takes the organic analogy. The 
“direction of man’s soul” as it is constituted, or reconstituted, in and by the novel becomes a kind 
of moral ontogenesis.  
Trilling argues for novels that chart a moderate course. In fact he looks to the novel genre 
in large part because of its affinity for “notions of renovation and reconstitution [of the will that] 
are social and pragmatic and in the literal sense of the word conservative” (“Art” 267). This 
                                                             
25In this passage, Trilling makes it clear that “developing series” is the key term, and stresses the importance of 
relations internal to that series in a manner similar to Brooks’ evaluation of the poem’s internal dynamism—if, 
again, a spatial figure is transposed to the diachronic trajectory of the series: “if the word ‘statements’ seems to pre-
judge the question so far as literature is concerned, let us say merely that we deal with a developing series—the 
important word is ‘developing.’ We judge the value of the development by judging the interest of its several stages 
and the propriety and the relevance of their connection among themselves. We make the judgment in terms of the 
implied purpose of the developing series” (283).  
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moderation is sexual. On one hand, the novel labors under the threat of impotence: it must 
constantly disprove the charge that it “has been exhausted,” its natural reservoir of life spent, its 
essence “fatigued” beyond quickening (256). On the other hand, it must temper a decadent 
cultural milieu in which “[t]he religious will, the political will, the sexual will, the artistic will—
each is dying of its own excess” (266).26  
Displaced onto the dialectical trajectory of fictional emplotment, Trilling’s organicism is 
less explicit than that of the New Critics. But it is at least as emphatic and, of the two discourses, 
it interpellates Giles Goat-Boy more directly. This is not simply because it recognizes and 
valorizes the novel genre as such, but because Barth’s novel perversely confirms Trilling’s 
concern at the excessive or misplaced vitality of a decadent culture by confronting the reader 
with an erotic picaresque that presents a Sadean catalogue of non-procreative sex. Giles’ goatish 
upbringing has left him without an understanding of human sexual mores, and even when he 
learns of them his Grand-Tutorial infallibility provides an armor of innocence that allows him to 
disregard them. Consequently, the goat-boy’s narration treats non-procreative sex in the same 
tones of neutral admiration that he uses to describe the sexual motifs that the black exchange 
student, Croaker, has carved into Giles’ walking stick with his teeth: 
. . . he had incised a number of humanish figures, recognizable though much stylized, and 
not unattractive. Their torsos were squat, sometimes nonexistent except for the apparatus 
of generation; their faces were squared, their eyes, ears, noses, and mouths very large, 
their teeth pointed. They rode one another’s shoulders or stood upon one another’s heads, 
two columns of them up the stick, and on each level the figure in this was engaged with 
its counterpart in that, in one or several ways: they clapped and coupled, buggered and 
bit; also sniffed and fiddled and fingered and shat, thrust out their tongues and forth their 
pudenda—a rare interclutchment it was of appetites. (206) 
 
                                                             
26Another possible, though oblique, point of connection between Trilling and the New Critics are the agrarians, who 
prosecuted a broader version of Trilling’s “death through excess” argument, diagnosing a culture-wide “moral and 
spiritual suicide” through the “awful spectacle” of industrialization (Lytle 202-03). Some agrarians became, or lent 
inspiration to, the New Critics.  
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Croaker’s sexual series is a kind of combinatory language in which each sexual link is a unique 
articulation consisting of the novel arrangement of the sexual organs of two bodies. It is a 
microcosm of the panoramic sexual farce that runs through the novel with the decadent aim of 
exhausting the possible erotic couplings beyond consensual, heteronormative sex. In the novel’s 
opening pages, Giles tries to “service” the ewes of his herd, attempts to incestuously couple his 
estranged mother, and solicits anal sex from the mentally-impaired janitor G. Herrold. The 
book’s supporting cast, like its protagonist, is perpetually aroused, but rarely do its couplings 
suggest the potential for procreation. Kenneth and Hedwig Sear are aesthete-voyeurs who are 
titillated by watching others couple in novel and exotic arrangements but have long since bored 
of each other. Maurice Stoker enjoys arranging such couplings between other men, women and 
animals and his wife Anastasia, whose martyr-complex compels her to participate. Peter Greene, 
the ur-capitalist figure in Barth’s expansive allegory, is habitually impotent. Elbis Eierkopf, a 
Werner Von Braun type, has “infantile paralysis” below the waist, and hence a prepubescent 
penis (320); in this he is compensated by Croaker, a grotesquely racist caricature with whom 
Elbis is repeatedly paired. Croaker’s mandibular eloquence is equaled by a lust so indiscriminate 
that he takes to sating it on whatever person or object is nearest to hand. And then there is 
WESCAC, which “quite like a randy freshman . . . had little on its mind but sex; filled with 
amorous memories of the Dorset ewes, all it cared to do was mate, never mind with whom or at 
whose expense” (65). Having acquired a “noctial” taste for sex from the livestock breeding 
protocols that it oversees, the machine that Spielman described as the source of the university’s 
“life-heat” stands apart as the only character among the novel’s oversexed cast whose sex acts 
seem capable of progeniture.  
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 Mark Greif documents one line of response to the novel’s perceived moribundity, arguing 
that “[v]itality becomes its own pursuit in an age when the ‘death of the novel’ is a presumption 
that can never be laid to rest” (“Novel” 27). This vitality comes to animate a new novelistic 
subgenre that Greif calls the “big, ambitious novel” that emerges in “archetypal form” in the 
1970s with the likes of Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow (1973) and Gaddis’s JR (1975). The “big, 
ambitious novel,” Greif argues, harnesses a vitality “heterogenous” to that called for by Trilling, 
rerouting it into a kind of antihumanist energy manifest in “a feeling of spread, multifariousness, 
or openendedness” (ibid). In this account, vitality retains its implicit valorization according to a 
logic of scarcity, which is perhaps why a novel like Giles Goat-Boy that parodies that 
valorization must necessarily fall outside of Greif’s account.27 As one of its dissenting editors 
complains from within Giles Goat-Boy’s paratextual “Publisher’s Disclaimer,” the novel’s “very 
energy (let us say, inexorableness) . . . is a liability to us, like the energy of crabgrass or cancer” 
(xvi). Distasteful similes for artistic procedure—the author’s relentlessly proliferating allegory is 
what this editor has in mind—opens vitality’s superlative inflections onto forms of life that 
display a malignant vital energy. Conversely, the Sadean athleticism with which the novel’s 
characters couple and recouple in sterile parodies of heteronormative sex mocks the sexual 
energy of vitalism by squandering it. Barth’s novel shows Trilling’s polemic what a truly 
“headlong” and “wasteful” profligate energy might actually look like. 
The problem with this discourse of novelistic vitality is that it must begin somewhere. 
The education of the will that Trilling wants the novel to effect requires the same kind of 
temporal sleight-of-hand that Jacob’s sovereign DNA molecule did: Trilling needs to presume a 
                                                             
27Greif deals with the 1960s in the form of a speculative line of questioning: “Why does the archetypal form we 
recognize seem to emerge in the early 1970s? Because of an effect of the always underexplained ‘Sixties’ on a form 
with a particularly long gestation period?” But there is very little about Giles Goat-Boy formally or thematically that 
suggests it as a gestative entry in the meganovel genre. Rather, it seems that Barth’s novel is an emphatically late, 
even epigonal, work, formally involute and thematically fixated on belatedness and anachronism. 
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fully-formed novelist who can transmit his moral DNA to the books that he writes so that they 
may, in turn, instill the reading public with the social will that he perceives to be endangered. But 
for the same reason that these novelists are needed—a widespread lack of social will—they 
cannot be drawn from the ranks of society, not exactly. Because of the decadent circumstances 
surrounding the will’s decline, the author cannot be a cultivated figure. Instead, from Flaubert to 
Hemmingway and Faulkner, Trilling’s exemplary novelists are creatures of “animal faith” who  
have been touched with something like stupidity, resembling the holy stupidity which 
Pascal recommends: its effects appear in their ability to maintain ambivalence toward 
their society, which is not an acquired attitude of mind, or a weakness of mind, but rather 
the translation of a biological datum, an extension of the pleasure-pain with which, in a 
healthy state, we respond to tension and effort; the novelist expresses this in his 
coexistent hatred and love of the life he observes. His inconsistency of intellectual 
judgment is biological wisdom. (“Fortune” 279)  
 
To solve his will-sourcing problem, Trilling reintroduces the artistic personality that Eliot 
extinguished in his “Tradition” essay, and that the New Critics subsequently excised from 
literary study when they developed the intentional fallacy.28 He doubles down on the very 
individuality that the new critics would efface by casting his novelist as a kind of radical original 
whose dialectical integrity—the integrity of a sustained and literal ambivalence towards 
society—is an intensely singular “biological datum, an extension of the pleasure-pain” of the 
author’s direct relationship to life.  
Both Trilling and Lukács tend to extrapolate the greatness of an author from the 
exemplarity of his or her characters, since that exemplarity is the mechanism by which the reader 
of a novel is made aware of her own socio-historical circumstances. But Lukács addresses 
primarily the European scene while Trilling, even when analyzing European novelists, has his 
eye on the American tradition. As a result, differences emerge in how that exemplarity works as 
a fictional device. Lukács applauds Sir Walter Scott for his standard protagonist, “a more or less 
                                                             
28See W. K. Wimsatt’s “The Intentional Fallacy.”  
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mediocre, average English gentleman,” a “typical character nationally, but in the sense of the 
decent and average, rather than the eminent and all-embracing” (Historical 33, 36). In Trilling’s 
American tradition, by contrast, “[t]he great characters of American fiction, such, say, as Captain 
Ahab and Natty Bumppo, tend to be mythic because of the rare fineness and abstractness of the 
ideas they represent; and their very freedom from class gives them a large and glowing 
generality” (“Art” 262). Infatuated with myth and obsessed with mythic precedent, Giles Goat-
Boy is a novel that wonders aloud about the possibility that Trilling’s great American characters 
are still possible, whether, in the age of molecular biology, exemplarity can mean anything other 
than a Lukácscian regression to the mean. Lucius Rexford, the chancellor of New Tammany 
College in Barth’s novel (allegorically, the president of the United States), exhorts his students to 
aspire to a Lukácsian ideal pushed to the point of absurdity: he is “young enough to be vigorous, 
but old enough to be prudent . . . neither cowardly nor foolhardy, but firmly courageous; neither 
meek nor arrogant, but justly proud . . . generous, witty, tolerant, philanthropic, gentle, cheerful, 
energetic, fair-minded, public-spirited, sagacious, self-controlled, articulate, and responsible—
and neither too much nor too little of any of these things!” (368). The specter of this exemplary 
mediocrity haunts Giles in his bildungsromanesque attempts to grapple with the import of his 
genetic heritage, but Giles Goat-Boy is an American work in that Giles’ primary struggle is with 
how he is to be an original in Trilling’s sense, how he might attain the “large and glowing 
generality” of Melville’s characters.  
Given the fact that both Lukács and Trilling derived their preferred aesthetics through 
(admittedly disparate versions of) the Marxian problematic, it is unsurprising that they would 
both look to the dialectic as an antidote to the presuppositions of formalist approaches. Nor is it 
surprising that their own work would “presuppose a synthesis between analysis and evaluation,” 
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each writer in his own way closing the distance between prescriptive and descriptive registers 
until Lukács’ historical analyses simultaneously serve to “address the present with a partisan 
urgency” (Jameson, “Introduction” 1-2), and Trilling’s death-of-the-novel polemic doubles as a 
wholesale re-description of the theory and history of the novel genre as a description of the will 
and a record of its literary exertions. This double valence ramifies into the double vocation of 
novels in these critics’ respective theories. “The novel at its greatest,” Trilling asserts, “is the 
record of the will acting under the direction of an idea, often the idea of will itself” (“Art” 266). 
At once mimetic and instructive, this record is also the agent that undertakes the “unremitting 
work of involving the reader himself in the moral life” (ibid). For Trilling this parallelism, 
whereby novels enact what they narrate, is key to the genre’s singular prosocial utility.  
Trilling’s ideal novel is a template, but a template that initiates the change that it 
diagrams. A few years prior to Trilling and a full decade before Watson and Crick’s discovery, 
Erwin Schrödinger would hypothesize a similarly double role for the genetic “code-script” he 
supposed to hold the secret of life. The chromosome fibers of the code-script are, he held, 
“instrumental in bringing about the development they foreshadow. They are law-code and 
executive power—or, to use another simile, they are architect’s plan and builder’s craft—in 
one.”1 This double-function would become an article of faith in the discourse of molecular 
genetics, eventually enshrined at the heart of the program metaphor in the genetic program’s 
self-identical illocutionary force: the virtue of the program was to execute the behavior its 
commands also described. I do not mean to argue for an historical link between Schrödinger and 
Trilling. However, the precision of this double-function resemblance along similar tropological 
axes of vital production is what provides the opening for Barth, informed by discourses of early 
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computing, to read the characterizations of novel-death discourse (represented here by Trilling) 
“genetically.” 
Croaker’s staff is a telling example of the way in which Barth reads the genome’s double-
function back into the discourse of novel death. As Giles continues to examine the staff, he 
learns that 
. . . the artwork was functional as well as a decorative—that to point to any pair of 
Croaker’s figures was to give a particular command . . . I was to learn later of further 
significances in the arrangement of figures from bottom to top—a kind of hierarchic 
psychochronology of lust whereof the ingenuity, combined with the art of the 
composition, suggested that Croaker was working in some tradition more sophisticated 
than himself. (206) 
 
Croaker’s staff, an “architect’s plan and builder’s craft” of Sadean desire, resembles a strand of 
DNA save that what it produces is an “interclutchment of appetites” that are “ingenious” rather 
than productive. It is an inverted image of Trilling’s ideal novel that would serve as both 
template and catalyst for the American moral imagination—the work of art as speech act that 
brings about what it declares, except what Croaker’s “psychochronology of lust” declares and 
initiates itself goes nowhere.  
Croaker is a hyperbolic, racist parody of Trilling’s “primitive” author, possessed of an 
artistic virtuosity that can only be intuitive as he channels a tradition “more sophisticated than 
himself.” His “psychochronology of lust” exemplifies Giles’ genetic conundrum, the problem of 
how to be, or become, an original within a recombinant field. The Sears, who enjoy a certain 
pride of place amongst the novels secondary characters insofar as they embody and give voice to 
the sexual decadence in which the entire fiction is steeped, recast the originality as a problem of 
sexual boredom when, in the course of suggesting to the goat-boy a sexual role-play “à quatre,” 
Hedwig remarks that “Novelty’s our cup of tea. Isn’t it, Kennard?” (356-57). Novelty is the 
bathetic fate of originality in a “nucleic acid world” become self-aware, a milieu in which the 
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“large and glowing generality” of the great American characters can only be approximated in the 
perverse biological hyphenate of the mongrel; of the “goat-boy.” 
In his response to the New Critics, Trilling’s polemical project reinvigorates the figure of 
the novelist, who the former would banish from view via the intentional fallacy. He does so in 
service of a model that requires the novelist’s potent moral energy in order to project that moral 
sense into his books and through culture. This moral vitality confronts the causal problem that 
would later dog the rhetoric of Jacob and other advocates of the program-model. Croaker’s 
totems give Barth’s readers to understand that the slippage from organic singularity to 
combinatory novelty is at the heart of both WESCAC’s cybernetic literalism and the novel’s 
ribald sexuality. By framing his deconstructed satire of the genetic program in the terms of 
novel-death discourse, Barth suggests that there are two traditions being kept alive by Trilling’s 
version of novel-death discourse. The first is Trilling’s own ideal: a vitalist fantasy of America’s 
moral regeneration at the hands of its novelists. Alongside it is a tradition of fictional 
experimentation in which Giles Goat-Boy counts itself an entry: a tradition with fewer 
aspirations to social amelioration but combinatory sensibilities born of its own purportedly late 
moment, a tradition perhaps better positioned to continue producing novels even after the novel-








CHAPTER 3: HARD-BOILED ECOLOGY: ECOSYSTEM AND EMERGENCE IN 
CHESTER HIMES’S HARLEM DOMESTICS 
 
Introduction: Aerial Views 
Crime fiction has always needed beasts, even if they are more often disguised as men. 
“The Murders in the Rue Morgue” is not just an early classic of the genre but, for many, its 
paradigmatic case: Poe’s murderous Orang-outan sits at the historical and conceptual heart of the 
detective story, our animal impulse to violence made literal. According to Sean McCann, the task 
of “separat[ing] bestial fury from the ordinary patterns of civil society” (9) fell to the early 
heroes of the genre, men of reason like Auguste Dupin and Sherlock Holmes, whose rational 
triumphs served to reassure the reader of the possibility, and the rightness, of a social order based 
in liberal theories of enlightened self-interest. 
Later, as the genre’s faith in ratiocination waned and its social philosophy took a turn for 
the hard-boiled, what had been the exception proving the rule became the rule. In the eyes of the 
protagonist of Hard-Boiled Crime Fiction (HBCF), a self-interest that was anything but 
enlightened came to look increasingly like animal instinct.1 Novels by Raymond Chandler and 
Dashiell Hammett introduced the reader to the metaphorics of urban jungles and the forms of 
criminal predation that structure them. The epistemological problem of CDF—“whodunit,” who 
among us is an animal in human guise—is replaced in these novels by the protagonist’s struggle 
to keep out of ecosystemic circulation. In Red Harvest (1929), Hammett’s Continental Op, who 
is brought in from the west coast in order to rid Personville (dubbed “poisonville”) of its criminal 
                                                        
1Throughout this chapter, I use Sean McCann’s terminology to differentiate between “Classic Detective Fiction” 
(CDF) and “Hard-Boiled Crime Fiction” (HBCF), a distinction with which my analysis broadly agrees (4).  
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element, struggles to keep from going “blood-simple like the natives” (154). In The Big Sleep 
(1939), Chandler’s Philip Marlowe must evade seduction by the vampiric Sternwood daughters, 
femmes fatales who rhetorically figure to make sex and seduction into predatory games. Under 
the hard-boiled gaze, the social order resolves into an amoral, “ascending scale of larger and 
larger mouths and bellies” (Worster 297)—resolves, that is, into a food chain, in ecological 
historian Donald Worster’s memorably reductive description. 
Early in the HBCF novel A Rage in Harlem (1957), the first of nine that would come to 
comprise what Chester Himes called his “Harlem Domestics,” the narrative gaze abruptly 
departs from its breakneck, cops-and-conmen plot, veering away from street-level description to 
deliver the following panoramic view from above:2  
Looking eastward from the towers of Riverside Church, perched among the university 
buildings on the high banks of the Hudson River, in a valley far below, waves of grey 
rooftops distort the perspective like the surface of a sea. Below the surface, in the murky 
waters of fetid tenements, a city of black people who are convulsed in desperate living, 
like the voracious churning of millions of hungry cannibal fish. Blind mouths eating their 
own guts. Stick in a hand and draw back a nub.  
That is Harlem. 
The farther east it goes, the blacker it gets  
East of Seventh Avenue to the Harlem River is called The Valley. Tenements 
thick with teeming life spread in dismal squalor. Rats and cockroaches compete with the 
mangy dogs and cats for the man-gnawed bones. (93) 
 
The move is a remarkable one, and not just for the bilious, colloquial racism that it appears to 
voice in its parodic invocation—and critique—of the academic, purportedly disinterested, bird’s-
eye gaze of sociological diagnosis.3 Appearing in Himes’s first attempt at a detective story that 
                                                        
2In Francois Bott’s 1964 profile of Himes, the journalist reports that “Himes tells me that he doesn’t think of his 
novels as true detective stories . . . he calls his books ‘domestic novels.’ He describes the miserable lives of a half 
million Negroes, some of whom are addicts, bums, crooks, pimps, prostitutes, or suckers. They live in a drab, dirty 
ghetto, in miserable hovels, with cheap whisky and drugs everywhere” (16).  
 
3The unnamed university towers from which the roving narrative gaze surveys 1960s Harlem can only belong to 
Columbia University. Himes’s critique here is twofold: first, he uses bestializing and pejorative figures of speech to 
make explicit the dehumanizing impetus behind the ambitious sociological and urban-planning initiatives of post-
WWII American academy. (In this latter connection, see Thomas Heise’s excellent “Harlem is Burning: Urban 
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he “really didn’t know how to write” (Absurdity, 111), this passage is also a noteworthy 
departure from the conventions of HBCF, given that genre’s idiomatic and ideological 
attachments to the hard-boiled protagonist’s first-person point of view.4 Indeed, the tactic is 
almost certainly a carry-over from Himes’s previous works, protest novels like his 1945 debut, If 
He Hollered Let Him Go, which leveraged third-wave naturalist techniques to offer race-
relations critiques on the model of friend and fellow expat Richard Wright’s Native Son. 5 In this 
extreme, counterintuitive leveraging of what Neel Ahuja has called “animalization”—that is, 
“contextual comparisons between animals (as laborers, food, pests, or ‘wildlife’) and the bodies 
or behaviors of racialized subjects” (557)—the passage is finally indicative of the (cynical) 
ecological sensibility that Himes’s Domestics would embrace to an increasing degree over 
1960s, and whose theoretical declensions the author would pursue, as logics of narrative form, to 
their catastrophic termini in the series’ final installments, Blind Man with a Pistol (1969) and the 
unpublished Plan B.  
 How do these aerial views—which will become increasingly common formal features, 
characteristic by 1965’s Cotton Comes to Harlem—reframe the relatively traditional genre fare 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Rioting and the ‘Black Underclass’ in Chester Himes’s Blind Man with a Pistol,” which contextualizes Himes’s last 
novel alongside the Harlem housing riot of 1964 and the study of urban black pathology beginning with Gunnar 
Myrdal’s An American Dilemma.) Himes also highlights the “distortions of perspective” that actually make it easier, 
from such a height, to perceive Harlem as an abstracted figure—a “sea,” a voracious “churn”—than it is to pick out 
individuals from the Harlem crowds. Himes’s Harlemites are thus doubly dehumanized, either as individualized 
grotesques or, through a kind of academic sociological pointillism, as the de-individualized material substrate for the 
expression of the life of the crowd. 
 
4This generic attachment to the first-person perspective is widely noted, though its cause is up for debate. 
Illuminating an oblique but important synonymy of purpose between American hard-boiled narration and the social 
reportage of continental European fiction, Fredric Jameson argues that the detective “fulfills the demands of the 
function of knowledge . . . through him, we are able to see, to know, the society as a whole, but he does not really 
stand for any genuine close-up experience of it” (“Raymond,” 127-28). Christopher Breu confirms the implicit 
flâneurie of the detective, but the effect for him is ideologically specific. The HBCF “situates [the detective narrator] 
as the subject of the gaze, implicitly controlling that which he observes, a [white male] positionality that is 
reinforced by the first-person narrative voice” (Masculinity, 13).  
 
5For the periodizing account of American Naturalism from which I am drawing this “third-wave” designation, see 
Donald Pizer, Theory and Practice of American Literary Naturalism: Selected Essay and Reviews.  
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of the Domestics’ hard-boiled narratives? How do Himes’s novels intervene on the trajectory of 
the HBCF genre writ large? In this chapter, I will attempt to answer these questions by reading 
Himes’s series in the context of two rival 20th century ecological paradigms: New Ecology, 
which emphasized a bioeconomic understanding of the natural world according to A.G. 
Tansley’s ecosystem concept; and a resurgent Organicism, which argued for the irreducibility of 
“emergent” natural phenomena to eco-systemic schemata.6 Himes’s early Domestics are, as a 
whole, less committed to these aerial views of ecological synopsis than Cotton or the three late-
sixties novels that follow it; by Blind Man, they are common enough to seem unremarkable. 
Moreover, the final novels begin to employ a freer, telescoping narrative point-of-view that goes 
beyond simply juxtaposing disjunctive scales (breaking away from a particular plot to survey its 
environmental context) in order to dynamically interrogate the thresholds of different “levels of 
emergence” (Worster 322)—a sort of descriptive pointillism through which an image of the 
particularized activity of individual bodies resolves, gradually, into an aggregate image of the 
“ecosystem” of the bioeconomist—or the “comprehensive organism” of the organicist.7  
By injecting the HBCF genre’s narrative stylistics, cynical themes, and procedural plot 
contrivances with a Naturalist literary sensibility that Himes shared with friend, rival, and fellow 
                                                        
6For this framing, I am heavily indebted to Donald Worster’s seminal Nature’s Economy: A History of Ecological 
Ideas. Though this “rivalry” was largely settled by the 1960s, with the New Ecology displacing organicist 
concepts—in a manner not dissimilar to the outcome of the mechanist/vitalist debate outlined in chapter one or the 
disciplinary subsumption of biology by cybernetic metaphors in chapter two—persistent organicist ideas lingered in 
the public consciousness, where they were pivotal in energizing the environmentalist movement of the 1960s.  
 
7Even as early as in A Rage in Harlem, however, Himes displays a nascent sense of the “emergent threshold” that he 
is discursively crossing in the passage quoted above, which is both an emergence across biological scale and the 
emergence of a new biological subject. To wit: the predatory imagery of the “millions of hungry cannibal fish” 
correlates to an earlier moment in ecological science, between 1910 and 1935, when the dominant paradigm was the 
food chain. But the passage goes on to displace the predatory organism in stages, first synecdochally reducing to 
“blind mouths”—a reduction to bioeconomic function (“fish as consumer”)—and, ultimately, to pure, energetic 
quantum: “Tenements thick with teeming life.” This final transition mirrors the complete erasure of the organism in 
something like Eugene Odom’s “universal models for ecological energy flow” (see fig. 4.1, included later in this 
chapter on page 158).  
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expatriate, Richard Wright, I will demonstrate how Himes composes a hard-nosed race-relations 
critique that reflected the quotidian absurdity of black experience.8 The turn through literary 
Naturalism also allowed him to effectively redouble HBCF’s disposition of social critique by 
literalizing its most sensational, most characteristic tropes. This literalization worked to evert the 
complex relationship between style and sentiment in HBCF as Himes inherited it: In lieu of the 
deadpanning façade presented by his HBCF predecessors—a façade that, as critics have come 
increasingly to acknowledge, is only skin deep—Himes embraces the idiomatic flamboyance of 
the genre’s tough talk and extreme violence. In fact he exploits this superficial-by-design 
linguistic excess in order to provocatively exaggerate the historically salient, and deeply 
problematic, trope of Black masculine hyper-virility. By fusing this trope to the genre’s subject 
matter, idiom, and philosophical cynicism, Himes renders all of these elements into a single bio-
regulatory problem: a vital excess.9 Crime, sex, and black speech become congruent circuits that 
are overstuffed with life—life construed systematically; as quantity, rather than quality. This 
perpetual excess presents the real threat to Harlem’s equilibrium, prompting the violent 
ministrations of his detective duo as they go about the endless managerial work of preventing the 
surplus of black life from spilling out into the (whiter and) greater New York City.  
As I suggest below, earlier pulps, echoing earlier ecological models, were structured 
primarily by predator-prey relations. But just as Himes reimagines the criminal demimonde as a 
transactional organic system within which sex, money, and language become endlessly fungible 
as the “juice” on which it runs, those prior ecological models gave way to a systems-theory 
                                                        
8“I thought I was writing realism,” Himes recalls in the second volume of his autobiography, My Life of Absurdity. 
“It never occurred to me that I was writing absurdity. Realism and absurdity are so similar in the lives of American 
blacks one can not tell the difference” (109).  
 
9Breu’s study of white hard-boiled masculinity makes the important point that it already “borrows in disavowed 
ways from the iconography of black masculinity in order to define itself against both older forms of Victorian 
manhood and the larger social order of which it is a part,” such that the black hard-boiled masculinity created in 
Himes’s novels is, in effect, a “literalization” of this earlier “racial borrowing” (15). 
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paradigm coordinating unruly organic phenomena according to an overlay of energy exchange, 
flow, and feedback. Here, at the intersection of systems biology, radical race critique, and avant-
la-lettre, blaxploitative schlock, a postvitalist pulp aesthetic begins to take shape in Himes’s 
fiction, one that provides a counternarrative to the disciplinary emergence of the ecosystem 
concept. The latter, with its relative autonomy from the baser phenomena out of which it is 
construed, has proven increasingly amenable to the development of a bio-managerial ethos. By 
inhabiting ecosystemic logic from the position of those baser phenomena—the individuals now 
subject to policing that is construed as bio-economical regulation and acting under an intuition of 
their own bodily fungibility—Himes indexes the differential individual and social costs of 
thinking the life of populations in systematic terms. And as the series progresses, the detectives 
ultimately find that their ability to apprehend the system-as-such—to see, anticipate, and regulate 
the flow of crime, money, and sex through its circuits—does not prepare them to address the 
social unrest of later novels that emerges, so to speak, from the bottom up.10 
Tumescent Life 
 
McCann’s account of HBCF frames its distinctive pessimism as a reaction formation, a 
pivot in and against a “classical” form of detective fiction (CDF) that was fundamentally 
prosocial. Pioneered by Edgar Allan Poe in the 1840s and popularized by Sir Arthur Conan 
Doyle towards the end of the 19th century, the CDF plot, in McCann’s analysis, “exploits and 
                                                        
10Emergence was—as indeed it remains—a problematically plastic concept in the life sciences, suggesting 
everything from Alfred Emerson’s “interdependent world unity” to the total flux of J. C. Smuts’ “aggregative, 
contextual, emergent” reality (Worster 329, 322). What I am attempting to argue here—hoping that I avoid falling 
prey to the temptation to exploit the slipperiness of this notoriously overdetermined idea—is that the two ecological 
theories of the time depend on emergence in distinctly different ways. For New Ecology, the emergence of the eco-
system stabilizes an object of study (that can then be subsequently managed). For the resurgent organicists of the 
period, emergence asks us to adopt a reverential humility towards our objects of study, investing the concept with a 
moral charge. Neither conception emerges unscathed in Himes’s Harlem, which ultimately narrates a more cynical 
weltanschauung than is implied in either idea, the manageable system or the spontaneous harmony. As a system, 
unmanageable; as a spontaneous form, chaotic: the ecology of Himes’s novels provocatively deploys both versions 
of the concept at once, with the result that each undoes the other. 
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then symbolically remedies the weakest features of the classical liberal version of society” (15). 
It does so by introducing, through crime, an interval of epistemological uncertainty. This is the 
“whodunit”: everyone is a suspect so long as the hidden motivations of the ensemble cast of 
characters remain unplumbed. The anxiety produced by this state of affairs symptomatizes a 
frailty inherent to liberal social theory, which depends upon the alignment of all individual 
actors’ rational self-interest to produce and maintain an ordered society. But, without fail, this 
liberal conception of the world is ultimately amenable to the analysis of the CDF detective 
because it is explicable according to the reasonable selfishness of those actors. Rhetorically 
positioned as an amateur social scientist, the CDF detective concludes his investigations by 
logically isolating a culprit—who inevitably proves to be a social deviant after all—thereby 
clearing the other suspects of blame and retroactively guaranteeing the liberal model as a 
workable basis for society.11 The narrative progression towards this reassuring denouement is the 
work of detection itself: the detective works the logical puzzle to pinpoint the dispositions of the 
suspects, the relationships between them, the capacity within each for the commission of the 
crime. Once these have been established, the detective rewinds the clock, reconstructing the 
sequence of events and the configuration of bodies, in place and along a timeline—all with a 
mathematical precision. Characteristically, what follows is a remarkable scene that has become a 
mainstay of the CDF genre, particularly in its 20th-century practitioners like Agatha Christie: the 
detective’s revelation, in which the story of the crime and subsequent events is revealed in 
reverse, the plot driving steadily backwards in time towards its narrative origin as the scene 
progresses forwards. Narratologically, fabula and sjuzhet achieve near-perfect inversion; in 
                                                        
11Edmund Wilson memorably summarizes the performative, cathartic reassurances of the CDF plot: “Nobody seems 
guiltless, nobody seems safe; and then, suddenly, the murderer is spotted, and—relief! He is not, after all, a person 
like you or me” (qtd. in McCann 7). 
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CDF’s deterministic universe, the detective serves as Laplace’s demon, an intellect for whom 
“nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes” 
(Laplace 4).12 Once the point of full, trans-temporal disclosure has been reached, catching the 
killer is a merely a formality. 
Standing in pointed contrast to CDF’s performances of extrajudicial competence, the 
philosophically bleak parables of HBCF writers offered cynical diagnoses of 20th-century 
American society by refusing to fictionally ameliorate either the (often spectacular) literal 
violence contained in their plots or the symbolic injury that crime inflicts on the social body. 
HBCF rejects the enlightenment fantasy that animates CDF—the fantasy that, by trusting in 
sheer ratiocinative strength of private citizens like Sherlock Holmes and Auguste Dupin, 
antisocial and criminal elements can be isolated and then neatly excised through the simple, 
deliberate exercise of ratiocination (McCann 8). For CDF’s trust in reason and its typically 
anastrophic narrative arc, HBCF substitutes an antisocial message. HBCF protagonists like 
Hammett’s Sam Spade and James M. Cain’s Walter Neff demonstrate neither the optimism nor 
the objective poise of their fictional forebears.13 Already compromised by their entanglements 
with the criminal demimondes and corrupt institutions that they are hypothetically positioned to 
critique, the bread crumb trails that the HBCF detective follows inevitably lead from an isolated 
and relatively minor malfeasance—blackmail, infidelity, missing person—to intimations of the 
                                                        
12Though McCann is careful to emphasize CDF protagonist’s bourgeois credentials—he is, crucially, a gentleman 
and an amateur, without recourse to arcane resources of specialized knowledge that would detract from his display 
of common sense—there is no doubt an increased acuity at work. We can at least say that the CDF protagonist’s 
genius represents the hypothetical extension of capabilities that we, ourselves, possess. As such, this protagonist can 
serve as an exemplary, even fantastic, figure (Laplace’s demon) while also allowing readers to project themselves 
onto him, returning a flattering reflection of our own skills of perception and human understanding. This doubleness 
is important, I think, for the way in which it allowed the CDF protagonist to both clarify a social order (“I see all . . . 
”) while, at the same time, serving as its hypothetical proof (“ . . . as could any clear-thinking chap.”). 
 
13See, respectively, Chandler’s The Maltese Falcon and Double Indemnity by James M. Cain. 
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ubiquity of moral compromise and a panoramic revelation of social decay. The plot trajectory of 
the HBCF novel is, by turns, anticlimactic and properly entropic. The instigating mystery may be 
solved, or it may not; either way, things fall apart, revealing an erosion of civil society that is, 
more often than not, already well underway.14 
In McCann’s account, CDF’s blind spots—political corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, 
the commonplace (rather than anomalous) nature of “irrational and destructive passions” within 
the body politic—are the blind spots of liberal theory itself (16). In “transforming [the CDF] 
story by radicalizing its tensions” and implying that “civil society can no longer contain private 
desire,” HBCF mounted “a kind of literary critique” of New Deal liberalism, emerging as “a 
telling political fable” through which the seeming intractability of the era’s social ills could be 
refracted (4-5). If HBCF was an avenue for political critique, though, it was also “one of the 
dominant ways in which masculinity was fantasized” at the time—the site of an enduring cultural 
fantasy according to which male efficacy was figured as “a prophylactic toughness that was 
organized around the rigorous suppression of affect and was mirrored by his detached, laconic 
utterances” as much as by the instrumentalized, seemingly amoral actions that made him a 
rebuke to liberal theory (Breu 1). Emphasizing the psychosexual dimensions of what McCann 
figures as predominantly sociopolitical critique, Christopher Breu’s analysis of “hard-boiled 
masculinity” usefully highlights its conservative, even nostalgic, valences. And as Leonard 
Casuto reminds us, particularly in its earlier instantiations, this particular edifice of masculinity 
is mutually constituted with sentimentality, both literarily and thematically.15 Not only do the 
                                                        
14McCann: “In the novels of Cain, Hammett, Chandler, and their peers, civil society can no longer contain private 
desire, public knowledge rarely trumps specialized expertise, and the idea of a common culture seems both 
profoundly appealing and ultimately unbelievable” (4).  
 
15E.g., earlier instantiations like Chandler and Hammett, the latter of whom produced what Casuto considers the ur-
text of the “hard-boiled sentimental” in 1930’s The Maltese Falcon (9). 
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arguments of these two popular genres, crime fiction and sentimental fiction, “serve as a source 
of mutual definition,” they both—each in its own way—“require both domestic ideology to draw 
on, and a market-based public world to explore and criticize” (9, 11). 
We begin, then, to see a dual valence emerge in the hard-boiled: as a style, qua Breu, 
ideologically conservative, even nostalgic; as parable, qua McCann, politically nihilistic. But in 
style as well as in substance, the hard-boiled is as much a matter of epistemology as it is politics. 
In art as was the case in science, the pristine, epistemologically optimistic weltanschauung of 
CDF could only degrade; HBCF entirely reoriented the crime genre by recontextualizing the 
criminal act within a chancy universe. The pristine and reversible determinism of Newtonian 
physics gave way to the probabilistic paradigm of thermodynamics, set against a backdrop of 
universal entropy; the gambler replaced the whist-player as the genre figure par excellence. 
Considered stylistically, the fatalism of the HBCF voice—as much as it certainly offers an outlet 
to political cynicism and/or white male anxiety—is also, fundamentally, an acknowledgement of 
the detective-hero’s curtailed epistemological prowess. As canny as ever but operating to repair a 
world that continually degrades, the hard-boiled hero, unlike the classic detective, might make 
the right play but still come up short.  
Himes absorbed the hard-boiled aesthetic as an avid reader of the genre, even as the 
details of his own young life—which saw him imprisoned for a theft that he did not commit—
confirmed the genre’s anti-social politics. Himes subscribed to the HBCF magazine Black Mask 
while in prison during the years that saw him develop his narrative voice and publish his first 
stories (Breu, Hard-Boiled 148). Black Mask was one of two seminal influences on a young 
Himes; the other was Richard Wright, an erstwhile friend, sometime rival, and fellow Black 
expatriate whose Native Son was an early lodestar for Himes in its style, its politics, and its 
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unstintingly bleak diagnosis of American race relations.16 Himes wrote his first five novels in the 
“protest novel” tradition for which Native Son serves as the exemplary twentieth-century 
instance, but the influence of hard-boiled narration has been oft-remarked upon even in those 
early, “literary” efforts. It was not until 1956 that Himes, 47 years old and newly expatriated to 
France, set himself to the challenge of writing a crime novel at the prompting of Série Noir editor 
Marcel Duhamel—not least because of the much-needed $1,000 advance that accompanied 
Duhamel’s suggestion.17 When, at last, he reluctantly set to the task, he recounts making a 
renewed study of Hammett and Chandler, along with William Faulkner’s Sanctuary and Light in 
August, in preparation.18 
The biographical turn from literary to genre fiction is deceptive—less a departure from 
his attempt to write “honest and revealing work on Black experience” than its development in the 
direction of a more explicit embrace of hard-boiled idioms that were always there (Himes, 
“Dilemma” xii). After all, backed into the genre by a cash shortage and, as he later admitted, 
unsure of where to begin, Himes produced a first installment that was less the detective story 
he’d been commissioned to write and closer to “what one might call an action story,” a 
recalcitrant if “unconscious protest against soul brothers always being considered as victims of 
racism, a protest against racism itself excusing all their sins and major faults” (Absurdity 111). In 
his own eyes, it was a perfectly logical sequel to The End of the Primitive (1956). Moreover, as 
                                                        
16In interviews and his autobiography, Himes—perhaps out of an anxiety of influence—is often noncommittal on 
the subject of Richard Wright. But in other moments it is clear that he deeply admired the slightly older author and 
found his Naturalist style a powerful vehicle for the expression of Black experience and Black issues: “I think that 
Black Boy achieved more than anything James Baldwin has ever written or will ever write” (Conversations 7), he 
told Michael Fabre in a 1963 interview.  
 
17See pages 102-03 of Himes’s My Life of Absurdity: The Autobiography of Chester Himes, vol. II for an account of 
Duhamel’s serendipitous contracting of A Rage in Harlem, published in France as The Five-Cornered Square. 
 
18“The first thing I did on returning to my room with a pocket full of money was to reread an old beat-up paperback 




Breu observes, “almost all of Himes’s fiction contains hard-boiled elements, including a terse, 
laconic prose style and a representation of masculine subjectivity that corresponds [to the hard-
boiled]” (Hard-Boiled 148). (Breu’s own analysis of Himes’s “hard-boiled masculinity” tellingly 
centers on Himes’s debut novel, If He Hollers Let Him Go (1945)—a protest novel in the mold 
of Wright’s Native Son—rather than any of the numerous HBCF novels that Himes would later 
write.) A welcome shift in recent Himes criticism has increasingly deemphasized any hard-line 
periodization that might be drawn to separate Himes’s “literary” and “commercial” efforts.19 
Favoring continuity across Himes’s career in this way is key to a full understanding of Himes’s 
own ambivalence toward hierarchies of literary quality, his blasé attitude towards the American 
reading public, and his irreverence for literary and academic institutions. 
According to Sean McCann, this ambivalence does not just make Himes a noteworthy 
HBCF author, and his Harlem Domestics “the most significant innovation in the postwar 
American crime novel”—it makes him, and them, absolutely characteristic:  
Driven by ambitions that they felt certain could not be realized, the major hard-boiled 
writers became, in effect, pulp avant-gardists—figures whose determination to overcome 
the limits of intractable cultural institutions could be measured by their willingness to 
embrace failure. (4)  
 
This combination of seriousness of purpose and artistic disillusionment, McCann argues, is 
intrinsic to the thematic and political substance of the genre, possibly even its condition of 
possibility. HBCF novels became “entries in an ongoing meditation on the difficulty of 
imagining a democratic culture in a literary marketplace shaped by the institutions of mass 
                                                        
19Christopher Raczkowski has summarized the scope and effects of this critical reappraisal: “A recent outpouring of 
scholarship on Himes commemorating his centennial in 2009, including special issues in Clues: A Journal Of 
Detection and African American Review, does much to establish Himes’s centrality to the political, artistic, and 
philosophical tumult of post-World War II American culture and to theorize the cunning of Himes’s literary 
demolitions of twentieth-century discourses of race, identity, liberalism and the reigning aesthetics of the social 
realist novel” (2). While I might cavil at Himes’s “centrality” to American culture, given his deliberately expatriate 
existence and his deep ambivalence about the specifically American literary scene, this reappraisal has nonetheless 
had the welcome effect of according Himes’s crime novels, specifically, the credit they are due. 
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communication and professional expertise” (ibid). In their pessimistic depiction of society’s 
failure to constrain, repair for, or even properly identify crime—a crisis of both epistemological 
and legal authority—HBCF writers in fact found an amenable reflection of their frustrated 
ambitions in the novel’s very form. 
Insofar as the hard-boiled is at once a literary genealogy, an observable style, and the 
highly visible marker of a subgenre of popular crime fiction, it is important that we understand, 
as Breu’s analysis seeks to, how “Himes novels seem designed to disturb received notions of 
both canonicity and literary propriety” (143). Moreover, it allows us to see that Himes, far from 
abandoning social critique, instead found new possibilities for its expression in the pulpiest 
reaches of an artistically disregarded popular genre. That, in essence, is my contention in what 
follows: that it is no more an oxymoron to call a pulpy crime serial, in all its hyperbolic glory, an 
iconoclastic form of domestic realism than it is to suggest, as Breu and others of like mind have 
started to, that Himes’s integration of the hard-boiled voice into the protest novel marks a 
particular kind of contribution to that more mainstream literary lineage. 
In a sense, interpreting Himes’s Domestics as works of realism amounts to nothing more 
than taking the author at his word. Again and again, in interviews and in his autobiography, 
Himes would insist that “realism and absurdity are so similar in the lives of American blacks one 
can not tell the difference” (Absurdity 109). (This, incidentally, is where Faulkner finds his place 
in Himes’s literary genealogy: “I have always considered the fiction of Faulkner the most absurd 
ever written,” he wrote, “and if I couldn’t get any ideas from it I was stuck” (Absurdity 106).) 
Clearly, Himes’s sense of the hard-boiled, triangulated through Faulkner’s absurd and Wright’s 
naturalism, is not reducible; it is neither an entirely generic feature of the crime novel nor the 
negative signifier of lowbrow style. On the other hand, no one was more acutely aware than 
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Himes himself of how the pivot to pot-boiler writing would be perceived by his audience, his 
peers, and, especially, American literary critics. This ambivalence often found Himes speaking 
out of both sides of his mouth, claiming, in one moment, that of all his lifelong hurts, “the 
[critical] rejection of Crusade hurt me most” and deciding that his American audience “could go 
to hell” in the next (Quality 102; Absurdity 201).  
While they manifestly belong to the tradition of “Hard Boiled Crime Fiction” (HBCF) on 
account of their prose style, subject matter, and cynical worldview, the Harlem Domestics mark 
a late development within it, perhaps the last development: a reaction within the reaction, a 
critique that—according to that familiar dialectic—at once arises from within, and rises against, 
the tradition that preceded it. To my mind, the key to understanding the double move of 
extension and refutation (and understanding, thereby, the particular ways in which Himes 
remakes the genre) is found in Himes’s willingness to take seriously, update, and make 
increasingly explicit the genre’s longstanding ecological premise. Later in this chapter, I explore 
how the novels themselves constitute a dynamic series, forming a metatextual trajectory tending 
towards an ever-more-literal embrace of the ecosystem as fictional paradigm. But even from the 
first installment, the Harlem Domestics were always already different from their HBCF 
predecessors: more viscerally embodied, more racially taboo, and in other ways that are related 
to, if not sufficiently explainable by, Himes’s unconventional literary career, his racial position, 
or his provocative politics. From the first, these nine novels expand the repertoire of the hard-
boiled as a fictional mode, preparing the way for the ecological catastrophes witnessed in the 
series’ final installments.  
A first, if obvious, difference between Himes and his predecessors is the frequency and 
explicitness of Ahuja’s “animalization” as a figurative tactic, which, to reiterate, consists of 
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“contextual comparisons between animals (as laborers, food, pests, or ‘wildlife’) and the bodies 
or behaviors of racialized subjects” (“Postcolonial” 557). In other words, Himes’s ecological 
sensibility is evident across the Domestics for the simple reason that he is always describing his 
characters in animal terms. In pursuit of a subject in The Real Cool Killers, his detectives barrel 
through a crowded bar “like hounds on a hot scent” (68). In a similar scene in All Shot Up, 
witnesses clear a crime scene with “the sound of a sudden scurrying like rats deserting a ship” 
(223). Later in the same book, a cornered killer “was like a wounded tiger, silent, crippled, but 
still as dangerous a killer as the jungle ever saw” (308). In The Crazy Kill, a street gang is gaily 
dressed “like an assemblage of exotic grasshoppers” (79). And in A Rage in Harlem, the narrator 
describes, on 125th street, “whores buzz[ing] about the area like green flies over stewed 
chitterlings” (112). Animalization—which, in its default case, serves as a tool of the regime of 
“speciated reason” (Ahuja 557) that naturalizes racial difference and legitimizes racism as a 
properly biological, “subspecial” categorization—is everywhere turned on its head through 
Himes’s acid-tongued descriptions: the explicitness, extremeness, and ubiquity of Himes’s 
animalizing language renders it uneasily parodic, heightening the reader’s awareness of, and 
discomfort with, a speciated logic that was already circulating in 1960s discourse.20 
Second to the increased animality of the domestics, Himes injects the genre’s hard-boiled 
narrative voice and procedural plot contrivances with a Naturalist literary sensibility. Himes has 
                                                        
20It bears mentioning that Ahuja does theorize a category for such parody; he calls this performative strategy the 
“Animal Mask,” which he describes as a tactic in which, “by ironically appropriating the animal guise, the 
performer unveils a historical logic of animalization inherent in processes of racial subjection” (558). However, I 
actually think that Himes’s work in some of these descriptions, especially the ones that raise comparisons between 
black bodies and insectile or parasitic species, have more to do with parodic hyperbolization of the pejorative 
referential strategy than with any positive rehabilitation of the animal as it functions as a second term within 
comparative syntaxes. Where the “Animal Mask” is an ironic stance “provisionally embracing animality” that 
(primarily contemporary) artists have mobilized today, in our “supposedly postracial moment” (558), Himes’s 
gambit is to inhabit the metaphorical logic of animalization and push it beyond itself, to the point at which the 
frankly racist comparisons become so uncomfortable that the reader cannot read past them. 
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rightly been called a noir naturalist, and we needn’t look beyond the few selections I’ve already 
quoted from the series for echoes of, say, Frank Norris in McTeague (1899), a novel in which 
prospectors in the western Californian mountains are rendered, at an aerial remove, “like lice on 
mammoths’ hides” (293).21  The recourse to Naturalism affords Himes access to a hard-nosed 
race-relations critique that aligns with his radical politics and reflects, in the very extremity of its 
unflattering portraiture, the absurd humor of black experience.22 When he takes up Naturalism’s 
descriptive regime, with all of its sociological and Darwinian inheritances, Himes gains access to 
harder metaphors, affecting a narrative posture imbued with the bombastic claims to scientific 
truth emblematic of that earlier novelistic tradition. Among the most important stylistic 
innovations of the Naturalist novel was a telescoping narrative perspective that had the power to 
undermine the significance of bourgeois realism by rendering the triumphs and setbacks of 
individual characters diminutive. A similar narrative mobility is crucial to the roving third-
person of the Harlem Domestics; but where a Theodore Dreiser oscillates between an affected 
scientism and a disposition of cosmic sympathy for his ill-fated protagonists, Himes is 
unrelenting: “Take two crumbling, neglected, overcrowded brick buildings,” he lectures, the 
bilious parody of an armchair sociologist,  
. . . slam them together with a hallway down the middle like a foul-air sandwich put two 
cement columns flanking a dirt-darkened glass-paneled door, and put the words, COZY 
FLATS, on the transom, and you have an incubator of depravity. There one could find all 
the vices of Harlem in microcosm: sex perversions, lesbians, pederasts, pot smokers, 
riders of the LSD, street hustlers and their cretinistic pimps sleeping in the same beds 
where they turned their tricks, daisy chains, sex circuses, and caterers to the society trade: 
wife-swappers, gang-fuckers, seekers of depravity—name it, they had it. (85) 
 
                                                        
21See William E. Rand’s “Chester Himes as a Naturalistic Writer in the tradition of Richard Wright and Theodore 
Dreiser” for an extended appraisal of Himes in the context of American Naturalism.   
 
22“My books are as authentic as the autobiography of Malcolm X,” Himes explains in a 1969 interview with Philip 
Oakes. “But I don’t strain after authenticity when I’m writing them. I sit there laughing at the people, I believe in 
them so completely” (Conversations 18).  
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The effect of this passage is a kind of literary pointillism viewed from a perspective that is 
gradually receding: the vices of COZY FLATS, subjected to Himes’s paratactic enumeration, 
begin to submerge the qualitative specificity of individuals, syntactically, within the population-
life—a kind of emergent apprehension of life as a sum, a lump, a mass. Paradoxically, it is the 
extreme, almost vertiginous, variegation of this description that gives rise to the impression of 
homogeneity: in the mélange, no one vice stands out as more or less shocking than the others. At 
the population level, sex is thematically ubiquitous and, as one prime operation of the 
biopolitical calculus that it necessitates, of signal importance. So here, for example, descriptions 
of “hustlers and their cretinistic pimps sleeping in the same beds where they turned their tricks” 
redouble the carnal bower as the site and source of sustenance, and Harlem is itself enfleshed as 
a result.23  
Lesser avatars of this cosmic pessimism, Himes’s paired protagonists, NYPD detectives 
Grave Digger Jones and Coffin Ed, reinforce the third-person narrator’s observations with their 
own banter. In a passage reminiscent of Himes’s description of the COZY FLATS, Digger 
reframes habitation as parasitism: 
“And people live here,” Grave Digger said, his eyes sad.  
“That’s what it was made for.” 
“Like maggots in rotten meat.” 
“It’s rotten enough,” Ed agreed. (63) 
 
A certain redundancy is at work here, to emphatic effect: Ed agrees with Digger, as always, and 
in their accord, they echo the narrative cynicism that suffuses the text from the top down from 
                                                        
23One of the more compelling reasons to read Himes as responding to specifically life-science discourse has to do 
with the way in which he is, like many American Naturalists were, doubly interpellated into a scientific framework, 
by way of what Jennifer L. Fleissner has described as a dialectic tension between naturalism’s twin debts to 
statistical thinking on one hand and vitalism on the other. Indeed, Himes’s latter-day Naturalism marks a kindred, if 
belated and generically displaced, playing-off of the vital against the statistical “as a particularly combustible 
combination—the former giving a red-blooded affective charge to the latter’s cool enumerations” (10). Himes 
inflects both terms cynically, of course—but it is the same dialectically-combined scientific vision, delivered in the 
same register of scientific authority, that he brings to bear on the HBCF genre. 
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their own street-level vantage. By extending his telescopic perspective to his protagonists with 
only the most cursory gesture at mediating that remove, Himes compounds the naturalist third-
person by routing it through the hard-boiled first person perspective, bringing all three observers 
to bear on the same urban milieu. Only, in doing so, Himes splits the hard-boiled voice open. 
While it may seem a minor variation on the formula, Himes’s bifurcation of the traditionally 
closed-off, monadic gumshoe inverts the genre’s negotiation of cynicism and sentiment by 
exposing that interior monologue to itself—and to the noise of the street. To wit: in contrast to 
the Chandleresque deadpan, beneath which one finds a (barely) submerged masculine 
sentimentality, Himes embraces the idiomatic flamboyance of the genre’s tough talk and extreme 
violence—an excess, superficial by design, that in Himes’s case overexaggerates the particular 
trope of Black masculine hyper-virility. Where many earlier HBCF and noir narrators exhibit an 
affectless façade—a deadpan that belies profound nostalgia for the prosocial order that it evokes 
in absentia—in Himes, that particular surface/depth polarity is reversed. The flash and verve of 
surface style that is shot through the dialogic patter between Digger and Ed accentuates a 
thoroughly unsentimental, sociopolitical nihilism in the texts’ themes, a nihilism that is allergic 
to being romanticized.  
Such attempts at romanticization were frequent when these books were being written; 
perhaps the most famous of these is Norman Mailer’s “The White Negro,” which begins with the 
claim that “Hip is the sophistication of the wise primitive in a giant jungle” (343) and continues, 
in this vein, to attempt to coopt the purported virility of the black experience, which he calls the 
“music of orgasm” (341), and harness that energy to animate his idea of the (white) hipster. For 
Mailer, Hipsters are the Black man’s progeniture—not merely etymologically, but in the essay’s 
own metaphorical logic: they are conceived, Mailer writes, at the “Greenwich Village ménage-à-
 142 
trois” during which “the bohemian and the juvenile delinquent came face-to-face with the Negro. 
And in this wedding of the white and the black,” Mailer continues, “it was the Negro who 
brought the cultural dowry” (340), bequeathing to this new type, this “White Negro,” something 
of his own technē for improvisational living and also the twinned “desire to murder and the 
desire to create” (342). As Mailer’s argumentation within the essay trends toward a more esoteric 
line of philosophical argument, it becomes increasingly clear that the Black man is the seminal 
influence within Mailer’s problematic allegorical three-way: existentialism and clinical 
psychopathy serve as two (emphatically white) archetypal hipster skins, or frames, that the 
sexual energies and syncopated “synapses of the Negro” (341) then rhetorically bring to life. 
However we read Mailer’s politics—whether we understand his appropriation as a 
gesture of racial solidarity or the act of a rhetorical opportunist—he is a timely polemicist insofar 
as he identifies that, for his postwar readers, Black male sexuality was a locus of both rhetorical 
power and social anxiety.24 If, as Mailer speculates,“[h]ip may erupt as a psychically armed 
rebellion whose sexual impetus may rebound against the antisexual foundation of every 
organized power in America. . . .” (356), then it is something like the bare life of African-
American experience—the hipster, too, now “[k]nowing in the cells of his existence that life was 
war, nothing but war”—alongside the Black man’s knowledge of the “music of orgasm, good 
orgasm and bad” (341) that will be its twin motors. However, in the slippage between the carnal 
scene of the Hipster’s conception and the “wedding” that endows him; between the 
countercultural synthesis that Mailer wants the Hipster to embody and the bastard child that he 
is; between the analytical discourse of psychosexuality that Mailer employs and the “music of 
                                                        
24See Frederick Whiting’s “Stronger, Smarter, & Less Queer: ‘The White Negro’ and Mailer’s Third Man” for an 
evenhanded assessment of the consensus critical condemnation of the “homophobic, racist, and misogynist 
reverberations of Mailer’s texts” (191) alongside Whiting’s own complementary attempt to understand how Mailer 
might be exploiting the very same taboo nature of his chosen terms in order to launch a subtler psychosexual 
exploration of homosexual and bisexual desire in a racialized context. 
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orgasm” that he values, which is not just Jazz but also the musicality of “hep talk,” a fugitive 
argot that amounts to “a new philosophy [implied in] a new language” (353)—in these slippages, 
an ambivalence surrounding black men begins to emerge as his sexuality becomes 
omnidirectional and its potency transposable to the academically sanitized perspectives of 
psychology and philosophy. It is, in other words, a fetishization of improvisation as a kind of 
sexual energy.  
Himes’s Domestics recognize and refuse this white temptation to cathect Black 
experience and Black culture in the figure of Lieutenant Anderson, who, like Mailer, is caught 
out as a “square” in the latter’s attempt to theorize an attitude that is more interested in 
“lifemanship” (Mailer 350) than its amenability to theoretical articulation as lay philosophy. 
Anderson, we are told, is not simply white; he is “indoors so much his skin remained an 
unhealthy white, like that of a man who has been sick” (Pistol 109). As Digger and Ed’s 
perennially put-upon commanding officer, Anderson is not entirely unsympathetic. The havoc 
wrought by his detectives in their pursuit of the criminal element across Harlem has him forever 
hangdog. But his attempts to “dig” his ace detectives by ineptly mimicking their language is met 
with Digger and Ed’s stifled guffaws: 
“You want we should move around a little and see what we can pick up?” Grave 
Digger asked.  
“No, just lay dead and let the race leaders handle it,” Anderson said. “We want 
the nitty-gritty.” 
Grave Digger stifled an impulse to say, “What dat?” and caught Ed’s eye. 
Anderson made them hilarious with what he thought was hep-talk, but they had never let 
him know it.  
“We dig you, boss,” Grave Digger gave a reply equally as square but Anderson 
didn’t get it. (138)  
 
What Lt. Anderson and Mailer fundamentally misunderstand is that the upshot of Digger and 
Ed’s hardboiled wisdom—the moral and message of the Harlem Domestics writ large—is that, in 
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Harlem, life’s abundance is a problem, not a virtue. Himes’s Harlem is a jungle—his narrator 
repeatedly makes the comparison—but it is more cesspool than forest, a far cry the verdant 
stage-dressings of a primitivist romance. Mailer and Lt. Anderson are captive to ideologies that 
are the outgrowths of a colloquial vitalism: the romance of the “life force,” the brave scenes 
lifted from the more heroic strain of American writers like Jack London and Edgar Rice 
Burroughs. I would ultimately like to suggest, then, that the Harlem Cycle invokes this 
anachronistic biologism—a frequent invocation, in the form of the white sexual tourists who 
seek it out in Harlem back alleys—in order to repudiate it. The series’ acid-bathed cynicism 
marks an attempt to disintegrate these ideological afterimages in pursuit of a more contemporary 
understanding of life. 
Beyond such narrative plants as Lt. Anderson and the white sexual tourists to Harlem 
(who have a tendency to turn up dead), the descriptive fabric of the novel is everywhere raising 
comparisons to the natural world in order to sour them. Himes’s characteristic descriptive move 
is extreme and caustic simile, for example: “The Temple of Black Jesus was on 116th Street, west 
of Lenox Avenue. It and all the hot dirty slum streets running parallel into Spanish Harlem were 
teeming with hot dirty slum-dwellers, like cockroaches eating from a bowl of frijoles” (Blind 
Man 73). Beasts at best and insects at worst, Harlem’s population is so consistently likened to 
specifically parasitic and tumescent forms of life throughout the Harlem Domestics that police-
work comes to resemble a kind of pest control.  
Control, as we have noted, becomes more tenuous as the crime genre evolves beyond its 
ratiocinative origins; by the time the detective genre reaches Himes, its thematic trajectory is 
long past imagining the possibility of an ending in which the detective’s arbitration of civic 
order, and the violence to which it is allergic, can be successful. The Domestics’ cynicism would 
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appear to confirm this: as Digger points out, “. . . justice ain’t the point” any longer. “It’s order 
now” (Blind Man 107). However, while Digger’s statement appears a further capitulation to the 
deteriorating state of the social order (and a further renunciation of the detective’s social 
responsibility), it also signals, oddly, a reinstatement of arbitrational office to the protagonist of 
the crime novel—albeit arbitration of a wholly different sort, “order” rather than “justice.” This 
is yet another way in which, by extending the HBCF trajectory, Himes ultimately upends the 
genre’s commitments. While they do not display the game-theoretical genius of Poe’s Dupin, 
Digger and Ed nonetheless do return the genre to an adjudicative posture. Theirs is a different 
calculus, of course, a logic of bioregulation akin to what Worster will call a bioeconomic 
“managerial ethos” (313): an adjudicative sense calibrated to a milieu in which social relations 
are themselves amorally transactional, and far from the consensus-based, liberalist social model 
to which CDF is the rejoinder.  
This is particularly apparent in the detectives’ liberal position on the sex trade. Their 
night beat often takes them through Harlem’s red-light districts, where  
They could see in the dark streets like cats, but couldn’t be seen, which was just as well 
because their presence might have discouraged the vice business in Harlem and put 
countless citizens on relief. Actually they weren’t concerned with prostitution or its 
feeder vices, unlicensed clubs, bottle peddlers, petty larceny, short con and steering. . . . 
They weren’t arbiters of sex habits. There was no accounting for the sexual tastes of 
people. Just don’t let anyone get hurt.” (29) 
 
Himes’s reorientation of the HCBF aesthetic from “hard-boiled sentimentality” to “hep” 
misanthropy follows its author’s recognition of a newly biological valence to the liberal social 
order that, following McCann, has long been HBCF’s principle object of critique. This shift is 
indicative of the transformed vocational imperatives to which Digger and Ed answer: in place of 
the peace officer’s charge to safeguard rights and mete out justice, their mandate resembles a 
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perverse form of husbandry, demanding that they manage populations threatening to overspill 
their environmental bounds—to tumesce.25 
Hard-boiled crime fiction, in the hands of early practitioners like Chandler and Hammett, 
eloquently explored similar, if more subterranean, figures of urban putrefaction. Chandler gave 
us the genre’s paradigmatic example in 1939’s The Big Sleep, when Marlowe’s entrée into the 
decadent ferment of Los Angeles criminality begins with a symbolic visit to General 
Sternwood’s orchid house. Upon entering, Marlowe is greeted by a blast of hot air, “. . . thick, 
wet, steamy and larded with the cloying smell” of the blooming plants with their “nasty meaty 
leaves and stalks like the newly washed fingers of dead men” (13). The wryly philosophizing 
General, who has hired Marlowe to investigate his blackmailer, complains of the orchids that 
their flesh “is too much like the flesh of men. And their perfume has the rotten sweetness of a 
prostitute” (11). The unnaturally warm and moist greenhouse establishes, in its hermetic 
enclosure, a zero-sum, vampiric ecology: the fecund orchids seem to feed off of the now-
“bloodless” General, who eats almost nothing, “seems to exist largely on heat, like a newborn 
spider,” and spends his days in a kind of twilight slumber (13, 10). Everything is off in this 
distorted natural environment with its “unreal greenish color, like light filtered through an 
aquarium tank,” in a way that comes to augur the unhealthy distortions of sexual and commercial 
intercourse that Marlowe will discover as he wades deeper and deeper into Los Angeles’ 
criminal milieu (8). Hidden from view and defined by predatory criminal hierarchies, 
                                                        
25Not only was Himes thinking about Harlem from the perspective of diagnostic objectivity in the 1960s, when he 
did so it was with the organic and medical analogies at the front of mind. When contracted to write a piece on 
Harlem by publisher of the New-Harlem paper Pierre Lazaref, he began it under the title “Harlem, An American 
Cancer” (Absurdity 249); it was later published as a booklet by Présence Africaine. He said of it: “It was bitter and 
anti-American and told it how it was” (250). A subsequent piece of reportage on Harlem, proposed in 1964 to Paris-
Match, was to accompany documentary photographs of collaborator John Taylor; run under the title “Anatomy of a 
Ghetto”; and follow a strict five-point prospectus detailing Harlem’s origins, demographics, and future prospects, 
the longest section of which, “Who these people are,” was to detail “Their occupations and their way of life . . . 
working and playing . . . eating and sleeping . . . virtues and vices . . . the high cost of living and the higher cost of 
dying . . .” (Absurdity 285).  
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opportunistic parasitism, and especially the sexual vampirism of the novel’s femmes fatales, with 
their “small corrupt” bodies, teeth that “glitter like knives,” eyes “still empty and yet full of some 
jungle emotion,” the criminal underworld of The Big Sleep is an amoral world apart, hidden 
within the waking city of Los Angeles and the Hills, a hothouse mockery of social life 
functioning by day and as it should (155, 137, 154).26  
Like Sternwood’s greenhouse, Harlem is hot, even when Himes experiments with dialing 
down the thermostat in 1960’s All Shot Up. All Shot Up follows Digger and Ed as they 
investigate a seemingly isolated case of grand theft auto that, in the final reckoning, leads back to 
a powerful Harlem politician looking to line his pockets. It is the only Domestic set in winter: 
“The snow crews had lost the race. The city was snowed in. The customary metropolitan roar 
was muffled to an eerie silence by sixteen inches of snow” (315). But despite the snow’s muting 
effects (and Digger and Ed’s frequent griping), All Shot Up is not a wholly frozen-over book; 
instead, in a manner that recalls the two-city trope of The Big Sleep, the winter provides the 
occasion for a thematic partitioning of interior and exterior, such that criminal hideaways and 
prostitution fronts become the dense centers of heat that has fled the streets. Digger’s 
acknowledgement that “‘there ain’t that many vicious people running loose in Harlem on a night 
as cold as this’” dictates a more calculated approach from the detectives, who, finding no skulls 
to crack, must find more creative ways to “flush” the criminal element “into the open” (210, 
297). As Digger observes, “It’s [winter] nights like this that cause wars . . . [they] increase[] the 
population. Then when you get enough prime males they start fighting to kill them off” (208-09). 
                                                        
26The “double city” trope has demonstrated enduring appeal, attending HBCF in its generic displacements into 
science fiction and metafiction: China Miéville’s The City and the City, Thomas Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49, 
and Paul Auster’s New York Trilogy are just a few of the better-known texts that leverage the trope particularly hard. 
The readerly satisfactions of the depth hermeneutics that such narratives make available have made the double-city 
trope a particularly productive one. Himes marks a relatively rare formal departure. For him, there is no fetid city 
within, or beneath, a moral one; instead, there is just city-as-fetid-city, festering openly. 
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The heat is still on—prostitutes are still “setting [their marks] on fire” (304)—but the action has 
largely gone underground, and as a result All Shot Up strongly recalls its HBCF predecessors that 
were marked by a similar two-world structure.27  
But the lull that All Shot Up represents to the larger trajectory of the Domestics—Lt. 
Anderson calls it “an armistice” (317)—only positions it as the exceptional instance that proves 
the thermodynamic rule: Harlem’s heat is inescapable, a heat that permeates interiors and the 
out-of-doors alike: “everybody escaping the hotbox rooms they lived in, seeking respite in a 
street made hotter by the automobile exhaust and the heat released by the concrete walls and 
walks” (Crazy Kill 73). It is a heat that is, simply, the parametric condition of life in Harlem. 
“Even if you couldn’t feel it,” Himes tells us in Blind Man with a Pistol, “you could tell it by the 
movement of the people. Everybody was limbered up, glands lubricated” (15). No longer even a 
temperature effect, heat in Harlem is a kind of deictic condition. (Indeed, the distinction between 
body and environment is entirely effaced: Harlem’s heat is the heat of its bodies, translating in 
unmediated ways to the organic excitations of the streets.) And it is ubiquitous: teeming, naked 
bodies and scenes of public unrest and criminality strongly suggest that, unlike the 
Chandleresque demimondes of vice that coexist with a more or less unsuspecting urban 
populace, in Himes, the life of crime—and the crime of too much life—has spilled out into the 
open.  
Life in the Open 
In 1910, an ecologist named William Morton Wheeler asked his colleagues to consider 
the ant colony as a single, “comprehensive” organism. Situated along a “magnificent hierarchy 
                                                        
27It’s unsurprising, then, that of all the Harlem Domestic novels, sexuality plays the smallest role in All Shot Up. In 
A Rage in Harlem, sexual desire sets the criminal plot in motion, and in Cotton Comes to Harlem the cathected 
object and Macguffin at the heart of the action—an actual bale of cotton thought to contain fifty thousand dollars of 
fleeced money—becomes a lewd prop in an erotic dancer’s routine described, in lengthy and oversexed terms, 
during one of the novel’s most important set pieces.  
 149 
of organisms” (309) from the very small (the biophore) to the very large (the universe), the 
colony, Wheeler argues, possesses its own “individuality . . . Like the cell or the person, [it] 
behaves as a unitary whole” (310). Insofar as an organism is, by definition, “neither a thing nor a 
concept, but a continual flux or process” of biological activities (308), Wheeler insists that he 
intends his claim to be taken literally. The hives, nests, and colonies of eusocial insects are for 
him “real organisms and not merely conceptual constructions or analogies” (309). Literally 
reconstituting insect colonies as “persons with reproduction as the ‘Leitmotiv’ of their 
consociation” (ibid), Wheeler’s appeal to his fellow ecologists converts reproduction from an 
inter- to an intra-organic activity. In order to bring the body of this new organism into clear 
focus, sex is reinterpreted as a homeostatic, rather than a creative, act. By entering into a 
homeostatic logic, moreover, sex is linked to death in a strictly proportional way. Without 
equivalent levels of death, life becomes dangerous, threatening to expand beyond its borders. 
The health of this composite body—health understood as Canguilhem’s “organic innocence” 
(Normal 101)—is only innocent from afar.    
In Cotton Comes to Harlem (1965), Himes proposes to his readers that they view Harlem 
according to the same biological synopsis:   
Now it was 1 a.m. Homicide had been there and gone. The medical examiner had 
pronounced all four bodies “Dead on Arrival.” The bodies were on their way to the 
morgue. Both the Colonel’s limousine and the Lincoln had gotten away. A search was 
being made. The seventeen police cruisers that had bottled up the area to keep them from 
escaping had been returned to regular duty. The workmen cleaning the Polo Grounds had 
returned to their work. The city lived and breathed and slept as usual. People were lying, 
stealing, cheating, murdering; people were praying, singing, laughing, loving and being 
loved; and people were being born and people were dying. Its pulse remained the same. 
New York City. The Big Town. (96) 
 
In this passage describing the aftermath of a shootout, Himes’s telescoping narrative attention 
tracks back from a street-level view populated by individuals, and individuated corpses, to a 
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panoramic summary of the city’s millions into one homeostatic “pulse,” an organic system or 
circuit reified and named as a single being: “The Big Town.”  
  Narrated into this smooth, almost cinematic, up-scaling of perspective is a threshold of 
agential transfer.28 The relentless action procedural of previous chapters, with a narrative point-
of-view hewing close to the perspectives of Digger, Ed, and their criminal antagonists, dissolves 
into the self-corrections of a system in which individual action is cast as inevitable and 
atmospheric, an aftereffect: “A search was being made.” The comprehensive organism of the city 
becomes the locus of activity in a grammatical sense, even if that action is continuous and 
homeostatic: living, breathing, sleeping. By contrast, people “were being born and were dying,” 
these most violent moments of individual experience rendered in passive voice and thereby 
reduced to attritional parameters within which Harlem, itself, maintains its course.  
This scene is not unique in the Harlem Domestics; interludes of this sort grow more 
frequent as the series continues, until, by 1969’s Blind Man With the Pistol, they are 
unremarkable; sometime around 1965, it is fair to say, the concept of scale emergence begins, 
itself, to emerge in Himes’s prose.29 But the narrative act of bringing Harlem to life in this way 
                                                        
28This scalar threshold-crossing recalls the “meticulously constructed” smooth zoom effect of the Eames brothers’ 
experimental film, Powers of Ten (1968, released 1977) (Woods 134). In the film, the narrator provides an 
“impossible perspective on the universe” (ibid) captured by what appears to be a single shot steadily zooming out 
from an individual in a park until, eventually, taking in the entire Milky Way galaxy; and then zooming back in, 
returning eventually to the individual scale before plunging into the man’s hand, to his chromosome, to a carbon 
atom within that chromosome, and ultimately to its atomic nucleus. The question that ultimately dogs the Harlem 
domestics is whether the vital phenomena it describes are fundamentally amenable to capture by the narrative 
equivalent of the Eames’ smooth zoom, or whether they demand an understanding of scale variance rooted in scale 
critique, which “emphasizes disjunctures and incommensurable differences among scales” and “refers to thresholds 
that constrain biophysical, technological, and social becoming” (Woods 135).  
 
29This point of emergence, at which I argue that Himes in Cotton Comes to Harlem has fully committed his series to 
what I am calling an “ecosystemic” descriptive regime, was acknowledged as a tipping point of sorts by Himes 
himself. In letters composed at the time, we learn that he was convinced of Cotton that “it is good, probably the best 
of my detective stories” (Absurdity 277); “this last book about the Cops and the Cotton goes all out on the race 
problem and conditions of life in Harlem,” he explains elsewhere, “and I have my detectives express just how they, 
and the other black people, feel in Harlem” (279). In contrast to the earlier domestics, written at a time when Himes 
admits that he “really didn’t know how to write a detective story” at all (111), by Cotton he appears to have made 
the genre his own, and wielded it with a greater command of its resources, clearly intended to use as a vehicle for 
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does not always follow the track laid down by Wheeler’s concept of the comprehensive 
organism. Wheeler’s ideas emerged from a “resurgent organicism” (Worster 318) within early 
20th-century ecological thought. The organicists valorized the concepts of biological community, 
holism, and even—eventually—a harmonious “world integration” to come.30 They embraced the 
teleological thrust of their hierarchy of organisms in an uncritical way that Himes’s cynical 
disposition would not abide. Instead, his larger choreographies are increasingly discovered in 
moments of extreme social disarray and violence—most remarkably, the race riot, which evokes 
comparison to “a rehearsal for a modern ballet. The youths would surge suddenly from the dark 
tenement doorways, alleyways, from behind parked cars . . . their bodies moving in grotesque 
rhythm, lithe, lightfooted, agile and fluid, charged with hysterical excitement that made them 
look unhealthily animated” (Blind Man, 136). In their “hysterical charge” and unnatural 
“animation,” these boys are essentially overheated ecosystemic vectors, subsumed within the 
emergent illogic of the mob, not the “comprehensive” unity of the hive. At the same time, an 
emergent “choreography” remains the most apt apprehension of these chaotic encounters. Himes 
remains committed to organicist description—“fluid” coordination, even if “hysterical”; “lithe” 
and “rhythmic,” even if grotesquely so—regardless of how catastrophically violent, or simply 
random, the encounters become, and despite the fact that these emergent patterns become ever 
more obscure to the detectives themselves.  
For that reason, I believe the Domestics are best understood as poised between two 
ecological paradigms, the organicist and the bioeconomic, without fully adopting either. Earlier 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
explicit social critique. I argue that the frankness of sociopolical critique to which he commits his characters, from 
Cotton on out, is corollary to his turn towards ecosystemic logics. 
 
30Social theorists would ultimately push the organicist model rather too far in this direction, finding their calls for an 
“interdependent world unity” reflected in the rhetoric of self-sacrifice employed by fascist movements of the 1930s 
and ’40s (Worster 330).  
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HBCF, like earlier ecological models, are structured by predator-prey relationships. In Himes, as 
we have seen, the structuring logic of predation is, increasingly, left by the wayside as a narrative 
resource despite the series’ consistent and explicit animalization of its characters. (Indeed, it is 
often through animalization that this abandonment of predator/prey is effected, insofar as the 
comparative animal term is massified, deindividuated: Harlemites as “cockroaches,” 
“grasshoppers,” or “pirhanas.”) In place of predatory logics, crowd scenes present an uncertain 
threshold for moments of spontaneous emergence, whereat Harlem might either resolve into an 
organism or into an ecosystem.31  
Colloquially and in miniature, Himes’s series’ evolution recapitulates a similar evolution 
in the disciplinary history of ecology: food chains gave way to open-system ecological models 
coordinating organic phenomena according to overlays of energy exchange, flow, and feedback. 
These paradigms came to constitute the “New Ecology” of the 1940s, which is still with us 
today. Harlem becomes the site of the New Ecology’s energetic (i.e. economic) reduction, a 
neighborhood in which “prostitutes and muggers lurk[] in the dark shadows, waiting to take 
some sucker’s money—or his life” (All Shot Up 47). Either suffices, which is precisely Himes’s 
point: sex, money, and language become fungible in the transactional organic system of his 
novels. In a literalization of the genre’s (heretofore metaphorical) debt to the life sciences, Himes 
overstuffs Harlem with energy until it threatens to overwhelm the neighborhood’s already-
strained metabolism. Simultaneously, a broader point is driven home, again and again: the 
“comprehensive organism” plays by its own rules; Digger and Ed’s rational and physical 
                                                        
31This is also to note that crowd scenes find themselves organically redescribed in Himes’s narration for one of two 
reasons: through a catalyzing action (a rock thrown in a tense community standoff with the police) or through an act 
of observation (the distorted “aerial views” previously discussed). This duality is itself a powerful and subtle 
recapitulation of the generic fabric of HBCF, whose gumshoe heroes have two quintessential postures: voyeurism 
and violent action. Do I intervene or do I observe? It is almost as if, in its crowd scenes that resolve in one of two 
ways, Himes performs the genre’s quintessential modal duality himself, as author, in the branching paths of his 
compositional choices from scene to scene. 
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resources, however prodigious, are in the end completely incommensurate to the task of 
managing it. Himes’s descriptions of Harlem—whether as an organism, an organic system, or 
(most commonly) a descriptive vacillation between the two—ultimately clarify a new 
biomanagerial regime. In this regime, traditional HBCF anxieties about criminality are 
supplanted by a concern for the integrity of an urban body and, above all, the health of that body. 
It is a body whose health will fail, spectacularly, in Blind Man with a Pistol, the final book of the 
series.  
* * * 
 The story of ecology’s paradigm shift begins with the food chain, a first and fundamental 
step towards modeling organisms and their interactions around a form of currency: food. 
Ecologist Charles Elton proposed the now-familiar chain in 1927 linking solar energy to apex 
predators through intermediary organisms: the plants that photosynthesize the sun’s energy; the 
herbivorous animals that convert vegetable matter to muscle mass; the “tertiary consumers,” 
intermediate predators that eat and are eaten in turn (Worster 295).  
As a theory of aggregate life, the food chain accomplishes two important theoretical 
functions that pave the way for subsequent models. First, it unseats the organism in favor of the 
reified “chain” itself as the principle object of study.32 The specific behaviors of the owl as an 
apex predator or the butterfly as a primary consumer remain interesting, but primarily as 
qualitative curiosities; organisms become interchangeably aims-directed waypoints in the 
realization of the calorie-consolidating thrust “up” the chain. Second, as its placeholder concepts 
                                                        
32This effect is roughly analogous to the scalar and medium decenterings of the organism effected by DNA’s 
discovery in the preceding chapter, and even to the mechanistic displacement of vitalist theory in chapter 1; the 
common theme emerging across midcentury life-sciences discourse that we find reflected in these novels is simply 
this: the replacement of bodies with abstractions, and/or with machines; and, ultimately, what can be rightly (if 
paradoxically) described as “a displacement of flesh and blood reference” from biology, leading to a scientifically-
described world “that has been effectively devivified” (Secrets 52-53).  
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like “producer,” “primary-,” “secondary-,” and “tertiary consumer” imply, the food chain 
introduces economic rationality to the natural world. The role within the supply chain is 
paramount; the ecologist’s work becomes the reinterpretation of animal behavior as market 
strategy. Worster puts it aptly when he describes the food chain model as “an ascending scale of 
larger and larger mouths and bellies” (297). Organisms become important for their size, not in 
their general stature but for their economic footprint, the respective diameters of their “mouths 
and bellies.” Quantification begins to supplant qualitative description, especially once Elton 
begins arranging his food chains in hierarchical tiers. Additionally, the food chain made “the 
form or organization of the community . . . the central problem” (Worster 295); synchronic 
arrays mapping fixed relationships between species, rather than diachronic models allowing for 
the study of how the relationships within an ecological community might themselves change 
over time, became the privileged form of inquiry. 
 However, the food chain is not fully abstracted from natural observation; it is still 
describable as a series of individuated predator-prey, producer-consumer relations; it is still 
represented on paper with drawings of grasshoppers, frogs, and hawks. The same could be said 
of food webs, which attempted a total description of an ecological community’s interspecial 
relations by combining all of the overlapping food chains within a given environment. This 
would change with A.G. Tansley’s introduction of the “ecosystem,” which explicitly moved to 
scrub the vocabulary of ecology of these residual organicist traces. “On linguistic grounds I 
dislike the term biotic community,” Tansley writes, because it “implies members, and it seems to 
me that to lump animals and plants together as members of a community is to put on equal 
footing things which in their whole nature and behavior are too different” (224). Still greater is 
Tansley’s distaste for Wheeler’s comprehensive organism, which seemed to him so broad an 
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application of the term “organism” as to strip it of all meaning. His alternative proposal asked 
ecological science to address “the whole system,” gathering biome and inorganic environmental 
factors together in an “ecosystem,” the model that has more or less remained dominant in 
ecology since Tansley’s 1935 coinage. Systems theory also provided Tansley a criteria of 
assessment for a given ecosystem: “dynamic equilibrium,” which—though never quite perfect, 
owing to the fluctuations of its dynamism—can achieve a degree of perfection “measured by its 
stability” (227).33  
 The arrival of the ecosystem concept meant that “all ecological kinships thereafter had to 
be reworked in terms of energy relations” (Worster 302-03). Ecology took its place as “an 
adjunct of physical science” (302). Ecological relationships were redescribed as thermodynamic 
exchanges. Living systems could now be represented in a fully abstracted manner: 
 
                                                        
33Here we see that, in spite of their almost entirely incompatible agendas, organicists and New Ecologists arrive by 
different paths to synonymous criteria for ecologically successful biome/systems. The New Ecologist’s dynamic 
equilibrium, like the organicist’s values of “sociogenic . . . cooperation” (Wheeler 324), are simultaneously 
teleological and conservative: aimed at a perfect state of what Georges Canguilhem called “. . . life in the silence of 
the organs,” as the absence of organic noise (Normal 101). 
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Fig. 4.1: Eugene Odum’s “universal” model of ecological energy flow 
 
Here, in Eugene Odum’s “universal models of ecological energy flow” (“Energy Flow” 12), 
energy itself becomes the focal point; the organism (here, “B” for biomass) is literally black-
boxed, rendered a mere “component” (12) to the systems analyst’s eye—a conversion-
mechanism for the energy that, in its continual movement through the system, gives a living 
system the stability to make it observable as such (i.e. as a system).  
It was Raymond Lindeman’s influential “Trophic-Dynamic Aspect of Ecology” (1942) 
that completed the disciplinary edifice of New Ecology by allowing ecologists to track the 
“trophic-dynamic” metabolism of the whole system, accounting not only for the precise 
arrangement of organisms into discrete “trophic levels” according to their economic functions 
(producer, primary consumer, secondary consumer), but also for the expected ratio of heat- or 
energy-loss between each “level.” To the New Ecologists, who were committed to reducing 








Image can be found on page 
12 of Eugene P. Odum’s 
“Energy Flow in Ecosystems: 
A Historical Review.” 
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piece of the puzzle: if they could precisely account for the ratio of energy loss at each “trophic 
level” within the system, the entire ecosystem could be accurately mapped according to 
thermodynamic principles (Lindeman 167-91).  
All the while, these “[n]ew techniques for quantifying the flow and use of energy in the 
ecosystem gave [renewed] support to [an] older utilitarian and managerial ethic” (Worster 257). 
In other words, the theoretical development of an ecosystem tipped the scales of the pragmatic 
and ethical discourses (and concrete actions) that ecology, as a discipline, has always closely 
entailed, with its unusually direct and intimate connection between observation and action, 
objective description and pragmatic intervention. Ecological metaphors in particular “are more 
than casual or incidental; they express the dominant tendency in the scientific ecology of our 
time” (292). So, when Robert Usinger typified a river as an “assembly line,” or when limnologist 
Chancey Juday presents ecological data from Lake Mendota by writing an annual “energy 
budget” that tallies expenditures and “investments,” they participate in the dispositional overhaul 
of a discipline that it becomes ever more appropriate to call “bio-economics” (Worster 305).34 
This shift amounts to a redescription of basic ecological phenomena: cross-species 
interdependence begins to exist under the sign of “production and consumption” chains. And in 
this way, the values connoted by the economic supply-and-demand model are also internalized 
(Worster 292-93). Although bio-economics presaged a renewed interest in an older managerial 
ethic, then, the notion of what proper “management” entailed would shift to reflect economic 
values; what had been a custodial task becomes, under bio-economics, a directive to maximize 
                                                        
34My project, in its application of ecology’s bioeconomic management ethic to the cultural sphere, mirrors 
biopolitical discourse in some important ways, particularly in its attention to the specific problematics of aggregate 
life and criminality as a vital excess or margin, at the population scale, that calls for “management.” I have chosen to 
engage these questions through crime fiction and ecology in the hope that they provide some new (though no doubt 
complementary) disciplinary context to the biopolitical account. In his lectures, Foucault’s analysis of genetic 
human capital essentially renders biopolitics as the application of economics to biology (227-31); in 20th-century 
ecology, we are confronted with a disciplinary context where that application was, straightforwardly, taking place. 
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ecosystemic efficiency and minimize waste. This transformation of the managerial ethic 
ultimately transformed the emotional and ethical dimensions of the ecologist’s work in turn; as 
Worster puts it, “[t]o describe nature as an organism or a community suggested one kind of 
environmental behavior by man [but] to speak of it as but ‘a momentary stay against entropy’ 
suggested a wholly different behavior, and as good as removed it from the ethical realm 
altogether” (304). Tansley, Lindemann, and Odum, dedicated reductionists, were also 
mechanists; they were remarkably successful in removing all traces of organicism from the 
discipline’s vocabulary. By the 1960s, the thermodynamic ecosystem, accompanied by a bio-
economical image repertoire and managerial ethic, had virtually monopolized orthodox scientific 
thought within the discipline.35 
Digger and Ed are, as we have noted, adjudicators. Their job, on the ecosystemic view, is 
to monitor and manage. The hard-boiled, fatalist affect—the gambler’s attitude—serves as an 
inurement to the “chancy” thermodynamic universe of HBCF, in which causality has come to 
seem both tenuous and obscure. Dueling imperatives pull them in the direction of efficient, if 
jaded ecosystem management at one moment and towards moral outrage in the next, placing 
them in an impossible bind as black subjects instrumental to the maintenance of a white power 
structure. Nothing could stand in greater contrast to the New Organicist’s idealism than the 
pessimism of the hard boiled. Where the former’s ethic sees nature as providing aesthetic 
consolation and serving as an aspirational model for human community, Himes’s ecological 
                                                        
35Ironically, the consolidation of this bio-economic managerial ethic among professional ecologists coincided with 
an explosion of lay interest in conservation during what has become known as the Age of Ecology. Rachel Carson’s 
Silent Spring had been published in 1962, sparking massive and sustained popular interest. Concurrent to 
organicism’s scientific marginalization, the Age of Ecology marked a “resurgence in popular form of that ambition” 
to explore and appreciate the natural world in both its emergent, irreducible complexity and in its oneness (Worster 
332). A “biologically renovated” morality—having learned the lesson between the wars that its “human 
epiorganism” hypothesis was troublingly consonant with fascist rhetorics of self-sacrifice (329)—took root in a way 
that emphasized the interspecific diversity of natural communities and valorized an idea of the natural world as both 
irreducibly complex and irrepressibly creative. 
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imagination is overwhelmingly concerned with the opposite: his animalizations demean both 
man and beast by association, becoming a doubly effective vehicle for the expression of 
unpleasant social truths. On the other hand, nothing could be more laughable than the idea that 
Himes’s Harlem is “manageable.” Emergence “[makes] for unpredictable outcomes in nature. 
Put substances together under the right circumstances and there [is] no saying what would 
happen” (Worster 322). Is Himes’s Harlem a system or an emergent whole? Does the violence 
and crime of its streets more closely resemble the entropic margin of systemic “heat loss,” or is it 
more accurately understood as the unpredictable workings of life articulating itself on a larger 
order of magnitude?  
The series’ final four books bring these questions emphatically to the fore. Taken as a 
pair, The Heat’s On (1961) and Cotton Comes to Harlem (1964)—respectively, the sixth and 
seventh books in the series—describe a Harlem in which the ecosystemic intimations of the 
earlier novels have been made fully explicit. Heat and Cotton are no less suffused with the 
pejorative animal metaphors of the earlier books: “As long as there are jungles there’ll be 
rapacious animals” (99), Digger reminds us in Cotton, as if to re-commit to the bit. But the 
series’ consistency at the level of its figurative language belies a metanarrative arc bending 
towards systemic collapse. Man-as-animal thematics no longer carry the reader’s attention, at 
least not in the same straightforward way. Displaced or coopted by a series of descriptive 
gambits aimed at apprehending a system simultaneously heating up and coming apart, the 
grammar of animalization becomes if anything less subtle, less technically adept; human-animal 
comparisons veer towards blunt instrumentalization as sociopolitical indictment or anarchic, 
broad humor. 
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After the cool-down of All Shot Up, Himes’s follow-up novel The Heat’s On (1961) 
emphatically announces the series’ return to conditions of feverish swelter:  
Even at past two in the morning, ‘The Valley,’ that flat lowland of Harlem east of 
Seventh Avenue, was like the frying pan of hell. Heat was coming out of the pavement, 
bubbling from the asphalt; and the atmospheric pressure was pushing it back to earth like 
the lid on a pan. 
Colored people were cooking in their overcrowded, overpriced tenements; 
cooking in the streets, in the after-hours joints, in the brothels; seasoned with vice, 
disease and crime.  
   . . .  
It was too hot to sleep. Everyone was too evil to love. And it was too noisy to 
relax and dream of cool swimming holes and the bare shade of chinaberry trees. The 
night was filled with the blare of countless radios, the frenetic blasting of spasm cats 
playing in the streets, hysterical laughter, automobile horns, strident curses, loudmouthed 
arguments, the screams of knife fights.  
The bars were closed so they were drinking out of bottles. That was all there was 
left to do, drink strong bad whiskey and get hotter; and after that steal and fight. (343) 
 
Heat, here, is presented as a ubiquitous (and thus tautological) logic of cause and effect. It 
permeates The Valley, releasing an “effluvium of hot stinks” and provoking noise and violence 
(ibid)—which, in turn, produce, or are figured as, still more heat. Heat is “atmospheric” and 
inescapable, applied from above and below to interior and exterior alike.  
Its oppressiveness in this opening scene stands in for the central problematic of The 
Heat’s On: “heat” has become overdetermined. Himes’s Harlem is, from the first, a bioeconomic 
regime where money, drugs, sex, and bodies can all be freely exchanged. Like its idiomatic 
fellow-traveler, “action,” a great deal hinges upon “heat’s” referential flexibility to lubricate 
those transactions in the pages of Himes’s novels. Throughout the Domestics it synonymizes 
sexual desire; money; police scrutiny; jazz music (and black orality, by extension); and, of 
course, it tells the temperature. In its extreme semantic range, heat emblematizes Harlem’s 
ecosystemic self-understanding. It provides the medium of bioeconomic exchange while 
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simultaneously indexing the rapidity of churn within the system: the hotter it gets, the more the 
system speeds up, the more crime, death, and sex occur. 
 By The Heat’s On, heat has become so oppressive—semantically, as well as 
narratively—that it begins to indicate the very limits of meaning itself. When a pair of white 
cops mistake Digger and Ed for criminals, they are forgiving: “Hell, we ain’t blaming you . . . 
It’s the heat” (341). When the pair gives up the attempt to hypothesize the reason for a suspect’s 
odd behavior, the heat is again to blame: “‘Who knows? All this heat is affecting people’s 
minds’” (395). Heat scrambles Ed’s thoughts, too, which we are told “were jumping like ants 
frying on a red-hot stove” (442). Heat’s referential overdetermination pushes the ecosystemic 
milieu of Himes’s Harlem to the point of total descriptive interchangeability. 
Correspondingly, Heat and Cotton feature plots about crimes explicitly framed as 
structural threats to the Harlem community at large; now that it is being more emphatically 
articulated in crowd scenes and aerial views, the superorganism acquires antagonists that are 
more properly to scale. The Heat’s On follows Digger and Ed’s attempt to take down a heroin-
smuggling ring, while Cotton Comes to Harlem sets them in pursuit of $87,000 stolen from 87 
Harlem families through an elaborate, Marcus Garvey-esque “back to Africa” con. These setups 
require the detectives to tackle challenges to which their skill-sets are increasingly ill-suited; as 
Digger opines in Heat, “I’ll take a simple violent murderer any day” (376). In contrast to the 
individual crime of passion, the malignant effects of dope-peddling cascade through the entire 
community: “All the crimes committed by addicts—robberies, murders, rapes . . . All the fucked-
up lives . . . All the nice kids sent down the drain on a habit . . . that one lousy drug has murdered 
more people than Hitler” (375, 1st and 2nd ellipsis in original).36 Similarly, Cotton’s cat-and-
                                                        
36Ed’s follow-up to his partner in this passage further emphasizes the duo’s biomanagerial posture, as he re-codes 
Digger’s moral indignation in a language that their white superiors will better understand—economics—in an 
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mouse is threaded through with narrative ruminations on “those eighty-seven families who had 
sunk their savings on a dream of going back to Africa lay[ing] awake, worrying, wondering if 
they’d ever get their money back” (96). In these examples, the proverbial health of the social 
body is at odds with the safety of its constituents; an invocation of the collective good always 
serves to argue for greater leeway for Digger and Ed in the use of extralegal violence in their 
investigations. (In Heat, Digger’s righteous attitude is more than a little self-serving; he’s under 
official review for killing a drug peddler in the course of what was, by his standards, a routinely 
brutal interrogation.) More often than not, the indulgence is granted, in the name of pursuing the 
greater good.37 
The increasing focus on crowd scenes and other “emergent” apprehensions in these 
novels is no doubt related to their expanded ambit. As the detectives increasingly minister to 
Harlem itself in lieu of solving crimes perpetrated on individual citizens, their opinings become 
more explicitly sociological and their activities become community concerns. This appears to be 
the case when, in Heat, a foot pursuit becomes a kind of sporting event for the onlooking crowd:  
The thin agile youth ran in a high-stepping, light-footed, ground-eating sprint, 
ducking and dodging between the people pouring into the street.  
Sides were taken by the enthusiastic spectators.  
“Run, buster, run!” some shouted.  
“Catch ’im, daddy!” others echoed. 
. . .  
Two jokers jumped from a parked car at the corner of St. Nicholas Avenue and 
split in an effort to catch the fleeing youth. They didn’t have anything against him; they 
just wanted to join in the excitement (450).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
attempt to argue for more leeway in their use of force to more effectively fight a “half million dollars a kilo” threat 
(376). 
  
37This “extralegal” privilege is geographically bounded. Lt. Anderson warns his detectives that “‘Every precinct’s 
not like Harlem . . . You get away with tricks here that’ll kick back in any other precinct’” (Heat 347). In this sense, 
the HBCF overlapping worlds of metropolis and its underworld is substituted for a world where the detectives’ 
violence is openly acknowledged, but only when “in bounds”—another way in which bio-managerial parameters are 
inscribed more strongly in Himes’s work, through a logic of geographical quarantine. 
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In one sense, the lack of deliberate intent behind the jokers’ interference gestures to the 
possibility of emergent behavior that is always lurking in the crowd scenes of late Himes, even 
if, as here, those encounters dissipate without climax or conflict. The jokers’ reasons for giving 
chase are obscure to themselves, but contribute to the whole spectacle. In another sense, this 
comparatively innocuous crowd scene—more typical is the violent, “macabre ballet” of the race 
riot (Cotton 66) or the apocalyptic terrorism of Himes’s unfinished final book, Plan B—suggests 
a kind of anarchic humor, too. Amidst all the violence, crowds are paradoxically creative, even 
artistic spaces for Himes—conditions ripe for improvisation.  
As Harlem is increasingly “fleshed out” into an organic system, Himes turns to figures 
like this high-stepping youth—figures that, in counterpoint to Himes’s (also proliferating) views-
from-on-high, allow him to narrate the system by moving through it. His narrative eye attaches 
itself to characters or objects that can be vectors through the system, allowing them to vivisect 
the neighborhood in cross-section. One way he accomplishes this is by introducing MacGuffins. 
In an early chase scene from Cotton, an armored truck carrying the bale of cotton reportedly 
stuffed with the stolen money cuts a bloody swath through Harlem’s streets, killing a petty thief 
who stepped into the street at just the wrong time. In Heat, the MacGuffin is literally enfleshed: a 
particularly anarchic chase scene sees Digger, Ed, and the drug runners all engaged in a madcap 
race across Harlem after Sheba the runaway dog, who has escaped with a million dollars’ worth 
of uncut heroin in her belly. Sheba makes for an apt, if gruesome, thematic encapsulation of the 
metaphorical disembowelment visited upon black communities by drugs—because this is Himes, 
we are not to be spared “[t]he hot poisonous air inside of the room, stinking of blood, 
chloroform, and dog-gut” (356) when the crooked Sister Heavenly catches Sheba and cuts her 
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open.38 Like the tracer bullets that Digger and Ed use to literally ‘light up’ their foes, these fleshy 
vectors illuminate Harlem’s black skin by setting it on fire.39  
As the Domestics cast their descriptive eye ever outward, these vectors provide the 
narrative logic that strings these novels’ scenes together into a plot. However tenuously, they still 
deliver the HBCF genre experience. But by the series’ final published book, Blind Man with a 
Pistol (1969), all pretense of narrative satisfaction has been abandoned. Blind Man is named after 
its striking closing scene, which critics are quick to point out serves as an interpretive key to the 
entropic metanarrative of the entire series: a blind man with a pistol gets into an argument with a 
stranger on a public bus, shoots someone else entirely, and flees.40 It’s a tidy parable for a very 
untidy book, which provides another clue to its summative project in its regurgitated opening 
line: once more, it was “2am in Harlem, and it was hot” (15). Not just heat, but genre idiom, 
have become oppressive; in these opening lines, copied word for word from from The Heat’s On, 
we get an example in miniature of the way that the novel recycles the characteristic features of 
earlier installments in order to heighten or literalize what had heretofore been implicit. In Blind 
Man, the streets of Harlem are on the verge of race riot, and Digger and Ed find themselves 
impossibly tasked with the job of hunting down the nonexistent instigators that their white 
commanding officers are convinced exist. Political foment attracts con men and criminal 
opportunists of all types. The grotesque self-parody of the series’ sexual themes are in full 
                                                        
38Fleshy “heat” vectors abound: there is also, in Heat, the speed freak who has hidden a speedball in his pet rabbit’s 
rectum for safekeeping, such that getting high first involves “tapping the rabbit” (357). 
 
39Again following Canguilhem’s thesis that it is pathology that brings the organic body into focus, the detectives’ 
tracer bullets—like the radioactive trophic tracers that Odum used to map ecosystemic circuits—map the aggregate 
body by introducing a kind of poison to it. Violence often serves this revelatory function in Himes, to the extent that 
it is the tool of first resort for the detectives when their investigations run cold.  
 
40For particularly adept examples of this critical focus, see Margaret Hunt Gram’s “Chester Himes and the 
Capacities of State” and Thomas Heise’s “Harlem is Burning: Urban Rioting and the ‘Black Underclass’ in Chester 
Himes’s Blind Man With a Pistol.” 
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flower. Tumescent life theorizes itself into explicit plot contrivance in the figure of politician and 
conman Dr. Mubuta, who is peddling a bunk sexual potency serum while preaching the 
ecosystemically militant gospel of Black Jesus:  
Now we’re gonna feed [the white man] the flesh of the Black Jesus. I don’t have to tell 
you the flesh of Jesus is indigestible . . . the flesh of the Black Jesus is even more 
indigestible. Everybody knows that black meat is harder to digest than white meat. And 
that, brothers, IS OUR SECRET WEAPON!” he shouted with a spray of spit. “That is how 
we’re going to fight whitey and beat him at last. We’re gonna keep feeding him the flesh 
of the Black Jesus until he perish of constipation if he don’t choke to death first.” (77-78) 
 
Indigestion is the appropriate leitmotif of a book that is no longer formally capable of digesting 
Black experience, either. Italicized “interludes” begin to perforate the main text of the novel. 
Where even the increasingly tenuous narrative hold over the anarchic comedy of Cotton and 
Heat continued to stitch Harlem together with the narrative devices of its bloody vectors, in 
Blind Man, we arrive at last at complete nonsequitur.  
At first, these undigested interludes appear to serve a documentary function, allowing 
paratext into the story as a way of enhancing its realism with “found” textual fragments and 
overheard snippets of street-level conversation. But that distinction quickly proves false. As the 
novel progresses, an increasing number of these undigested text-fragments actually appear to be 
scenes from Digger and Ed’s ongoing, fruitless investigations—the closest thing to a plot that the 
novel displays. By the end of the novel, procedural HBCF narrative and blighted urban 
environment—the presumptive “text” studded with “found” documentary paratexts—have 
swapped places: it is now the detective procedural that is fragmentary and the sociological 
panorama that has come to anchor the book proper, supplying its longest descriptive scenes: 
orgiastic meditations on Harlem’s flesh, now divorced of a sufficient narrative rationale for 
observing it.  
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Accordingly, Digger and Ed are sidelined. During the novel’s largest set piece—when an 
anti-segregation march collides with a cavorting band of Black Jesus worshippers—Digger and 
Ed are reduced to nameless bystanders: “[t]wo big black men who looked as though they should 
have been with the Black Panther marchers, instead sat watching them” (102). Unable to deliver 
culprits to their supervisors, they frustratedly throw out the names of those responsible: 
“Lincoln,” “A blind man with a pistol,” and other answers that “don’t make any sense” (134, 
191), until, fed up, they make their frustrations clear: 
“I take it you know who started the riot.”  
 “Some folks call him by one name, some another,” Coffin Ed said.  
 “Some call him lack of respect for law and order, some lack of opportunity, some 
the teachings of the Bible, some the sins of their fathers,” Grave Digger expounded. 
“Some call him ignorance, some poverty, some rebellion. Me and Ed look at him with 
compassion. We’re victims.”  
 “Victims of what?” Anderson asked foolishly. 
 “Victims of your skin,” Coffin Ed shouted brutally, his own patchwork of grafted 
black skin twitching with passion. 
 Anderson’s skin turned blood red (153-54).  
 
The detectives see what Lt. Anderson can’t, or won’t: hard-boiled forensics have no purchase on 
systemic problems, which don’t offer up villains to kill or to jail. At the individual scale where 
the HBCF detective naturally operates, the emergent “mob” actions and population-scale 
upheavals are unpredictable and impossible to adjudicate. By bringing his detectives to the 
emergent threshold, Himes has led his detectives the detective genre’s next epistemological 
declension: where HBCF replaced the exacting logic of CBF with a more pessimistic, 
probabilistic determinism, Harlem’s ecosystemic logic—a “life of absurdity”—has interrupted 
causal logic to the extent that even HBCF forensics no longer produce results. 
 In Blind Man’s final scene, left with no skulls to crack, Digger and Ed effect a 
compensatory scale-shift of their own, one that demonstrates just how superfluous they have 
become:  
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Grave Digger and Coffin Ed stood in the street, shooting the big gray rats that ran from 
the condemned buildings with their big long-barreled, nickel-plated .38 caliber pistols on 
.44-caliber frames. Every time the steel demolition ball crashed against a rotten wall, one 
or more rats ran into the street indignantly, looking more resentful than the evicted 
people.  
 Not only rats but startled droves of bedbugs stampeded over the ruins and fat 
black cockroaches committed suicide by jumping from high windows.  
 They had an audience of rough-looking jokers from the corner bar who delighted 
in hearing the big pistols go off.  
 One rugged stud warned jokingly, “Don’t shoot no cats by mistake.”  
 “Cats are too small,” Coffin Ed replied. “These rats look more like wolves.”  
 “I mean two-legged cats.” 
 At that moment a big rat came out from underneath a falling wall, and pawed the 
sidewalk, snorting. 
 “Hey! Hey! Rat!” Coffin Ed called like a toreador trying to get the attention of his 
bull. 
 The soul brothers watched in silence.  
 Suddenly the rat looked up through the murderous red eyes and Coffin Ed shot it 
through the center of its forehead. The big brass-jacketed .38 bullet knocked the rat’s 
body out of its fur.  
 “Olé!” the soul brothers cried (188-89). 
 
In a farce on the fragile masculinity that produced HBCF itself, Digger and Ed recreate 
their own aerial view, looming over the anthropomorphized, “tenant-dwelling” rats 
before blasting them “out of their fur.” Their legendary nickel-plated pistols, celebrated 
as mythic in stature across the series, reduced to pest control; the series’ incisive 
animalizing rhetoric reduced to a lame cat pun—the HBCF protagonists are reduced to 
petty ecological tyrants, exercising their will on the stubborn, but utterly outmatched, 
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